FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QVARTERLY REVIEW

JANVARY

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
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, Governor of New York; Coördinator of Inter-American Affairs, 1940–44; Assistant Secretary of State, 1944–45; Chairman, International Development Advisory Board, 1950–51; Special Assistant to the President, 1954–55 * * * *ALBERT WOHLSTETTER,* University Professor at the University of Chicago; his article is based on a paper given recently at the Elsinore Conference on Military Technology in the 1970s, under the auspices of the Institute of Strategic Studies * * * *ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI,* Professor of Government at Columbia University and Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs; member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, 1966–67 * * * *JOHN DIEBOLD,* President of the Diebold Group, Inc., management consultants; member of the Secretary of State's Advisory Group for Developing a Foreign Affairs Programming System * * * *ADAM MALIK,* Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1966; Minister of Trade, 1963–66; Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1959–63 * * * *CHARLES W. YOST,* Senior Fellow on the permanent staff of the Council on Foreign Relations; Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, 1961–66; former Ambassador to Laos, to Syria and to Morocco; author of "The Age of Triumph and Frustration" and "The Insecurity of Nations" (in press) * * * *BERNARD LEWIS,* Professor of History of the Near and Middle East, University of London, since 1949; Visiting Professor of History, University of California, 1955–56; author of "The Arabs in History," "The Emergence of Modern Turkey," "The Middle East and the West," and co-editor of "The Encyclopedia of Islam" * * * *DON PERETZ,* Director, Southwest Asian and North African Program, State University of New York at Binghamton; author of "Israel and the Palestine Arabs," "The Middle East Today" and other works * * * *VU VAN THAI,* Ambassador of Viet Nam to the United States, 1965–67; Director General of the Budget and Foreign Aid, 1957–61; Adviser, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations, 1964–65 * * * *STANLEY HOFFMANN,* Professor of Government, Harvard University; author of "Contemporary Theory in International Relations," "The State of War" and a forthcoming book for the Council on Foreign Relations, "Gulliver's Troubles or the Setting of American Foreign Policy" * * * *JERZY LUKASZEWSKI,* Professor and Director of Studies in Political Science, College of Europe, Bruges; formerly member of Special Research and Reports Division of the International Labor Office, Geneva * * * *J. L. S. GIRLING,* Senior Research Fellow, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra; formerly on the research staff of the Foreign Office, London, and on the staff of SEATO in Bangkok.

The articles in FOREIGN AFFAIRS *do not represent any consensus of beliefs. We do not expect that readers of the review will sympathize with all the sentiments they find there, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others; but we hold that while keeping clear of mere vagaries* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *can do more to guide American public opinion by a broad hospitality to divergent ideas than it can by identifying itself with one school. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear there.* The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 46 JANUARY 1968 No. 2

POLICY AND THE PEOPLE

By Nelson A. Rockefeller

AMIDST the rapid and often bewildering change that characterizes our age, advocates of extreme solutions seem to be gaining ground everywhere. Lawlessness in the cities, the restlessness of a good part of the younger generation—especially those in college—and an inconclusive war cause a growing disquiet.

We live in an age of revolutionary transformation. We can seek to shape it or we can doom ourselves to irrelevance. We can accept the challenge to our creativity or we can resign ourselves to ineffectual bitterness. We can lose ourselves in passionate and paralyzing controversy over technical aspects of individual problems, or we can, as I deeply believe we must, develop a more creative perspective—one which enables us to see the inner relationship of great issues and the larger framework within which they can be solved.

A characteristic of a revolutionary period is that it appears to its contemporaries as a series of unrelated crises. What has seemed an obvious course of action in one decade becomes problematic in another. Familiar concepts for dealing with our problems become detached from present reality. This is a particular difficulty in a society like ours which historically has dealt with its challenges "pragmatically"—that is, on the basis of values and concepts accepted as too obvious to require explicit formulation. Such an attitude is effective in dealing with technical problems, but increases the difficulty where human considerations are involved—whether in changes of social structure or in our foreign relations. In the absence of a guiding philosophy, the tendency is to await developments. This attitude can make it difficult even to agree on the nature of a problem, much less on its solution. Thus the

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analysis of a technical issue takes precedence over purpose, which alone can make remedies relevant. More energy is expended on deciding where we are than where we should be going. While a crisis may remove any doubt about the existence of a problem, it also curtails the scope for productive action.

A constant problem in government is to establish a balance between creativity and knowledge. When the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base it is at a minimum. When "all the facts are in," the chance for imaginative action has often disappeared. This is why I believe that the test of a leader is whether he is willing to act on the basis of assessments which cannot be "proved" empirically when they are made.

In a democracy this can happen effectively only if leaders have the convictions and the faith to act when the tactical pros and cons seem fairly evenly balanced and only if there exists a constant dialogue between leaders and the public. My own experience has convinced me that, all too often, problems are tackled when it is too late. The art of government consists of identifying emerging problems in time, of understanding the forces that shape them, of confronting these problems with a clear sense of purpose, and achieving consensus on a plan of action drawn to an adequate scale and made relevant to the citizen.

A worrisome aspect of the present period seems to me to be the growing frustration of the public in the face of rapid change over which they feel they do not have much control. Too often the result is a feeling of not being a part of the political process. It may take the form of a sense of impotence in the face of problems believed to be beyond the ken of the average citizen, or of a distrust of all government, or of both simultaneously. If this trend continues we will lose the mainspring of our traditional vitality.

A democracy cannot afford "drop-outs" from the process of government. We must develop fresh premises that will demonstrate how our ideals remain relevant to the realities that confront the citizen. In the midst of perplexing technical problems, our deepest challenge is increasingly philosophical.

II

Industrialization and the specialization of functions inseparable from it, coupled with the growth of governmental bureaucracy and power, jeopardize the relationship of the individual to his work and of the citizen to his government. Democratic values

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developed in essentially agricultural or commercial societies. In no country did democracy develop as a result of industrialization. (Germany and Japan adopted democratic forms only after catastrophic military defeats.) An industrial economy depends on values like predictability and efficiency, which may call forth a sort of "constitutionalism"—a set of commonly accepted rules. Unfortunately, the values are not necessarily "democratic values" as the term is commonly understood in the West. In other words, democracy is not the result of a quest for efficiency and a higher standard of living but of other values that are deeper. These include the Judaeo-Christian tradition of the worth and dignity of the individual, the historical evolution in the West of autonomous Church and State hierarchies, the belief in a standard of justice which transcends the power to coerce, and faith in human creativity as a basis for progress.

Industrialization leads to two somewhat contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, it provides the means to realize the economic and social aspirations of the people more fully and the possibility of their participating more broadly in government. On the other hand, material progress by itself only exposes the need for a deeper purpose to life. If prosperity becomes an end in itself, it may well produce a growing alienation of the citizen from the body politic.

It is our tradition and conviction as a nation that the individual is to be protected from any undue accumulation of power. This purpose underlies the separation of powers in government, the divorce of Church and State, the civilian control of the military, and the labor and antitrust laws directed against the abuse of economic power. In the nineteenth century, it was believed that freedom depended on limiting the role of government. But in the 1930s, the threat to freedom seemed to come from the predominance of economic over human considerations. Sweeping legislation was enacted to help the economically deprived and to ensure that no citizen would become the victim of all-powerful economic forces. Now our generation is in the process of learning that some problems cannot be solved by legislation alone. The plight of the cities, for example, is in considerable part a problem of social relationships. Many of today's urban minority families have been uprooted from a simple rural environment and now find themselves thrust into a situation for which they were completely unprepared and which supports them neither economically nor

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emotionally. The key issue of race is not merely to legislate equality of opportunity; this is in many respects the easiest aspect. Nor is the solution limited to such necessities as jobs, housing and education. Beyond all these, it must be possible for minority groups to gain a sense of belonging.

Industrialization coupled with increased concern for social welfare has produced what Daniel Bell has called the "communal society." One of its characteristics is the interdependence of people; another is that more and more actions are undertaken through group or communal instruments rather than through individual initiative. The requirement to specialize, moreover, has deprived the average individual of a sense of "visible product," reducing the feelings of independence and pride of accomplishment enjoyed by the artisan or farmer of former times.

The growth of this kind of society accounts for much of the current unease and discontent. In the nineteenth century, when the role of government was relatively small and issues were comparatively simple, many voters took part in politics as members of groups with clearly defined and competing economic interests. The conflict between such groups—farmers vs. merchants, South vs. North, planters vs. capitalists, labor vs. employers—was an important factor in the evolution of political parties. Although the clash of economic interests was exaggerated by some historians, it shaped the American political process in important respects. In the 1930s, many intellectuals held that the U.S. economy had "matured" with the settlement of the frontiers and that progress for any group within the economy could be made only at the expense of another group. Genuine concern arose as to whether democratic political institutions could survive the competing claims of economic interest groups.

In today's relatively prosperous society, the nature of the conflict has changed. The conflict of economic interest groups has diminished with the rise of the role of government and with the general recognition that legitimate economic claims of all groups can eventually be satisfied by a growing economy based on the seemingly limitless resources of science. Moreover, many of the issues represented by special interest groups are no longer a subject of serious argument. The view that society should help the less fortunate and the underprivileged is no longer urged in traditional pressure-group terms. The widely accepted need for more education and better health, for rebuilding our cities and modern-

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izing our transportation systems, for purifying our air and water, is seen to be required for political, social, moral or aesthetic reasons rather than because of economic claims put forth by groups with competing interests.

Massive social programs have been launched to meet these goals. Their impact on all levels of government in our federal system has been staggering, vastly complicating the relationships between local, state and federal government. The power of the executive has grown in relation to other branches of government. This has resulted not only from the growth in the size of government, but also from the increasingly technical nature of knowledge, the complex nature of issues and the multiplicity of goals, many of them in conflict with each other.

The increased role of technical decision-making at all levels of government has had the effect of institutionalizing certain crucial controls and directive functions in the executive branch, and this has added new dimension and power to the bureaucracy. Foreshadowed in the 1930s by the growth of regulatory agencies exercising quasi-legislative and judicial functions, the bureaucracy has grown in direct proportion to the technical complexity of issues. When bureaucracy becomes too unwieldy and unresponsive to change, more energies are expended in managing the administrative machine than in defining its purpose. Success comes to consist of moving the bureaucracy to the point of decision—almost irrespective of content. A gap opens between the technical knowledge of bureaucracy and the leadership's capacity to absorb technical information and to transmit it to the public.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that more and more voters feel frustrated. Political parties, traditionally the strongest links between the electorate and the government, are losing their hold. The proportion of voters unaffiliated to either party is increasing, and indications are that those who are affiliated tend to cross party lines more and more often.

All of this gives contemporary politics its particular cast. In the nineteenth century, campaigns at least concerned issues, if not principles. Today the cult of the uncommitted voter too often turns political contests into a competition for the middle ground, making it hard sometimes to distinguish between contenders. The issue of a campaign often turns on "personality." In their attempt to draw in voters from the entire spectrum of opinion, parties tend to repeat within themselves the divisions in the

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society at large, with the result that internal party strife is sometimes more bitter than the contest between the parties.

The dangers of this tendency have been pointed out by Daniel Boorstin, who has noted the decline of the heroic leader and the rise of the "star" leader in the political process. He attributes this change in the character of political and other heroes to the increasing use of the "human pseudo-event"—an "event" staged by an individual, his press agent or the news media to create a desirable image. The need for images, he adds, stems from the lack of a clearly stated philosophy, which in turn results in uncertainty concerning our ideals. Our national politics has thus become "a competition for images or between images, rather than between ideals."[1]

The result is a sense of insecurity and a distrust of all politics. Having been taught classical democratic theory in school, the citizen knows he is expected to vote and is taught to believe his vote is important. Often, however, he finds it difficult if not impossible to become informed on the issues and, most importantly, he does not know how to make his disagreement effective. He comes to believe his vote has little influence in the decision-making process.

To a considerable extent, the growth in government and the increase in specialization are irreversible. Nostalgia for a simpler age will not help matters. What is at issue is nothing less than whether life can be given meaning—as I deeply believe it can —in an environment which sometimes seems to dwarf the individual. The contemporary uneasiness—especially of our young generation—reflects rebellion against the emptiness of a life which knows only "practical" problems and material goods and seems to lack a deeper purpose.

I have learned in New York State that people are willing to make whatever effort is necessary to resolve a problem if they understand its relationship to our purposes as a society. For example, when public opinion was said to favor retrenchment, the voters of New York State approved by a wide margin a $2.5 billion bond issue for a new and comprehensive approach to transportation—an important key to the solution of fundamental economic and social problems in the state. Previously they had voted four-to-one in favor of a $1 billion pure-waters bond issue

[1] Daniel Boorstin, "The Image: Or What Happened to the American Dream." New York: Atheneum, 1962, p. 249.

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to end pollution of our rivers, lakes and ocean fronts, and so restore them to the full use of our society. In both cases, there was protracted and intensive dialogue between the government and the people, in which organized citizen action played a vital role.

Great accomplishments require inspiration as well as technique. The challenge to our democracy is whether we can establish a framework of purpose and concepts which will enable us to see in the day-to-day difficulties the raw material for a renewed creative action. I am profoundly convinced that this is possible.

III

The conduct of foreign policy vividly illustrates how contemporary problems test the democratic process. Here we see the need to establish a larger framework of objectives, purpose and concept if we are to act constructively. In an article in the inaugural issue of this journal forty-five years ago, Elihu Root wrote:

> The demand for open diplomacy and contemporaneous public information . . . rests upon the substantial basis of democratic instinct for unhampered self-government. . . . The usefulness of this new departure is subject to one inevitable condition. That is, that the democracy which is undertaking to direct the business of diplomacy shall learn the business. The controlling democracy must acquire a knowledge of the fundamental and essential facts and principles upon which the relations of nations depend. . . . The world will be the gainer by the change, for, while there is no human way to prevent a king from having a bad heart, there is a human way to prevent a people from having an erroneous opinion.[2]

Since then, the formulation of foreign policy and the business of learning about foreign policy have become even more complex and the penalties for error potentially much graver. Elihu Root wrote in the twilight of a period of international order centering on Europe—an order which had regulated relations among nations throughout the nineteenth century and in the beginning of the twentieth century. The First World War shook this system and the Second World War completed its destruction. The European powers have declined relatively in power and influence; the United States and the Soviet Union have become the strongest nations, while new nations have come into being in every continent. International relations have become truly global—a process which has been accelerated by the rapidity of travel and the speed of communication. Two things have been lacking: a new

[2] Elihu Root, "A Requisite for the Success of Popular Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, v. I. n. 1.

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concept of relations between nations and a framework of order in which the aspirations of humanity can be peacefully realized and in which nearly sixty new nations can find their places. To complicate matters further, the sense of security has been shaken by East-West ideological conflicts and by new weapons of unprecedented destructiveness. Our age lacks safety, structure and international consensus.

In the light of these concerns, it is especially hard to define the basis of our physical security. Our concepts of a threat to security are geared to traditional notions of territorial expansion; thus our doctrine tells us to resist physical aggression across existing national borders. But we have had to learn that much more fundamental changes in power relationships can occur *within* the frontiers of a sovereign state, either through domestic upheavals, sometimes inspired and supported from outside, or through technological change, such as the development of nuclear weapons by Communist China.

Moreover, the incomparable risks created by the new technology impose a special burden on both decision-makers and individual citizens. Never before have major protagonists had to fear almost instantaneous and simultaneous destruction. With new weapons, a strategy becomes almost entirely dependent on theoretical calculations and psychological criteria. Never has so much hung on weapons for which there exists so little operational experience. At the same time, judgment of the interaction of complicated weapons systems is largely psychological. In a policy of deterrence, what matters above all is the opponent's state of mind. For purposes of deterrence, a threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful than a serious threat interpreted as a bluff.

Perhaps nowhere is the gap between substantive knowledge and the operation of the democratic process so complicated as in the field of defense. The issues are highly technical; experts with years of experience disagree among themselves, often violently. Congressional committees have difficulty in acquiring comprehensive knowledge as to the interrelationship of technical, strategic and policy issues involved; their resulting frustration often strains executive-legislative relationships. For the average citizen, the task may seem almost insurmountable. Yet his very existence may quite literally depend on decisions about our strategic posture. Confronted with this dilemma, he may become cynical or

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fall prey to demagogic appeals. It is the task of leadership to encourage thoughtful discussion and to make certain that the public understands the fundamental—essentially non-technical—considerations on which our strategic posture depends.

Meanwhile, the world has become fragmented as never before. In the nineteenth century, the emergence of two new states—Italy and Germany—disturbed the equilibrium for decades. In the twentieth century, the development and aggressive spread of communist ideology and the appearance of scores of new states were bound to be accompanied by turmoil. The unrest has been intensified because the domestic instability of many new states tempts outside forces to exploit their internal weaknesses and encourages their own leaders to use foreign dangers to strengthen their hold on a shaky domestic position.

Three characteristics of our age—a basic sense of insecurity, the lack of a political structure and the absence of consensus as to objectives—mark it as a period of transition in international relations. So long as there is no agreement on objectives, the temptation is great to deal with issues one by one. There is a tendency to break up problems into their constituent elements and to assign each to be dealt with by experts in that area.

Such an approach means we deal with symptoms. Debate is polarized between those who see every upheaval as caused by the deliberate design of evil men and others who, in our age of intercontinental missiles and instantaneous communication, question whether we have any national interest beyond our shores. In the face of such complexities, and lacking unifying concepts and long-range objectives, many leaders are tempted to invoke their assumedly superior information rather than resort to patient explanation. And critics who demand perfection forget that, while great objectives are essential, they can be reached only if one is prepared to advance by measured steps. Some rely for help on what are thought to be the automatic processes of history: the "inevitable" amelioration of dictatorships or the "automatic" association of humane governmental systems with economic development. But history will not do our work for us. Whether totalitarian systems can be brought to a more accommodating posture depends at least in part on whether there are penalties for bad faith and bad behavior. And the history of this century should have demonstrated that economic progress, if not leavened by humane values, may only refine the tools of slavery.

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Nazism did not develop, after all, in an economically backward society.

The sense of impotence—of being unable to affect events—is even more acute in facing problems of foreign policy than in domestic policy. Yet the challenge is relatively straightforward. The crucial fact is that we have not developed an effective political structure to bring about peaceful change. The upheaval in the world will subside only with the emergence of a more or less generally accepted international system. Until then, all nations will live with the consciousness of danger, and until then military power will remain essential to national security.

At the same time, one must recognize that security cannot be achieved by power alone, for this would be the road to empire if not to cataclysm. The goal is order, but order is not created simply by moral affirmation. In world affairs there are few "final" solutions; foreign policy has no terminal point. Each successful settlement establishes a new set of relationships, with their own complexities and potentials for friction. And though we cannot create order by ourselves, it surely cannot come about without us.

IV

The deepest problem before America, then, is moral or psychological. Since much of the current uneasiness reflects a search less for solutions than for meaning, remedies depend for their effectiveness on the philosophy or values which inspire them. The student unrest is impressive, not because some of it is fomented by agitators, but because it includes some of the most idealistic elements of our youth. In fact, much that disquiets us today gives cause for hope, for it reflects not cynicism but disappointed idealism.

Decades of "debunking" and materialism have left the young generation without adequate moral support in face of the challenges of a revolutionary age. Leaders at all levels are seen to have been asking not too much of our people but too little. The contemporary discontent proves among other things that man cannot live by economics alone; he needs quality and purpose in addition to material well-being; he needs significance and meaning beyond physical comfort. The quality and success of the Peace Corps can be explained on no other ground. The spirit of idealism which it has fostered should—and can—animate our actions in meeting a wide range of challenges.

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A democracy, to be vital, must be able to mobilize the moral energies of its people. If government at any level should consistently take the attitude that "Father knows best," those moral energies will be sapped at the base. If, on the other hand, protest confines itself to striking poses, it, too, will be doomed to sterility. The dialogue we need is one geared to a conceptual approach to the problems at home and abroad, not to individual "solutions" based on the illusion that we can escape problems by fragmenting them.

Over the years our society must cherish the pluralism, the centers of initiative, that made America so great. We must give thought to the effort to decentralize initiative. Within the framework of our federal system we must encourage all private organizations, supported by a sense of responsibility on the part of private citizens, which can provide the building blocks to make that effort succeed. Such institutions, and others which are governmental in character, can play a vital part in our conscious strategy to revive the belief of the average American that his opinion matters.

The stakes could hardly be higher. In previous centuries, a part of mankind might languish while another advanced. In a world which is indivisible, a failure to deal with our own problems could spread disintegration worldwide.

For a people grown great in the experience of the frontier, the twin challenges of humanizing a technocratic bureaucracy and helping the world find a modern structure offer an adventurous opportunity. This is an exciting age. The current uneasiness exists because people care—and yet do not see the way to make their aspirations come true. The task is to prove that their aspirations are relevant and attainable. This cannot be the responsibility of the President alone; it is the responsibility of all public officials, of leaders in all walks of life—indeed, of all of us.

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ILLUSIONS OF DISTANCE

By Albert Wohlstetter

FOR twenty-five years, in a good many remote odd spots in the world, the United States has been locked in battle; or has been seconding some distant and sometimes dubious friend; or trying, by promising help, to deter the start of the trouble altogether. With so many and such far-flung commitments and no sign of letup, it is only natural that there should be a lively debate about their number and extent and how they fit our capabilities. The frustrations of these 25 years of engagements in remote wars, and not only the present long-drawn-out and uncertain struggle in Viet Nam, encourage a new isolationism.

The new isolationism differs in many ways from the old. It often fits the desire to turn over to the United Nations problems that we have dealt with mainly on a national basis—all of foreign economic aid, for example, and all or most of the problem of resisting local aggressions against allies or friends. However, the radical nationalism of the old isolationists had itself a good deal in common with the wishful sort of internationalism: both were ways to avoid the uncertainties and strains of dealing with a great many diverse and partially hostile political entities.

Today, sentiment favoring a withdrawal from international to domestic concerns may be based simply on fatigue; or on the familiar but unanalyzed feeling that very distant troubles are remote not simply in miles but in their likelihood of having any effect on us. But aside from a sense that distant troubles are irrelevant, there are more substantial beliefs. One belief (very influential, though usually inexplicit) holds that "the effectiveness of the power radiated from any national center decreases in proportion to the distance involved."[1] As a result, areas near the borders of a great power are dominated by that power. In these spheres ("spheres of influence" have figured prominently if rather ambiguously in recent Senate Hearings), a great power can forcibly exclude distant great challengers. The result is, then, a balance which it is futile to try to upset; and unwise: its

[1] These are George Kennan's words. "Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin." Boston: Little Brown, 1962, p. 261. *Cf.* Nicholas John Spykman's statement that "power is effective in inverse ratio from its source," in "America's Strategy in World Politics." New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942, p. 448. The term "neo-isolationist" is also Kennan's and he applies it to himself. Like him, I do not take it as a term of abuse.

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persistence is a guardian of vital U.S. as well as opposing national interests.

The involvement of the United States in land war in Asia in particular is said to be unthinkable; and today this stricture against land war in Asia is accompanied by references to the limitations suffered by any "air and naval power" in opposing a "land power;" and it has been bolstered with much reverent or at any rate unquestioning citation of military authorities like General MacArthur by a good many people not accustomed to such piety. Because the United States, we are told, is a naval power, a kind of whale, or a naval and air power, apparently a sort of flying whale, it would seem it cannot project its strength on the land mass of Asia. In any dispute with a continental power, an "elephant" like China, the only hope for us lies in some negotiated settlement.

Such sweeping injunctions against distant ground wars are voiced not only by doves but by such accredited hawks as Mr. Goldwater. In fact, they fit the views of those whose impatience expresses itself by a desire to get matters over with quickly by bombing rather better than they fit the views of those who are skeptical of exclusive reliance on bombing but hope to reach a quick settlement by negotiations. For the stated limitations of air and sea power would affect both the agreements reached and the application of any sanctions against their possible violation. If it were really true that there were no alternative to negotiation of conflicts in Asia, then the negotiation would not be worth much. It would not represent a bilateral exchange leading to a stable resolution but a unilateral measure at the mercy of the Asian land power. Theories that strength weakens sharply with distance and that air and naval power can do little to affect remote land powers fit the old isolationism a little less awkwardly than the new.

In any case the theory that military strength declines in a straight line with distance has never been correct. Logistics support by water has in general been cheaper and easier than over land. References in earlier geopolitical writing to continental land masses, islands and the like, have been in fact a crude means of suggesting some of the differences then current between the logistics of land and water combat. In discussing geography, geopoliticians at best have been talking about the technologies of communications or transport or weapons range. Maxims so de-

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rived, however, are not eternal. These technologies have been changing at a rapid clip.

None the less, the agonies of Viet Nam have revived some rather old-fashioned geopolitics. Whatever one's view of Viet Nam (and I have substantial differences with U.S. policy there), the isolationism it has encouraged receives no adequate support from such theories. Distance bears no simple relation either to interests or military strength. In the case of nuclear relations, the defects of the old geopolitical treatment of distance are striking. However, its defects for describing variations in non-nuclear military strength with distance are also crucial.

It was rather common until recently to talk of the comparative disadvantage to the United States in fighting eight or ten thousand miles from home against an adversary whose home base is near the scene of conflict. While these dramatic long-haul distances catch the headlines, neither in current nor in past technology do they determine the matter of comparative disadvantage. This has been documented in detailed studies of the comparative logistics at present levels of technology in several areas of possible non-nuclear conflict—in Thailand, in the Himalayas, in Iran and in Lebanon—and in the actual conflict in Korea.[2]

The most striking fact displayed by these studies is that the capacity for long-distance lift of the major powers massively exceeds that for short-distance lift inside the theater, especially in the very short ranges in which the battle would be joined. These bottlenecks inside the theater are largely determined by local factors: climate, terrain, harbors, port unloading facilities, railroads and roads, etc. They are not a function of the long-haul distances. The specific local circumstances and opportunities to change them may favor the combatant that starts from far off or the one that starts from nearby. On the Thai-Laos border the United States can lift, from 8,500 miles away, four times as much as China can from 450 miles away. Various potential combat areas in Iran would show a logistic stand-off between the neighboring Soviet Union and the United States. In the Himalayas, support for Chinese and for opposing forces would be measured

[2] For more detail on these studies, see Albert Wohlstetter and Richard Rainey, "Distant Wars and Far Out Estimates," monograph presented at the American Political Science Association meeting, New York, September 1966. *Cf.* also Albert Wohlstetter, "Theory and Opposed Systems Design," to be published in "New Approaches to International Relations," edited by Morton Kaplan. In this connection we are indebted to the work of Mary Anderson, Wallace Higgins, L. P. Holliday, Norman Jones and John Summerfield.

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in tons per day: the 200,000 tons per day the United States might deliver over the long haul from U.S. ports to Calcutta are not the critical matter.

The figures above describe the rate at which supply can be lifted steadily after the initial build-up. If one looks at rates of deployment and build-up where stocks are accumulated in advance in a potential trouble area, the conclusions are not altered. Moreover, if one looks at the matter in terms of cost, as distinct from capacity, the minor importance of the long haul appears even more vividly. Adding several thousand miles to the distance at which remote wars are fought increases the total cost of fighting by only a very tiny percentage. It appears, for example, that if the support of U.S. forces in Korea had been 2,000 miles further away, it would have meant adding less than three-tenths of a percent to the total annual cost of the war.

The studies cited deal with recent past technology. The technology of the 1970s will decrease military communication and transport costs further, but especially long-distance costs. Larger payload transport both on the surface and in the air will greatly reduce costs per ton-mile. Fast cargo ships might (Congress and the established shipbuilders being willing) combine with the planned massive increase in air cargo capacity to offer more efficient mixtures of pre-stockage and rapid deployment of men and material for the initial build-up. The C-5A will be operational in large numbers in the 1970s; it will have a ton-mile cost one-tenth that of the DC-3 and will carry $2\frac{1}{2}$ times the payload of the largest jet now flying.

Synchronous communications satellites make the point even more clearly than improved transport.[3] It has long been true in telephony, for example, that a very large part of the costs of long-distance service is traceable to such elements as local switching, operator charges and local lines. Communications satellites make the distance between transmitting and ground stations unimportant so long as both are within line of sight of the satellite, whereas undersea cables vary in cost directly with length. Satellites spanning the Atlantic and Pacific will greatly increase the capacity and reduce the costs of sending messages to far-off and isolated locations, and so will make possible a much more de-

[3] See Leland Johnson's "Some Implications of New Communications Technologies for National Security in the 1970s," presented at the ninth annual conference of the Institute for Strategic Studies, September 29, 1967.

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tailed and centralized control of classical wars in distant theaters.

If future technology reduces further the difference between fighting a war close by or far off, it can do this not just for the United States, of course, but for other nations as well. This is only one reason that technical developments should not fortify any illusion of omnipotence. We may contest some sorts of war badly almost anywhere, in particular revolutionary wars where recently improved weapons technologies seem to me largely irrelevant (though no more so in Viet Nam than they might be in Colombia or even in Cuba). Military strength is frequently a very poor and self-defeating way of protecting or fulfilling interests. This applies to military strength used nearby as well as military strength used far off. It is plainly better not to have to fight at all. Even more plainly, an ability to fight cannot be directly translated into political authority. Limits in the usefulness of American military strength are clear in relation to countries that are in varying degrees hostile to the United States, such as tiny nearby Cuba—perhaps even more so in relation to America's allies. In spite of the rhetoric about France's slavery to American despotism, General de Gaulle always struck me as a rather masterful slave long before he had even a façade of a *force de frappe*. The point can be made in reference to those allies most menaced and least able to defend themselves. McGeorge Bundy suggests that polemists using words like "puppet" have never been on the other end of the strings. It is rather more, I should think, like pushing than pulling strings. The fact that military technology can be projected by the United States and by others at great distances reveals some critical connections between remote parts of the world, but lends no support to the mechanical extension of American political hegemony.

Furthermore, though we can affect matters in some places close to us or far off, we frequently have no discernible interest in doing so. In the last year, the isolationist debate has shifted somewhat from capabilities to interests. A good many places interest none of us very much, and some that interest us can take care of themselves. That's almost always better. No one on either side of the debate is for intervention all over or for total escape. The genuine issues concern the right extent and places of commitment. They cannot be clarified wholesale. And they have not been by the endlessly tedious repetitions and denials of the phrase "policeman to the world."

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A great many things—historic, political, ethnic, cultural, sentimental—affect national interests, including a residue of past technologies like the methods of ocean transport that durably linked Great Britain, Spain, France, Portugal and the Netherlands to some of the remotest parts of the world. But future technologies will affect interests too, and on the whole in a direction that makes the new isolationism pure nostalgia. Let me say something on interests of nations in cultural contact, in trade and the movements of capital, and in national safety.

II

Cultural interests have never fallen off directly with distance. Englishmen and North Americans find Australians and New Zealanders quite accessible culturally, and are sometimes greatly puzzled by their immediate neighbors. French contacts with some parts of North America were always considerable and lately seem to be much on the increase. The vast improvements coming in long-distance communications and transport will multiply remote cultural contacts just as they will increase the capacity to project military strength. Civilian supersonic passenger planes, the subsonic high-payload 747 stretch jets, a possible passenger version of the C-5, and the commercial satellites —all neatly parallel in the civilian field the military equipment that makes the problem of getting to a theater of war small compared to getting about in it. Travelers are already used to the sharp contrast between the speed with which they can hurtle between distant airports and the maddeningly slow pace getting to and from the airport, queuing up for tickets, taxis, baggage, porters and traffic lights.

High-payload jets will cover great distances still more quickly and cheaply, but may increase the queues. Supersonic jets will be economic only on long trips. Their principal result will be to bring the remote places closer. It has been pointed out that if sonic booms prevent supersonic aircraft from flying over land, New York will once again, as in the time before the building of the transcontinental railroad, be closer to Europe than to Los Angeles. Passenger traffic in the Pacific should increase still more strikingly. Travel time from Los Angeles to Tokyo may be cut by nearly two-thirds. It will take perhaps forty minutes more than to get from Los Angeles to New York.

For civilian communications as for civil transport, the right

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map cannot be drawn in kilometers or miles, in what François Perroux calls "banal distance." Buenos Aires is closer now to Europe or the United States than to Caracas or Santiago. Telephone calls from Buenos Aires to Caracas go through New York. Calls between two points in Africa may go through switch points in both London and Paris. The new communications will alter optimal switching points and help local traffic, but in particular will bring together widely separated points.

From the standpoint of economic and strategic interests, one important result of improvements in communications and transport will be to increase the geographical extent of interests and simultaneously to reduce the specific importance of what are now critical bottlenecks at transit points. Suez is an example: reducing the costs of very long hauls cuts the added expense of a detour.

Indeed, most of what I have said about effects on cultural contacts applies quite directly to economic interactions: that is, to the movements of commodities and capital and possibly seasonal labor. Air freight capacity has been increasing rapidly for commodities of high value; the huge cargo aircraft now on the way will make distant air transport economic for new ranges of less valuable commodities. For bulky primary commodities, those that are lowest in value density, like oil, the development of supertankers drastically reduces long-haul costs. The economies of scale are enormous. A tanker with a capacity of 150,000 deadweight tons can move crude oil 5,000 miles at $1.69 per ton compared to $7.29 for a 10,000-ton tanker. Construction costs decrease with increasing tanker size from $220 per ton at 20,000 deadweight tons to less than $70 at 300,000 tons. Operating costs decrease, too, in particular with increased opportunities for automation. In fact, the *Tokyo Maru*, a tanker of about 135,000 deadweight tons, will be operated by a crew of 29, while tankers of 50,000 tons may use 35 men or more. The Japanese in the early 1970s will be constructing 500,000-ton tankers, something like ten times the size of the largest tankers available during the Suez Crisis of 1956. As a result of such changes, not only are detours around gateways like Suez cheaper than they were; they may, because of the limitations of the gateways themselves, be cheaper than the direct route. Suez at present can handle fully loaded tankers only up to 70,000 deadweight tons.

The lowered costs and increased capacity for both long-distance

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transport and long-distance transmission of messages increase the number of economic alternatives available, and make it feasible to go around choke points. These communications and transport developments reduce interest in specific gateways to remote places, but not the interest in remote places themselves. On the contrary, to the extent that they make links to distant points more reliable, they spread interests more evenly but farther. For example, Japan's growing trade with Europe in manufactures will be less in danger of arbitrary interruption. In reducing the risks of war or peacetime interruption, these technical changes counter one of the chief traditional arguments for economic autarky.

One argument for autarky current in many variants for nearly 150 years rests on technology. Robert Torrens in his 1821 essay on the production of wealth predicted that the industrialization of additional countries, population growth and diminishing returns on primary products would reduce the basis for foreign trade. This hypothesis of course entails as corollary the declining importance of trade among already industrialized countries in particular. It is not an argument for intraregional trade but for the autarky of nations even within the same region. In fact it suggests reduction of trade among regions within a single nation as these "converge" in economic structure.

This venerable thesis, frequently revived and modified, has several essential theoretical flaws. Except in some extremely simplified economic models, a convergence in overall average efficiency of trading countries does not entail fewer possibilities of specialization in particular products. Among other things there may be economies of scale. The argument neglects technical changes, like the global extension of communications, that tend to create world markets for specific products, and neglects techniques that increase the advantages of trade such as reductions in freight and communications costs. Increasing income itself creates a demand for variety and for products of higher value in which transport costs are in any case less important. Finally, like some sounder theories that oppose it, the Torrens and related hypotheses say nothing in principle about the way the benefits of trade vary with geographical distance, and in particular how transport costs as a complex function of distance may decline as techniques change.

Aside from its theoretical lacks, the belief that technology

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would reduce the role of trade does not square with available data, even though trade has been hampered by government barriers. World trade in manufactures in the 90 years after 1876, in spite of setbacks in the protectionist and depressed interwar period, increased per capita two or three times. Between 1950 and 1966 it has been increasing even faster than world production of manufactures—7.3 percent compared to 5.3 percent per annum.[4] For the United States, in spite of claims to the contrary, from the 1870s to the 1960s neither exports nor imports declined relative to G.N.P. in real terms.[5] Similarly within the United States, interregional trade, as Richard Cooper has shown, has grown more rapidly than total output, in spite of an apparent "convergence" in economic structure of the various regions.

What is true of trade seems true also of the movements of capital when not constrained by artificial barriers. Improvements in long-distance travel and telecommunications encourage distant foreign investment by making it easier to manage. Data processing on a large scale may stimulate organizational innovation and in any case makes feasible much more detailed and far-flung control. All of this should continue to encourage the already significant growth of international corporations whose interests extend far beyond any narrow geographical region, and make economic autarky more inappropriate than ever. The distant projection of interest should not be taken, however, as applying only to the capital-rich countries, as an attribute of "imperialism." The underdeveloped world has perhaps even more obvious interests in the distant developed world as a source of aid and as a market for exports. Indeed, as Edwin Reischauer suggests, one of the more disturbing aspects of some of the new isolationism is an implication that "Asians, having their own distinctive cultures and special problems, should go their own way, presumably in poverty and turmoil, while we of the advanced nations go our own prosperous and peaceful way."

The revolution in transport and communications casts doubt not only on the new isolationism of a growing minority but also on the more respectable but rather mechanical regionalism that may frequently be found in both the Democratic and Republican

[4] See Alfred Maizels, "Industrial Growth and World Trade." Cambridge University Press, 1963, p. 79 ff; for an extension of his data through 1966, see *Monthly Economic Letter,* First National City Bank, New York City, Sept. 1967.

[5] See Robert Lipsey, "Price and Quantity Trends in the Foreign Trade of the United States." Princeton University Press, 1963.

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establishments: the grand designs for Latin American common markets, Asian common markets, African unions, economic unities spanning the Middle East from Morocco to Afghanistan, and others. The composition of some of these groupings suggests how poor a criterion for association mere proximity is. Some have higher-cost communication and transport links among themselves than to the outside world. They may be mainly rival exporters of the same commodities, those in which they have the greatest comparative advantage. Yet a mechanical regionalism is not exclusively American. The head of the Commission of European Communities recently expressed his conviction that the world will inevitably organize itself into continents just as it organized itself into nations five centuries ago.

Reducing trade barriers inside a region may permit important economies of scale and indirect benefits to future growth as well as direct gains in efficiency at a given time. But this applies also to reducing trade barriers among countries that are not contiguous and that may be very widely separated. From a cosmopolitan view, the direct gains from a customs union depend on whether the increased trade and specialization within the union would outweigh the decrease in division of labor as between the union and the countries outside; whether in short it involves a net shift to higher or lower cost sources. Some unions might represent a gain; some surely would be a loss, particularly if their composition were determined solely on the basis of criteria as unrelated to economic efficiency as contiguity. Many groupings of countries outside the West seem little more than a literary or touristic convenience for Europeans and Americans, or a bureaucratic convenience for dividing up the work in their Foreign Offices. Various members of such a "region" may otherwise have had rather little economic or political interest in each other. Nor much interest in military coöperation.

Neighborhood in international relations, as Jacob Viner has pointed out, has never guaranteed neighborly feelings, and often has prevented them. Writings on international relations in the eighteenth century and later took proximity as one of the natural conditions of enmity. Indeed, one of the largest defects of regionalism in the postwar period has been a frequent neglect of the hard truths of differences in political interest inside regions and the varying bonds of interests with countries outside. Regionalism, which has seemed a halfway house between nationalism

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and a utopian universalism has itself sometimes been a kind of utopia for hard-headed Realpolitikers.

The historic antagonisms that divide a geographical region may of course be the very reason offered for a focus on regional association. But the network of conflicting and common interests extends far beyond a single region, and so do problems of conciliation. Today Germany is not the greatest menace to the English or the French. Just as generals are said to prepare always to fight the last war, statesmen and social scientists may be prone to prevent the last war, but not the next.

The increasing ease of communication and transport in the future should not be taken as simply irenic, leading to harmony and peace. On the contrary, it means an extension of the "neighborhood" to more remote areas, and such larger neighborhoods need not mean neighborliness any more than the small ones. The possibilities of coercion as well as coöperation increase. Which brings us back to the third interest, that of national safety.

III

National safety is the most critical matter and perhaps the least understood by those who think of it in terms of nineteenth-century and earlier technologies; or by those who conceive of it exclusively in terms of bilateral nuclear deterrence, the preoccupation of the mid-1950s. One essential here is that improvements in the technology of putting weapons on target and providing logistics affect not merely one's own capabilities and those of one's friends, but those of potential adversaries as well. These changes, then, extend drastically the range at which potential adversaries can do harm. This is most obvious in the case of the technologies for nuclear war. Not only the nuclear capabilities of the two largest powers, but also of others, will extend far beyond any single region, and will permit coercion if unopposed.

But improvements in technology extend the range at which classical, not just nuclear, conflicts may be fought. And as in the case of nuclear technologies, such improvements apply to potential adversaries too. While neither for the nuclear nor the classical case is distance without effect, the effects are complex; and very much more complex than is recognized by linear theories of the weakening of strength with distance. None the less, the upshot of these considerations of technology in the 1970s is that basic interests in safety will extend farther out than they ever

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have before. Many of the new isolationists in the United States were interventionists in World War II because they recognized that even then interests in security extended far beyond one's hemisphere.

A second essential is that bilateral mutual deterrence is not enough to prevent the international system from deteriorating. Even if a small nuclear force were able to make one country the equal of any other in deterrence, this would leave unsolved the problem of protecting non-nuclear countries from nuclear coercion. A few intrepid proponents of nuclear equalizers might be ready to distribute nuclear bombs to everybody. To most of us, however, the perils are plain in a spread of nuclear weapons rather less than worldwide. A country without nuclear weapons that feels menaced by a nuclear adversary is likely to seek nuclear weapons of its own unless it feels assured of nuclear protection by someone else. Moreover, since any country, nuclear or non-nuclear, is likely to have interests affected by the coercion of some non-nuclear nation—perhaps a neighbor, perhaps a more distant country—the issue of guarantees, of formal or informal commitments for nuclear protection, cannot be avoided.

On the other hand, getting stable isolated nuclear balances in particular regions, comprising as they do such diverse antagonisms and varying interests with respect to countries outside, will not be easy. Simple balances involving nuclear commitments from one or two member countries will be hard to make persuasive, and some of the members may feel more menaced than assured by the regional nuclear capabilities. Multiple regional nuclear balances would by definition involve an extensive spread of nuclear weapons with the attendant problems of a still further spread by a chain reaction affecting countries in and out of the region and increased probabilities of nuclear war by accident or design. Multilateral nuclear forces for such diverse "regions" as Asia seem much less feasible even than for the European counterpart. And an Arab-Israeli M.L.F. seems rather far off in the future. Or even a Saudi-Hashemite-Algerian-Egyptian one.

While a variety of forms of coöperation among countries in and out of a particular region may be useful, long-distance nuclear commitments by great powers have been essential at the very least to cancel long-distance threats by others. The growth of new long-distance nuclear forces like that of China will emphasize these. Long-distance commitments confer no perfect stability.

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But neither does any other alternative. I do not think that the deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union is unconditional. In a many-nation world including, so far, five countries that have exploded nuclear devices and 130 that have not, unconditional deterrence, I would stress, is not a sensible goal. If each of the nuclear countries could unconditionally deter any other, this would mean nuclear instability, not stability. For then any nuclear power could threaten or safely use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear nation within range.

Commitments for protection against nuclear coercion or attack, whether tacit or explicit, formal or informal, unilateral or in alliance arrangements or in the form of a U.N. collective security agreement, are a necessary element of stability on the international scene. Long-range commitments and defenses that make the risks of commitment commensurate with what is at stake are essential.

The word "commitment" is traumatic, given all the remote and uncertain conflicts in which our country has been engaged. A commitment, moreover, lessens autonomy one way or another for both the party committed and the recipient of the commitment. The United States commits itself in NATO to regard an attack on Europe as an attack on itself. It has extended commitments in varying degrees to other allies and to some nonaligned countries. This is sometimes painful, but it is not quixotic. If we do not commit ourselves and keep it plain that it is more in harmony with our interests and capabilities to fulfill the commitment than not to do so, the countries in question will feel they have to preserve their safety by their own means; and to try to obtain nuclear safety by nuclear means. In a great many cases these are likely to be even less effective than the long-distance commitment.

In sum, neither military capabilities, nor economic interests, nor interests in cultural contacts, nor in national safety seem likely to be narrowly circumscribed by geography, to be contained for example, by continents. Neither national nor regional autarkies look sensible in either strategic or economic or political terms. Orwell projected for 1984 a world split into a few huge blocs. I find such a prospect neither attractive nor likely to improve the chance of peace. Even inside a single nation sharp regional lines dividing the country into groups with different political, sentimental, ethnic and economic interests make civil war more likely.

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On a world scale it would be more ominous. Orwell showed his insight by having his huge continental blocs constantly at war. The fact that, so far as technology is concerned, the 1970s do not seem to be marching toward 1984 strikes me, then, as all to the good. There are many forms of coöperation, including, to be sure, some regional ones that are useful for specific and limited purposes. But perhaps it is just as well that the useful sorts of association are "cross-cutting"—that is, likely to vary in membership from one purpose to another.

We all believe in the importance of preserving options, of being able to defer decision in order to make a final resolve on the basis of the utmost in information about alternatives. We feel uneasy about getting involved, about "contracting in." None the less, commitment, foreclosing some options, is essential if we want to keep other options open in the future. The technologies of the 1970s suggest that many of the essential commitments will continue to be long-distance.

The new isolationists sometimes phrase their misgivings about American involvement in distant countries not in terms of traditional geopolitics—the range of weapons and the feasibility of transport—but in terms of our limited knowledge of the problems of these outlying peoples and the limitations of our wisdom, intelligence and perseverance. All of these are, sad to say, limited. But if mileage is today no criterion for increasing either our interests or our capabilities, it is even less plausible to suppose that our degree of knowledge is a simple linear function of distance from home, starting high and falling off very steeply. Sometimes we manage to be rather ignorant of countries close by; and while understanding of other countries is always limited (like self-understanding), we have managed to amass a considerable store of knowledge about some remote spots. It is not evident, for example, that we know more, or are any wiser, about either Haiti or the Dominican Republic than we are about India or Australia. And since we can be greatly affected by distant troubles, we have to deal with them. If we are not adequately informed about them, there is really nothing we can do except to find out more and think harder.

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THE FRAMEWORK OF EAST-WEST RECONCILIATION

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

EUROPE is increasingly restless with the division imposed on it more than twenty years ago. To end that division, and thereby to take a step toward a larger community of the developed nations, is a task requiring the often conflicting virtues of perseverance and imagination. It also requires asking explicitly: What can be done in the next twenty years to change this condition—and to change it in a way that is compatible with historical trends and more immediate requirements of political reality?

I. THREE CONCEPTS IN SEARCH OF REALITY

Several concepts currently purport to provide an answer to the above questions. Three among them particularly stand out and deserve closer attention: The Atlantic conception, the "European Europe" Gaullist vision and the Soviet idea of a European security arrangement. Let it be said immediately that each, though in different ways, is inadequate or only partially satisfactory. One, rooted in the transitional setting of the cold war, even if generally in tune with the wider sweep of history, fails to respond to the growing political concerns of Europe; the second reflects current political moods but ignores historical trends; the third fails on both scores.

Usually, the Atlantic concept is employed to express not only an existing reality—that America and Europe have a special affinity—but a desire for a particular kind of relationship between them. The spectrum ranges from the notion of an intimate and integrated Atlantic community, with the United States and individual European states merging into one, to the famous concept of partnership between America and a more united Western Europe. Such a partnership, it is asserted, would generate an irresistible magnetic attraction to the East, and eventually the European problem—particularly the division of Germany—would somehow be resolved. Such a Europe would also share with America certain global responsibilities—a hope voiced more frequently by American than European spokesmen.

The nature of the eventual European settlement, and the ways

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and means of reaching it, are rarely spelled out in any detail by the Atlanticists. This is not surprising. The concept of Atlantic partnership presupposes the creation of a united (or integrated) Europe; this is bound to take a long time, certainly longer than originally assumed. Till then, the problem of the other half of Europe must be held in abeyance, given the scale of priorities subscribed to by the Atlanticists. Premature ties with the East would dilute Western institutions and bring alien systems and ideologies into the family setting. This would delay the appearance of "the partner" in the Atlantic partnership.

Moreover, the question of Germany introduces a special complication. An implicit and necessary component of the Atlantic concept is the idea that the West European partner cannot prosper and endure unless all its member states have identical status in all respects. The futility and tragedy of the Versailles-type solution for Germany has often been cited as the reason for eschewing arrangements that would imply a discrimination against the Federal Republic. To the extent that the united European partner in the Atlantic community would also presumably be a party to Atlantic security arrangements, including the nuclear field, the right of Germany to participate on an equal basis in a European nuclear defense force follows logically.

Thus, in so far as the problem of Europe's unresolved partition is concerned, the pure Atlantic approach poses two basic dilemmas. Until a united Europe appears, East-West relations are relegated to a secondary position, primary emphasis being put on creating an undiluted Western Europe. Even Eastern entry into or association with existing Western bodies, such as O.E.C.D. (Organization for Economic Coöperation and Development), is opposed, either as premature or inherently subversive of the fundamental purpose of Western multilateral coöperation. At the same time, the fear (or suspicion) of some Western European states that the Atlantic concept is essentially a scheme for the preservation of American hegemony in Europe and for relieving American burdens in the Third World stiffens European resistance to the partnership, thus postponing indefinitely the moment when the West can address itself seriously to the unresolved legacies of World War II.

In addition, emphasis on complete uniformity within the European component of the Atlantic partnership, including the nuclear security field, introduces an element of unreality into

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discussions of the German problem. No spokesman for the Atlantic idea has yet been able to spell out how—and why—the East should accept the notion of German reunification if the end result is an automatic accretion of strength to a Western Alliance that includes a German finger on the nuclear trigger. Unwillingness to draw a distinction between inequality—which rightfully cannot serve as a solid foundation for a united community of several nations—and a special position dictated both by the reality of political circumstances and the desire to change them peacefully, has led to the formulation of an Atlantic position on German reunification that assures continued German—and thus also European—division.

Finally, implicit in the Atlantic concept, although never deliberately asserted, is the idea that Europe is really Western Europe (indeed, Atlanticists usually say "Europe" when speaking of its Western half). It is thus unresponsive to the strongly held European feeling that the cold-war division of the Continent into American and Soviet-dominated halves no longer corresponds either to security or political needs, and that the time has come to end Europe's partition. The inherent inapplicability of the Atlantic concept, in its pristine form, to this condition explains much of our own difficulty in making the United States relevant to new East-West relations, even though in fact it has creatively pioneered in developing these relations.[1]

Indeed, failure to adapt the Atlantic concept to what might be called the post-cold-war era in Europe has distorted the meaning of the actually farsighted, imaginative and usually constructive American initiatives on the East-West front. Since we have pursued our initiatives in the context of a concept that to some implies U.S. hegemony and to others an American preference for the status quo (including partition), they have tended to reinforce the European suspicion that we want to strike a bargain with Russia, even at the expense of Europe. Misgivings concerning that kind of détente have not been restricted to Western Europe; even Easteners have whispered that this is not what they hope for. The attraction of de Gaulle thus has grown in direct proportion to our efforts to promote East-West reconciliation.

[1] It has become fashionable to credit de Gaulle with having invented the idea of détente in Europe. The truth is that the United States pioneered—first by aiding Jugoslavia and then Poland, by developing cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union and the other states, and by exchanging top-level visits. At the time, de Gaulle scorned these moves and only later began to emulate them.

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To some extent, President Johnson in his path-breaking speech of October 7, 1966, strove to cope with this difficulty by emphasizing that progress in strengthening the Atlantic Alliance was interdependent with further growth of East-West ties. However, the basic conceptual difficulty remained unresolved; the lingering tension between Western unity and détente was not overcome. This condition was aggravated by the Vietnamese war, which intensified cross-Atlantic suspicions, and by de Gaulle's peremptory moves, which created openings for Soviet diplomatic diversions. The combined effect was to push the Germans (as hinted in Kiesinger's and Brandt's speeches in June-July 1967) toward a basic reappraisal of their interest in close Atlantic ties and a growing interest in exploring bilateral dealings with Russia. In the process, American relevance to both Western and Eastern Europe declined.

De Gaulle exploited both this decline and the conceptual inadequacy of the Atlantic approach. Far from desiring a reunited Germany, though occasionally going through the ritual of referring to it, he strove to create a new European equilibrium. De Gaulle has never spelled out his ideas to the extent that the Atlantic concept has been, but his central objective has been to reduce the presence in Europe of the two external "hegemonial" powers. This he hoped to accomplish by creating a West European hard core, led by France—detached from an integrated Atlantic relationship but continuing to enjoy U.S. nuclear protection—which would then proceed to forge a "European Europe to the Urals," *i.e.* translating the East-West détente in Europe into an eventual entente.

While murky in specifics, it is evident that to accomplish his ends de Gaulle played on European restlessness and shrewdly strove to exploit the Asian involvement of his two powerful adversaries. He counted on the Sino-Soviet dispute to drive Russia into Europe, and he exploited American involvement in Viet Nam to generate a sense of distinctively European interests. Though cautious not to detach himself too much from U.S. nuclear protection, de Gaulle indicated that the eventual solution to the partition of Europe would come through the dissolution of the two confronting alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both de facto agencies of the respective hegemonial centers. A Europe built on bilateral relations, respecting the primacy of national sovereignty, engaging whenever expedient (especially to France)

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in closer economic coöperation, would be a Europe restored—indeed, a Europe ascendant.

The General's concepts are superficially plausible. Moreover, his dedication to the nation-state responds to traditional European nationalist notions. At the same time, the anti-hegemonial components of his concept are a useful additive, especially attractive to some in the younger generation who are tired of what appears to them to be excessive American or Soviet preponderance on the European scene.

Yet it is more than doubtful that de Gaulle's concepts are any more relevant to Europe's present—not to speak of its future—than the ideas that he rejects. The dissolution of the two alliances perhaps might solve the problem of confrontation but it would certainly create new ones. The argument that the cold war can be abolished by abolishing the blocs, or vice versa, is not only deceptively attractive, it is dangerously wrong.

In fact, if a loosely organized Europe sought détente with the East, the result could only be the West's acceptance of the status quo, in particular the permanent acceptance of two German states. A politically fragmented Western Europe would be a Europe incapable of steering in a common direction on behalf of commonly shared goals; détente for the sake of détente could be the only common denominator. Inevitably, it would lead to Western rivalry in seeking to improve relations bilaterally and to develop advantageous trade with the East.

Accordingly, it is probably true that a loosely organized Europe, lacking an integrated political and defense structure, at most a free-trade area and without close ties to the United States, could more easily reach a détente with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For the East, accommodation with such a Europe would not require any substantial ideological evolution, especially since no special concessions or adjustments in the Eastern position would be required. The communist élites, having nothing to fear from a Europe of this kind, would probably be quite responsive to Western overtures because they could thus have their cake and eat it too: they could savor the tangible benefits of closer economic contacts with the West without any substantial change in the overall political situation.

In this connection, it is important to bear in mind that the present communist élites, especially in Eastern Europe, are in the first stage of post-peasant political awakening. By and large,

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their political attitudes are a curious mixture of communist formulas and of rather primitive and intense nationalism. Their outlook is basically parochial and conservative. A détente that perpetuated their domestic dictatorship and left the European political map unchanged would be for them the ideal solution.

Whether a détente of this kind would be stable is another matter. There are strong reasons for skepticism. It would mean a recreation of a Europe based on the old principle of state supremacy, with a major European nation—Germany—condemned to division. In those circumstances, frustration and insecurity in West Germany would almost certainly follow. Having attained neither national unity nor fulfillment in a larger European community, the Germans could be expected to seek accommodation with the Soviet Union. Irrespective of original Soviet motives—even if it is assumed that the Soviets sincerely seek a stable détente in Europe—the temptation to exploit German anxieties could be too strong for Moscow to resist. The result could be a new phase in European tensions, with the Continent's stability in general and East European security in particular being its first victims.

Yet that is what de Gaulle seems to be precipitating, not only by exploiting the involvement of the United States in Asia and the end of the Atlantic orientation in Bonn (the latter clearly demarcated by the coming to power of Kiesinger-Brandt), but by his apparent determination to quit NATO altogether. Perhaps deliberately, the French President, in his speech of August 10, 1967, has given the world his reasons for rejecting the Alliance:

> By withdrawing from NATO, France, for her part, extricated herself from [United States-Soviet] subjection. Thus she would not find herself drawn, eventually, into any quarrel that would not be hers and into any war action that she would not herself have wished. Thus she is capable of practicing—as she considers right, from one end of Europe to the other—entente and coöperation, the only means of achieving the security of our continent. Thus she can uphold, in a world that many old and new abuses hold in a state of ferment, according to her vocation, the right of each people to self-determination, a right that is today the necessary foundation of any confederation, the imperative condition of international agreement, the indispensable basis of a real organization of peace.

In so doing, he may well be hastening the day when a German leader will make a similar pronouncement.

The Soviet Union also has an entry in the competition for the best European solution. The Soviet formula has developed

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slowly, in response to external opportunities appearing in the West and internal political turmoil in the East. Under Khrushchev, the Soviet Union did not really have a European policy; it was too busy pursuing a global chimera. Anxious to become coequal with the United States, and then even determined to dethrone it as the world's number-one power, Khrushchev alternated between a grand courtship and a grand contest. Both ended tragically: the courtship was buried in May 1960 in a meadow near Sverdlovsk, marked by the remnants of a fallen U-2; the contest ended ignominiously with Soviet ships submitting to armed inspection by the United States while ferrying Soviet missiles from Cuba back to Soviet ports.

From that time on, the Soviet Union gradually shifted to a more regional foreign policy. Its outlines took clearer shape after Khrushchev's fall, especially given the opportunities created by the growing American involvement in Viet Nam. Exploiting them, and also taking advantage of de Gaulle in a manner somewhat reminiscent of earlier U.S. support for Tito, the Soviet leaders proceeded to forge, through words and actions, a new European policy. The Soviet leaders exchanged an unprecedented number of visits with their NATO European neighbors and became eloquent exponents of the separate identity and interests of Europe. Indeed, even the terms "technological gap" and the "brain drain" became part of the peripatetic Soviet leaders' lexicon. Although it was not made clear how a semi-developed Soviet Union could be of much help to Western Europe in these regards, it may be assumed that raising such issues was calculated less to produce a practical common response to the American challenge than to evoke a sense of shared emotion in the face of the alleged American threat.

More important was the Soviet sensitivity to the growing feeling in Europe that gradual improvements on the East-West front cannot be confined to the economic and political fields. Western public opinion increasingly has felt that the time is becoming ripe for doing something about the European security problem. Although careful not to spell out precisely what the nature of an eventual European security arrangement might be, communist leaders, especially from 1966 on, began to reiterate the need for a European security conference designed to address itself to this issue. In calling for such a conference, Soviet leaders were deliberately coy about American participation; while not

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explicitly excluding it, they obviously hoped that some Western states would be willing to discuss the question, thus drawing a distinction between European powers, including the Soviet Union, and non-European intruders.

Soviet motives were not difficult to discern. On the immediate tactical level, even a low-key dialogue with West European chancelleries on the subject of a security conference, with its consequent impact on West European public opinion, could contribute to the isolation of Bonn, in turn stimulating West German anxieties. A weakening in European-American ties was also not unwelcome, although Moscow presumably realized that a total Atlantic rupture could increase German influence in Western Europe. But short of such a sharp break, which the Kremlin probably calculated was in any case unlikely, the intensification of Atlantic "contradictions" was desirable. Finally, there was a tactical payoff inherent in making proposals which seemed reasonable and appealing to men of good will.

From the longer point of view, the Soviet Union no doubt hoped that any broadly gauged East-West security discussion would legitimatize the status quo in Central Europe, and particularly the existence of the two German states. In addition, by reducing Western attachment to the notion of Atlantic interdependence in security matters, a trend could be set in motion toward the eventual neutralization of Western Europe. Although it may be an exaggeration to say that the Soviet goal is to make Western Europe into a Finland, the Soviet leaders could not be unaware of the increased political leverage that they would gain over a Western Europe less intimately tied to the United States in matters of security.

Finally, even if treated at face value as a bona fide effort to find a solution for the problems of Europe, the Soviet approach still has grave shortcomings. It simply disregards the fact that the unsolved legacies of World War II cannot be resolved by a fiat that transforms them miraculously into a generally accepted and enduring settlement. Unwilling to separate those aspects of the status quo which perhaps may—and in some cases even should—endure as a consequence of the traumatic upheavals of World War II from those that are merely a temporary manifestation of the cold war, the Soviet leaders proffered a solution which was really not a solution but a means of obtaining a ratification of maximum Soviet objectives.

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It is therefore more than doubtful that merely convening a European security conference—presumably with the participation of East Germany, which in itself would be a major Soviet success, and also of the United States, which naturally some of the more gullible Westerners would classify as a generous Soviet concession—would settle anything. A conference which ignored the problem of Germany's division would serve only to stimulate West German frustrations and disappointment. Indeed, while one can easily catalog the unsettling consequences of the Soviet initiative on the West, one is hard put to find similar costs for the East. This asymmetry simply deprives the Soviet proposal of political relevance.

II. THE SHAPE AND STAGES OF RECONCILIATION

The long-range goal of the United States in regard to East-West relations is to transform the present hostility, of which Europe's partition is both the cause and the symptom, into an increasingly stable East-West coöperation designed to end that partition. This means deliberately promoting new patterns of relations and, in so doing, gradually eliminating those factors that prevent stability. The status quo must not be an end in itself but the point of departure for gradual change; in escaping from the rigidity of two tightly knit blocs facing each other across the Elbe, we must avoid dissolution of the two existing alliances into the traditional multi-state system.

In my personal judgment, a more stable European solution, one more in keeping with present trends and historical tendencies than any of the three concepts discussed earlier, should eventually involve an interlocking structure based on four entities: America and Russia as the peripheral participants, and Western Europe and Eastern Europe as the two halves of the inner core (in time, perhaps, becoming still more closely linked). Each would enjoy differing degrees of internal homogeneity and each would engage others in varied patterns of relations, with differing degrees of intimacy and intensity.

The Atlantic concept would thus be retained but readapted to become one aspect, somewhat diluted, of the larger whole; the "European" elements and the security emphasis of the other two approaches would be similarly readapted, in order to formulate an approach that met more symmetrically the real interests of the parties involved and the needs of European stability.

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In the course of the next decade or so, Western Europe is almost certain to move further toward an integrated economic community; there may also be the beginning of some European political consultations. Some common defense arrangements are also likely, especially after de Gaulle. It will hence be an increasingly important force, with an emerging identity of its own, though probably reluctant to share in U.S. global responsibilities.

Eastern Europe, given its relatively backward stage of political development and social modernization, will certainly be less homogeneously organized. None the less, it too is already moving toward some subregional coöperation, exclusive of Soviet participation. It may be expected that this trend will continue, although probably more on the basis of a network of bilateral economic and political arrangements. Eventually, some confederational arrangements may develop, creating by the mid-1980s a loose community of about 130 million people with a G.N.P. of about $215 billion. In any case, greater coöperation within Eastern Europe should be encouraged, for without it the region will continue to be a source of instability and a political vacuum filled by outsiders. For example, as the East European nations decentralize their economies, Western assistance in creating currency convertibility would make a great deal of sense.[2] Another useful possibility would be a Balkan customs union consisting of Jugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece, and one that included Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and even, perhaps, East Germany.

The American-West European relationship will presumably continue to include a security arrangement, although greater unity in Western Europe will necessitate a restructuring of the presently integrated NATO command, composed of one giant and fourteen "non-giants," into something more like a bilateral United States-West European agency for security planning and coördination. West European integration, including a defense treaty among the European members of NATO, might eventually permit the redefinition of NATO into a more equal—and bilateral—Atlantic defense agreement. U.S. assistance in developing a European A.B.M. system that was patently defensive *technologically* could accelerate movement in that direction, thereby downgrading the significance of small national nuclear

[2]See the proposal by H. W. Shaffer, "An East European Payments Union?", *East Europe*, March 1966.

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forces while not stimulating East European fears of Germany's offensive potential.

More important than NATO in stimulating close Atlantic coöperation will be the inescapably growing economic, technological and monetary ties between the United States and Western Europe. Tariff and fiscal arrangements, the possible appearance of a technological Atlantic community, increasingly joined efforts to help the Third World, all will probably stimulate the development of new coöperative institutions.

At the same time, one may expect the number of East-West agreements within Europe to increase. Growing West European integration will inevitably act as a magnet for an Eastern Europe increasingly self-assertive and anxious to participate in the European adventure. This growing East-West coöperation will not be confined to bilateral agreements; even more important will be the many new multilateral bonds, with East European states increasingly wishing to become associated with common all-European institutions and ventures. In effect, a looser all-European economic community will be taking shape, with Western Europe as its more homogeneous hard core.

In some respects, East-West relations will be purely European; in others, they will involve also the United States and the Soviet Union. This is especially likely in regard to security arrangements. Eastern Europe's fear of a united Western Europe allegedly prone to domination by the Federal Republic will decline if the scope of collaboration includes some East-West security relationships between the two existing but looser alliances. While the old dichotomic confrontation will have faded, it is unlikely that either the West or the East Europeans will wish to face the other side without some backup strength from the respective superpower. The East Europeans, as de Gaulle learned in Warsaw and as the Czechs have made clear, will not wish to face alone a Germany that is so much more powerful than they; this is likely to remain the case even if West Germany is more fully absorbed into an integrated European community. Lingering fears will make them desire some assurance of continued Soviet protection and even American involvement.[3]

Since Soviet-East European security ties would automatically

[3] Thus a Czech commentator, J. Sedivy, in "European Coöperation—European Security," *Literarni Noviny*, Feb. 25, 1967, flatly states that a European security arrangement would have to be safeguarded not only by the U.S.S.R., but "certainly by the United States."

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skew the delicate European balance in favor of the East, West Europeans may be expected to be similarly anxious to maintain a U.S. commitment. Thus security arrangements linking all concerned will probably be preferred, in spite of present French and Rumanian attitudes. If the objective is a broader community of the developed nations, such wider security arrangements are also preferable. An East-West security arch, resting on the four pillars needed to support the peace, would require more systematic political consultations, including not only the Europeans but Americans and Russians as well. In addition, bodies such as O.E.C.D. and E.C.E. (Economic Commission for Europe) would provide the framework for more intensive economic and scientific coöperation among themselves and in relation to the Third World. The economic, political and security links would thus provide an institutional framework for the four units.

In addition to security links, some East European states may also wish to retain ideological ties with the Soviet Union, although it seems almost certain that with time these will wane in importance. It is hard to predict what will happen to the Warsaw Pact as regards its real substance. At the least, it probably will remain a political-contractual link, legitimatizing Soviet involvement and political influence in Eastern Europe. If current trends continue, it seems unlikely that communist military integration will progress much further. Thus, as the status of NATO changes, the two military alliances will become somewhat more analogous.

East European economic ties with the Soviet Union will probably become more bilateral—or involve more specialized and limited forms of multilateral coöperation. CEMA (Council of Economic Mutual Assistance), an essentially political-ideological body, which includes an economic giant, the Soviet Union, and an economic irrelevancy, Mongolia (much as if the Common Market contained both the United States and Haiti), is not likely to duplicate the success of the E.E.C. (European Economic Community) in achieving economic integration. It is more likely to become a communist equivalent to O.E.C.D., which in itself would make it quite important and useful. (Accordingly, coöperation between O.E.C.D. and CEMA could be quite constructive.)

Finally, outside of ties that traverse Europe, special United States-Soviet relationships are bound to proliferate. The two nuclear superpowers will either compete globally, or coöperate, or,

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more likely, do both at the same time, be it in space or in the Third World or in respect to new weapons systems. The continuing rivalry and the growing coöperation will perhaps induce a greater realization of their mutual responsibility in world affairs, and create—even without formal expression—a special political relationship. Both will have to be careful, however, to avoid creating the semblance of a condominium; in this respect the identical interests of both Western and Eastern Europe are likely to exercise a major restraint on relations between the superpowers.

None the less, coöperation between them and among the European nations will remain the key to any long-range solution. This lesson was drawn as early as 1946 by Willy Brandt, when he wrote: "Hitler's Germany was defeated by a coalition of the major allied powers. Germany is occupied by these powers. It can emerge from this crisis as a unified state only if the recovery takes place in agreement and coöperation with both East and West."[4]

III. THE MEANS TO RECONCILIATION

For all this to happen, quite extensive changes will have to take place in Europe, especially in the East, which holds the key to the future of East Germany. Since politics is the art of making one's preferences come true, the discussion which follows takes current trends as its point of departure, and—to the extent that the European dynamics are susceptible to some outside influence—seeks to relate them to those policies that are compatible with the long-range goal outlined above. Despite currently intensified Soviet hostility, it is deliberately an optimistic projection. A sudden recrudescence in international tensions or Soviet aggressiveness could halt or even reverse the trends discussed here.

None the less, it is not unreasonable to expect that the next decade will probably see continuing erosion of the more militant aspects of Marxism-Leninism. The Sino-Soviet dispute and domestic pressures in the Soviet Union both conspire to bring on such a change in perspective. Ideological change will help to bring on political change. To be sure, for a long time to come the Soviet Union and most of the East European states will remain single-party dictatorships. The ruling bureaucracies are becoming increasingly nationalist and that, combined with their étatist

[4] As cited by *Industriekurier*, February 14, 1967.

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and socialist tendencies, gives them some resemblance to prewar social-fascist movements in Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, as these countries become aware of their growing social and economic complexity, they will probably show more tolerance for political and intellectual dissent. Progressive decentralization of the communist economies will facilitate international economic coöperation, hitherto handicapped by centralized national planning. It will also facilitate the emergence of more independent, technologically oriented élites, likely to be strongly interested in economic coöperation with Western Europe and the United States.

Indeed, some communist countries already recognize that they have at least an economic stake in Western unity.[5] East European trade with Western Europe is the primary source of hard currency for communist economies, and the development of a prosperous European economic community has become a factor in the further economic development of the communist states. In time, a changed economic perspective might lead to a changed perspective in politics.

There is already considerable evidence that not all East Europeans welcome a communist policy designed to split the West and to detach Europe from the United States. A number of voices have been heard in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Jugoslavia to the effect that such a policy is shortsighted, and that it will result in a revival of German nationalism. Eventually, the communist élites may come to view an integrated Western Europe, absorbing German energies and ambitions, as something in their interest as well.

In this connection, the East Europeans would be especially attracted by Western invitations to participate in common efforts to avoid a "technological gap" between Europe and America. They have only recently become aware of this problem, but their concern has been magnified by their unspoken fear of becoming technologically obsolescent not only in relationship to the West but also to the Soviet Union. Hence the extraordinary interest of the East Europeans in such initiatives as the Fanfani proposal to create a transatlantic technological community,

[5] After predicting for years the inevitability of the Common Market's disintegration, communist spokesmen have finally realized its durability. Thus S. Albinowski, in his appropriately entitled "Condemned to Success," *Zycie Warszawy*, March 20, 1967, admits past skepticism and concludes that "the Common Market is a permanent institution which will influence our trade relations with Western Europe more and more."

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open also to communist states; hence the spate of comments in their journals about the desirability of broader international coöperation.

The participation of the communist states in a wider multilateral framework of East-West coöperation would be bound to have a Europeanizing impact on the communist élites themselves. It would help to develop in the East a European-minded technical and economic élite, and would eventually encourage the appearance of more broadminded, less parochial attitudes within the political élite. Moreover, since multilateral coöperation is incompatible with a high degree of internal state-controlled and centralized planning, pressures for domestic liberalization would be intensified. Thus greater involvement of the East European states in institutional and multilateral forms of coöperation with an integrated Western community would help the internal processes of evolution in the East, all of which cumulatively would promote the emergence of a new political attitude.

Eventually the communist élites would become less inclined to feel that their security depends entirely on maintaining the status quo. Once the political issue of Germany becomes less intense, and it becomes less important to maintain the doctrinal rigidity of East Germany, the problem of the division in Europe would become more susceptible to peaceful change.

However, one very important qualification has to be made. The Soviet Union will not let East Germany simply slide over into a Western community that, from its point of view, could become easily dominated by a powerful and rearmed Germany. Such a change would mean a fundamental shift in the balance of power, not to speak of the loss of Soviet control over the very important economic resources of East Germany. West German access to offensive nuclear weapons would inevitably intensify Soviet fears and phobias. This is even more true for the East Europeans. There is simply no realistic reason convincing enough to justify an argument that the Soviet Union would permit East Germany to be absorbed by a politically, economically and militarily integrated Western Europe.

Soviet concerns would likely be somewhat reduced—and Soviet willingness to countenance some form of German reunification increased—if there were a special security arrangement precluding West German participation in a European nuclear strike force and if broader East-West security arrangements were de-

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veloped. Similarly, it must be recognized that East Germany, whatever its ties with West Germany, cannot be excluded from a special relationship both to the Soviet Union and to whatever remains by then of CEMA.

It follows that the reconciliation of East and West will not be achieved by a single act of settlement, nor will a solution to the German problem be an event isolated in time; it will have to be a process of growing together of East and West and, in a different way, of the two Germanys. This process will have economic, cultural, political and security aspects, and it will eventually require an institutionalized multilateral framework.

Extensive development of East-West bilateral ties began in the late fifties and early sixties. It is to be expected that in the late sixties and early seventies these bilateral relationships will expand and also that East-West multilateral economic coöperation will develop significantly. In the next several years it is likely that the E.C.E. will become more active in developing East-West economic and technical coöperation. O.E.C.D. may also become involved in assisting East-West scientific and technological collaboration, thus responding to the intense East European concern with the "technological gap."

It is not unreasonable to expect that in the 1970s there will be created a special East-West economic assembly, perhaps sponsored by O.E.C.D., E.C.E. and CEMA. It could foster joint East-West ventures, communications and technological coöperation; it could study ways of coping with the difficult problem of multilateral coöperation between market and state economies, and develop common all-European projects, such as a Lisbon-Moscow superhighway. It is also reasonable to expect that in the course of the next five years surplus labor will be permitted to flow from East to West. This could have a considerable social and cultural impact as workers returned home.

During the same period, most of the East European states and the Soviet Union will probably have become associated with GATT and I.M.F.; in addition, they may perhaps have negotiated special preferential agreements with the E.E.C.; and Jugoslavia may have become an associate member, having achieved full convertibility. Broader East-West convertibility should be possible by 1975, but probably not earlier.

Another possibility in the next several years is some movement toward the creation of an East-West Political Assembly

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in which direct and continuing discussions could be held. Initially, at least, there may be some advantage in keeping it a rather informal body for off-the-record discussions comparable to the Bilderberg meetings. (Indeed, as a test, some Jugoslavs could be invited to the Bilderberg.) Eventually such an assembly could also become a forum for the development of common positions toward the problems of the Third World. Even more rapid may be the gradual involvement of the communist states in the specialized functions of the Council of Europe, perhaps leading eventually to its transformation into the East-West Assembly.

If the present rigidity of the partition of the two Germanys can be lifted, it is likely to bring stronger assurances by Bonn that it accepts the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's permanent Eastern frontier. This would do much to reduce the Polish and Czech stake in the existence of two German states. Some day European frontiers will become unimportant; first, however, they must become accepted as permanent.

Although the security issue remains the hardest nut to crack, progress seems possible once economic and political relations are improved. This view is also gaining acceptance in Eastern Europe. For example, in a remarkably candid and balanced article, which indirectly criticizes the Soviet Union for "unwise attempts to test one's strength on the German question," the previously cited Czech author calls for a two-phased approach toward "the process of European unification," the first being in the field of increasing economic coöperation, the second in that of security.

Given sufficient Western initiative and prior allied consultations, it should prove possible before long to initiate open-ended discussions of security in Central Europe between the two alliances, thus obviating the problem of East Germany's direct participation. If held on a continuing basis, initially at a level lower than ministerial (on the model of the lengthy talks prior to the Austrian peace treaty), they could lead, perhaps by the early 1970s, to the creation of a European Security Commission, based on the two alliances. Its more specific purpose would be to monitor troop movements in Central Europe and make periodic inspections of troop postures. It might also advance other schemes designed to moderate the military confrontation, in keeping with the suggestion contained in President Johnson's speech of October 7, 1966. Reciprocal troop withdrawals from Germany may take place even earlier than that.

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The basic point to remember here is that alliances in the past were designed to wage war; in recent times, they have helped to deter war; in years to come, they must concentrate on promoting peace. Accordingly, NATO could play a constructive role by actively promoting East-West security and disarmament arrangements. A Special Commission, designed to provide the kind of impetus to thinking on disarmament and East-West security which at present comes from only a few national governments, could give NATO new purpose and political meaning.

A continuing expansion in all-German links is to be expected, especially following Ulbricht's death. It will probably take the form of mixed commissions, economic ties, joint German development of mail, telephone and television service, a common electric power system, increased freedom of individual movement and so forth.

All of the foregoing will gradually create a favorable setting for more formal and systematic all-German economic relations, perhaps in the form of an economic community, thereby making possible also a formal relationship between East Germany and the E.E.C., even while the former retains its links with CEMA and some of its existing obligations to the East. (Jugoslavia's formal coöperation with CEMA has not prevented it from expanding relations with EFTA and E.E.C.) Assuming positive developments in economic, political and security fields, and assuming that these processes are kept apart from West German efforts to establish normal diplomatic relations with East European states, and assuming, finally, that other non-communist states do not allow themselves to be seduced into a formal recognition of the two Germanys, the development of all-German ties will gradually contribute to bridging the partition politically. By the mid or late seventies the process of German reassociation, in the context of growing East-West reconciliation, may be quite advanced.

IV. A SHIFT IN EMPHASES

A long-range goal serves as a beacon. It helps to determine not only the desired end; it also signals the best way to get there. Developing and then articulating a relevant concept is the first stage in the pursuit of an effective policy.

The approach suggested in the preceding pages would associate the United States with the preponderant desires of the

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Europeans—both West and East. These are becoming clearer, especially now that the limitations of de Gaulle's concept have emerged in sharper focus after his September trip to Warsaw; and the tactical character of the Soviet posture was underlined by Moscow's behavior in the Middle Eastern crisis.

This broader approach would keep the United States true to its long-standing commitment to the cause of closer West-European integration and Atlantic coöperation. The Atlantic idea would not be abandoned, but it would cease to be the central and, for some, exclusive, concern of American policy in Europe. Nor would it be replaced by an effort to construct a U.S.-Soviet arrangement—the traditional alternative of those Americans who have reacted against our established policy. Burying the cold war does not, and should not, mean reviving Yalta.

The gradual fading of the cold war, and its transformation into a more coöperative relationship, is predicated on the assumption that there will not be any significant change in the existing strategic balance. Both the Soviet Union and the United States, even while developing more coöperative relationships in Europe, are likely to remain rivals in the Third World. Precisely for this reason it is important that the United States retain its present security advantage. Otherwise, conflicts in the Third World could feed back into the European relationship, presenting the Soviet Union with a tempting opportunity to alter the European status quo through military blackmail.

Pursuit of the policy of peaceful engagement favored here would entail some shifts in emphases and methods. Along with important changes in German attitudes,[6] the United States could likewise put greater stress on the process of German reassociation, which might include transitionally a special status for East Germany, in the setting of broader security arrangements for Germany and its neighbors. Moreover, to compensate for the somewhat less vital role of NATO as the principal Atlantic

[6] The German concept of reunification, it should be noted, is undergoing a most profound change. In Chancellor Kiesinger's words: "The desire for reunification means nothing else to the Federal Government than to create an opportunity for our compatriots in the other part of Germany to express their will clearly and distinctly." (Press Conference, March 7, 1967.) Herbert Wehner went even further, hinting at the possibility of recognition of East Germany if it "could be liberalized according to the model of present-day Jugoslavia." (*Washington Post*, Jan. 31, 1967.) And on June 17, the Chancellor said that it is "difficult to imagine that a united Germany, given a continuation of the present political structure in Europe, could easily associate itself with one side or the other."

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bond, the United States will probably find it necessary to emphasize more its economic and technological ties with Western Europe, thus giving the Europeans a greater sense of shared destiny than is provided by one-sided efforts to keep NATO as the primary focus of American-European relationships.

Indeed, it is ironic that the country that least needs NATO for its own security should today appear the most anxious to preserve it; more than this, it is counter-productive, for it feeds European suspicions that the Alliance is an instrument of American control over its allies. It would be better if the United States simply took the position that it will remain as committed to NATO as the Europeans themselves, but not more, and that eventually NATO could become the Western component of an all-European security system. Unless given a new goal, old alliances do not die; they just fade away.

One thing appears certain: if the United States remains inactive, which some recommend as being the better part of wisdom, or merely concentrates on the American-Soviet relationship, it will become increasingly estranged from Europe and most Europeans will seek to settle their destiny outside the Alliance. Discussion with the Europeans of our concepts and proposals for common initiatives will help to revitalize Atlantic ties and will revive the feeling of interdependence with America. Indeed, we should not fear provoking occasionally a lively controversy. A spirited dialogue is preferable to a quiet divorce.

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IS THE GAP TECHNOLOGICAL?

By John Diebold

FOR some three years the so-called "technological gap" between Europe and the United States has been the subject of mounting concern to statesmen and to leaders of the business community on both sides of the Atlantic. Prime Minister Harold Wilson warns that Europe is about to succumb to a kind of "industrial helotry" to the United States. Charles de Gaulle, Ludwig Erhard and Franz-Josef Strauss speak in similar terms. It is one of the focal points for the ambivalence with which the United States is viewed by non-communist nations. Our power is feared; also it is needed. A part of the fear stems from that very need. And a part of the need is to remove the cause of fear. The time has come to sum up the diagnosis and direct our attention to the formulation of practical policies in Europe and America.

Is the gap between Europe and the United States really technological or, rather, something quite different? Is it really as serious as some of our friends in Europe appear to believe? The conclusions reached in this article indicate that the gap is managerial, not technological, and that its consequences, though serious enough to warrant Europe's attention, reflect the existence of natural comparative advantage among industrial nations. In other words, the gap between Europe and the United States should not serve as an excuse for autarkic measures and, to some extent at least, can be viewed as a necessary element in the continued international economic and political viability of the United States.

The nature and causes of the gap—whatever it may be called—should be approached through an examination of the economic, educational, cultural and political difficulties attending European attempts to advance scientific and technological knowledge and to apply its fruits. But it is desirable first to examine the ways in which the United States enters into and influences this picture. On the one side, there is within the United States itself the apparently irresistible force of invention and application of invention, partly based on governmental financing and carried through by huge and growing corporations. On the other side, there is the carry-over of this phenomenon into Europe by way of American enterprise.

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Not only is the United States the home of giant corporations, which can afford the costs of basic research and development and the risks of innovation, but it also has a long lead in the establishment and growth of relatively small, new enterprises created for the development and exploitation of advanced technology. These technologically based businesses are found commonly in the areas of electronics, acoustics, optics, solid-state physics, high-energy physics, instrumentation, metallurgy, pharmaceuticals and plastics. Europe has no such tradition of broad-based industrial entrepreneurship and this, combined with its somewhat rigid social structure, hampers the formation of new business based on the latest technology. Also venture capital for exploiting new technology is in short supply. The European capital market still is poorly developed and organized to provide the initial financing needed by smaller, innovative enterprises. Another major obstacle is the lack of concerned and involved governments providing assured markets for the products of these new enterprises arising out of advanced research. By contrast, in the United States, the government is often the main or only initial customer, providing market support at the most crucial stage of establishing the business.

The carry-over of American activity to Europe can be measured by the size of our direct private investments and the sales of U.S. subsidiaries in Europe. Both have grown three times faster than the rate of European economic growth over the past eight years. Although in any one country sales of American subsidiaries still represent less than 5 percent of total economic activity, the increasingly obvious penetration of American goods, ranging from toothpaste to computers, provides a basis for European alarm. When our favorable trade balance with Europe is added, it is easy to understand how fears of dependence on the United States find a response in both European governmental and business circles. In addition, of course, American products manufactured under license represent an important factor in European consumer and industrial markets. The latest data available show a five-to-one advantage ($251 million to $45 million annually) for the United States in receipts from licensing agreements.

At the beginning of 1951, U.S. direct private investment in Europe stood at $1.7 billion. Fifteen years later, at the end of 1965, it was $13.9 billion—an eightfold increase. The largest absolute increase—more than $9.7 billion—took place during the

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latter half of this period, after the signing of the Treaty of Rome which established the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). Significantly enough, however, during this latter period, new U.S. investment in the E.E.C. has been less than in the rest of Europe.[1] It is quite possible to say, therefore, that although the formation of the E.E.C. triggered the American juggernaut by calling attention to the possibilities of the European market, since then U.S. corporate giants have straddled Europe, inside and outside of the E.E.C., apparently unaffected by a political and economic division which is most fundamental to the European psyche. American business, with its international character and huge resources, not only has been able to benefit more than all but a few European corporations from the supranational climate and potential within the E.E.C., but even has ignored successfully the continued split between the Six and the rest of Europe.

Thus a measure of discouragement enters into the European attitude—a discouragement that leads not only to hostility but to an abdication of responsibility for taking practical steps to meet American competition. In the view of Peter Hilton, of the Institute for New Products, Inc., there is "an inclination to cut back research and development allocations by European industry on the premise that they would only be rediscovering what the United States has already discovered."

II

An important element in the gap is believed to stem from differences in research and development (R. & D.). Undoubtedly R. & D. expenditures in this country exceed those in Europe; the figures are something like $23 billion versus $9 billion annually. On a per capita basis, the ratios are 3 to 1 vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and Germany, 8 to 1 for Belgium and 25 to 1 for Italy. But when calculated in terms of relative gross national product and purchasing power these ratios are reduced. Further, the overwhelming portion of our R. & D. expenditures goes into defense and space efforts which are only indirectly related to our

[1] At the end of 1965, U.S. direct private investments in E.E.C. nations totalled $6.25 billion, an increase of $4.57 billion over 1957. In the rest of Europe, U.S. investments totalled $7.64 billion at the end of 1965, an increase of $5.17 billion over 1957. It should be noted, however, that these figures represent a larger percentage increase for the E.E.C. than for the rest of Europe—272 percent as against 209 percent. Also, Switzerland accounted for 20 percent of the non-E.E.C. increase; and Britain, with $3.15 billion in additional investment, had only a 159 percent increase. None the less, there is no getting around the fact that U.S. investments in the rest of Europe exceeded those in the E.E.C. by $594 million during this period.

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success in applying technology to commercial uses. *How* indirectly is an important question.

On the one hand, the United States Government provides a market for companies in advanced technological fields and provides a raison d'être for the pool of trained personnel which has been built up and maintained to serve this market. On the other hand, legitimate questions can be raised as to the effectiveness of governmentally sponsored R. & D. efforts in serving the real needs of our society and of our international competitive position.

Finally, there are clear indications that research and development in Europe is first-rate. As will be seen, it is its application and (in the words of the chairman of a major U. S. electronics corporation) "the engineering follow-through [which] bears the burden of the difference in results here and there." In lieu of a full discussion, it can be stated that, whether or not the differences in R. & D. expenditures and quality are as large a factor in favor of the United States as may appear at first glance, there can be little doubt that they do help and constitute an element of some importance.

None the less, there are other elements which are more fundamental. One is the prevalent—although far from universal—European attitude toward risk-taking. Competition and the consequent need to innovate generally are deprecated in Europe. Indeed the role of European governments is often to protect against innovation, and private enterprises too generally prefer to let others do the hard work of breaking new ground, while hoping that future developments will not profoundly affect traditional ways of doing things.

This attitude affects the most crucial problems of management: the harnessing of inventive efforts to meet market needs, the evaluation and development of markets, product planning, production scheduling, a certain type of dependence on government, and the administration (training, promotion, incentives) of managerial personnel itself. The following examples come to mind:

1. The French Compagnie des Machines Bull lost a prosperous business (and still is in deep trouble, in spite of massive infusions of capital and know-how from General Electric) primarily because it disregarded its competition in the computer field and miscalculated both its market and its own capabilities. It is most likely that sound management in these areas could have retained

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for Bull a significant and independent position as a computer manufacturer.

2. I.C.T., the British-owned computer manufacturer, until recently did not have a management sufficiently strong to bring together the diverse parts of its merger-built structure. The primary managerial areas to suffer were product planning and marketing.

3. The electronics division of a large European firm functioned entirely without product planning that would put it in touch with the market. It consistently lost money for several years. After the recommendation was made that a top managerial post for product planning be established, it took one year before the company's management accepted the need and another year before the position actually was filled.

Of course, these kinds of failures are found in American firms as well. But the examples cited here not only are typical of the European situation but concern some of the most important companies in the economies of their respective countries. Another characteristic of European business is its failure to gear up to meet the demands for innovation, through the application of systems engineering and a readiness to fill orders under short lead times.

Again, with regard to marketing, an interesting example is found in the field of machine tools controlled by magnetic tape. European—and, particularly, British—companies developed some first-rate control devices. But, disregarding actual market needs, they concentrated on very high-precision and, therefore, high-cost controls. A major U.S. firm, in developing control equipment for the American market, found that considerably larger tolerances were quite acceptable, hence used a different and much less expensive technology to produce a relatively low-cost control system. As a result, the firm not only has a major market position in this country but also is taking the bulk of the European market away from the European suppliers. This is one of the most impressive cases showing that Europeans do have a technology of the highest order, but fail to meet real needs in spite of—and, to some extent, perhaps *because* of—their technological capabilities. The gap here certainly is not a technological one.

An entrepreneurial and managerial concept peculiar to Europe, and found in some of its most important enterprises, is the desire to become sufficiently large, at the cost of unprofitable product

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lines and operating losses, so that the government cannot afford to let the enterprise collapse. This results in a type of dependence on government which greatly widens the division between what a company produces and the actual markets it should serve.

There is also a tradition which prevents the dismissal of managers, except for the grossest blunders, and which discourages risk-taking because the failure to innovate is not considered a cause for censure while the failure of an innovation might be. In such an atmosphere business and profit planning, and the consequent search for and adaptation to markets, hardly exist. Another factor contributing to this atmosphere is that key scientists and managers rarely have an equity in the companies they serve. What Europe needs are not only capital markets which will finance risk-taking and innovative ventures, but participation in these kinds of investments by the men who can make them succeed. There are indications that such steps are beginning to be taken.

Some further examples serve to reinforce the conclusion that Europe's inadequacies do not reside so much in the fields of scientific and technological invention or R. & D. as in the availability of entrepreneurship, managerial skill and capital for turning inventive genius into profitable innovation. Many technologies in the aerospace industry, including the swing-wing plane and the hovercraft, were initially developed in Western Europe but are being applied successfully in the United States. The same is true of laser technology and cryogenics. A majority of the inventions underlying the office copying machine industry in which the United States is dominant can be traced to Europe—specifically France, England and the Netherlands. Fluidics, vital to engine control in supersonic jets, and holography—with wide areas of application, including photography, molecular biology, mass data storage and the direct transfer of handwriting into computer language—were originally European efforts now being put to practical use in the United States.

An examination of patents granted in various countries provides another approach to the nature and causes of the gap between Europe and the United States. It shows not only a lack of actual or intended application of inventions on the part of Europeans, but also a consequently growing gap in the inventive process itself. The countries selected for this examination are Belgium, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden,

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with Japan and the United States providing the basic comparison. Between 1951 and 1965, patents issued by these European countries to their own nationals generally declined. Excluding the United Kingdom, for which comparable data are not available, the decline was from 42,616 to 28,085 annually—or more than one-third. In both Japan and the United States, domestic patents increased greatly over this period—from 4,350 to 17,797 and from 39,606 to 50,332, respectively. In the European countries examined—West Germany excepted—patents issued to foreigners in 1965 greatly exceeded patents issued to nationals. However, in the United States the number of patents issued to foreigners was only one-fourth of those issued to American citizens and in Japan foreign patents were one-half of domestic ones. Between 1951 and 1965, U.S. patents formed an increasing percentage of all patents issued to foreigners in the European countries, with the exception of Sweden. Meanwhile, there was no substantial increase in the number of patents issued by the United States to nationals of the European countries, except West Germany.

But U.S. patents issued to Japanese nationals jumped from virtually none in 1951 to nearly 10 percent of all those granted to foreigners in 1965. Some of this increase may be ascribed to Japan's postwar recovery. But, since nearly all of the increase took place after 1960, one must seek other reasons also. Japan has a competitive international spirit which stimulates investment in development and application engineering and, above all, in managerial and marketing innovations that make the technology pay off. The Japanese have learned what Peter Drucker calls "creative imitation." Many of their patents carry already developed products and processes one or two steps further, improving quality, cost effectiveness of production and marketability. And their adaptation of U.S. managerial methods—another instance of "creative imitation"—appears to be the driving force behind both the applications and the growth of profitable markets for them.

A major reason for the patent situation as it has been described resides in the complexities and incompatibilities of the various national patent systems themselves. These make the process of applying for patents in foreign countries both difficult and expensive. Such expenses, of course, are most easily borne and justified by American industry, with its relatively large assets and its desire to apply internationally the results of its own research and

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development. Further, there appear to be some fundamental weaknesses in the patent laws of certain European countries. As compared to the United States, Europe offers weaker protection for its patent holders. This not only discourages inventive efforts, but results in a secretiveness among inventors and their employers which severely hampers the dissemination of information.

A widely discussed phenomenon in connection with the gap between Europe and the United States is the brain drain. During the five years, 1962 through 1966, more than 60,000 professional and technical workers came from Europe to the United States. The yearly average has remained fairly steady, between 11,000 and 13,000. Among certain professions, up to 15 or 20 percent of those graduated annually from European universities are emigrating, and often they are the best in their field.

The reasons are not hard to find. Starting opportunities and salaries in Europe are far below what can be found by professional people in the United States. The scientists' and technicians' access to top management and to the decision-making process in day-to-day operations, as well as their eventual chance to rise to management positions, is much more limited in Europe. Financial participation in the results of innovative processes still is virtually nonexistent. Thus, a large number of European scientists and technicians are attracted to the United States by better pay, higher status and greater opportunities for creativity and responsible decision-making. A fundamental aspect of these advantages is the so-called "mission-oriented" approach of American research and development. Although far from all scientific personnel like to be tied to profit-making or otherwise tangible objectives, many find expression for their creativity, as well as financial reward, in this approach. American enterprise is known for tying creative endeavor to tangible objectives in the most advanced fields, especially computer and communications systems, aerospace and certain areas of metallurgy.

The incentives given to potential European immigrants to the United States are summarized well by an excerpt from a typical recruiting ad in Europe: "Employers will pay the full fare to the States for you, your family and belongings—probably offer you an advanced study course—give you staff support and facilities you never had before. The powerful American economy offers terrific prospects for technical people at all levels of experience. Major long-term projects opening up are creating new opportuni-

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ties. The professional's role in research, development and manufacturing is highly valued in the U.S.A. Employers are more willing than ever to hire a man for his potential and give him lots of responsibility fast."

There is nothing really new in this. A similar situation was noted nearly a century and a half ago by Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote in 1831: "To build a house, to run a ship, to manufacture an object, or to produce wheat the American people always found a way to use half the manpower needed in Europe. Hence, salaries are twice as high and this in turn draws always larger groups of immigrants."

III

Lest the picture we are drawing get out of balance, it must be remembered that European achievements are far from negligible in pursuits that lie just below the pinnacles of advanced technology. These are of fundamental importance to scientific advance and human progress, and though sometimes lacking in glamor, they reap great economic benefits.

The Pilkington glass process, developed and applied in England, has revolutionized plate glass manufacture in the United States and the rest of the world. New steel-making processes found their first applications in Europe and only some of them have even at this late date been applied by an American steel industry hampered by huge investments in old processes and serving a market affected by the introduction of substitute products. The development and production of the Philips color television camera is a major European achievement in the area of advanced electronics itself. The high quality of European automobile and pharmaceutical manufactures and the superiority of Italy's pharmaceutical equipment are well known throughout the world. Although widely scattered, some of the most advanced and creative installations of computer and communications systems—that is, the software aspects of an industry which is becoming central to nearly every aspect of human endeavor—are to be found in Europe. Even though much of the equipment originates in the United States, its advanced application is a European achievement. One consequence of these European advances is that the U.S. share of world exports of manufactured goods has been falling over the past decade. The shares of most European countries have more than held their own.

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With regard to the brain drain, an examination by the European countries of what their critical manpower needs are as against what they are actually losing could well result in a revision of judgments regarding the real effects and seriousness of the brain drain. And it could resolve the question of the extent to which European scientists and technicians who return to their countries after a stay in the United States are subtracted from the brain-drain totals. Presumably, those coming to this country under governmentally financed educational programs are never included—except for the 1 percent that meet the legal requirements permitting them to remain. But what about others who return after having gained valuable experience? For example, this year my firm is bringing six such people from our European subsidiaries for training in the United States. In a year or two, they will go back. Are they a part of the brain drain? Also, Europe—like the United States—actually experiences a substantial inflow of manpower from the developing nations. These persons come for additional training but unfortunately they often fail to return to their homelands. Are they considered in the total assessment of the European problem? And to what extent is the brain-drain issue quite understandably exploited by the European scientific community itself to enhance the financial remuneration and the professional opportunities of its members, especially where governmental support is involved?

Finally, in assessing "the gap," it is necessary to take a hard look at the development of American industry itself, both technologically and geographically. Hardly a day goes by when one does not read an account of the parlous state of some industry, its backwardness in applying the latest advances of science and technology, and the reluctance of the financial community to risk capital on new processes and necessary development. And hardly a day goes by that members of my firm do not deal with the problems of some major corporation where managerial caution or lack of personnel who are adequately equipped hampers the achievement of breakthroughs to new products and vital services.

Within the United States there are more significant gaps and brain drains than between Europe and the United States. The brilliance generated by a few centers on the East and West coasts cannot blind us to the dark areas of backwardness in Appalachia and other regions. The brain drain from the Midwest

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to California, Massachusetts and New York is greater than the whole world's loss of trained personnel to the United States. There is a remarkable similarity between the complaints of political leaders and businessmen from Illinois, Indiana and Michigan, and those in England, France and Italy: natives of these states and nations are educated at great expense only to be lured away by the glittering areas around Berkeley, M.I.T. and the Middle Atlantic coastline.

In due time, of course, these inequalities within the United States are likely to disappear—even be reversed—through the natural forces of our competitive economic system and the judicious application of governmental policy. But the problem does exist. The State Technical Services Act passed by Congress in 1965 is intended to spur state activities to provide local businesses with information on, and the ability to apply, the latest technological and scientific advances. The very existence of this Act—as well as other legislation, including the establishment of productivity councils, the support of small business enterprises and regional development schemes—is a reminder that, however far we have reached into the future in certain areas and industries, there are large parts of our country and of our economy which have not yet been brought out of the past.

It is true that I.B.M. has between 60 and 65 percent of the European computer market; almost all European long-distance aircraft are built in the United States; the Concorde supersonic aircraft being developed by France and Britain may be outdated within three years after coming off the production lines by the supersonic transport which will be built by the United States; and the brain drain of the 1950s and 1960s toward the American economic and technological colossus may be as serious and significant as the exodus of scientists, philosophers and poets *away from* the political madness of Europe during the 1930s and 1940s. None the less, neither has our technological superiority in a number of industries been achieved with ease nor is it certain to remain with us. The areas in which we lead are important but they are not the only determinants of economic and political power. In some cases they are far-flung salients only precariously supported from inadequate positions of fundamental economic, educational and political strength. Perhaps, rather than being the staging areas for further irresistible advances, they are only bargaining points. The advantages they represent are not neces-

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sarily permanent or even long lasting. The "dollar gap" changed within a few years into vast dollar and gold holdings by West European central banks. And Hiroshima has become one of the greatest cities of one of the world's most powerful industrial nations.

IV

There is little doubt, then, that a type of gap exists between Europe and the United States in certain areas of the most advanced technology and science. But the appellation "technological" gap is a misnomer. It is in reality a gap caused by a number of European managerial and financial inadequacies, as well as by a still outmoded educational system, social immobilities and political barriers. The consequences of this situation are the cause for legitimate concern.

There are several things that reasonably might—but probably should not—be done. The United States, in a Marshall Plan type of program, could subvent the West European acquisition, both private and governmental, of American scientific and technological knowledge and of our managerial techniques for applying the fruits of research and development. The United States could, for example, transfer organic parts of its great academic-industrial complexes to European soil. These complexes could then be made to grow, training and employing Europeans exclusively. The operative conditions for such assistance could be the accelerated admission of the United Kingdom and her EFTA associates into the Common Market, the swift rationalization or unification of West European corporate, tax, patent and social service laws, and, perhaps, even the establishment of a unified European currency under a body similar to but more powerful than the old European Payments Union.

Further, the United States could revise its immigration laws to exclude any potential West European immigrant certified by his or her native country as vital to that nation's interest. It even could expel any foreign residents in the United States who had not yet either applied for or attained citizenship, if their services were desired by their native countries.

These are things which might be done. It is even possible to construct an historical rationale for such a course of action, in the light of what the United States has done in the past. It is equally evident, however, that these are things that probably should not

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be done. This is not 1947, with Europe prostrated by war and ready to accept America's tutelage in return for the assistance needed to get back on its feet. For more than a decade now, Europe has been an increasingly successful rival of the United States in the competition for markets and political influence. Any attempt to enforce conditions—other than payment in hard cash —for U.S. assistance would serve only to raise the temperature of the still smoldering resentments left over from the days of American hegemony.

Indeed, Europe, in order to maintain its competitiveness, will have to learn increasingly to apply the advanced products and techniques of American science and technology and the methods of American management to the production and marketing of those items in which it excels.

What, then, should Europe do? On the basis of what we know today, the following steps might be considered:

1. Establish technological and scientific priorities and managerial goals on a country-by-country and on a supranational basis. This would imply, specifically, the application of information, communications and other hardware and systems techniques to the expansion of European industries and their worldwide markets. It is necessary to go considerably beyond the $500 million governmental financing of private computer manufacturers planned in Britain, France and West Germany over the next five years. These are national investments, aimed principally at national markets. They tend to discourage mergers and other forms of coöperative and competitive action, and reinforce the continued development of incompatible and inadequately diversified systems which fail to meet the need of European industries for the latest technology. Similarly, this type of national financing is likely to provide computer manufacturers with little help in meeting competition outside of Europe.

2. Conclude intra-European political agreements to enact compatible corporate, tax, patent and social service laws which will permit the formulation of goals for business mergers and marketing. Figures for 1964 indicate that the United States, with 55 companies having sales of over $1 billion annually, enjoys a 3-to-1 advantage over Europe in this regard. However, in respect of companies with sales of over $250 million annually, the United States has a somewhat less forbidding lead of 2 to 1—248 United States companies against 119 European ones. Once the harmo-

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nization of European legal systems becomes a reality, one could reasonably expect a substantial increase in the number of European companies of the latter size, well able to afford large-scale R. & D. and marketing expenditures. But probably even more important than the matter of size for individual businesses is the formulation of competitive marketing strategies and the development of appropriate equipment among technologically advanced European industries. This process must take place on a supranational scale and requires a supranational legal and entrepreneurial climate.

3. Accelerate and expand the revisions begun in the European educational system. This is fundamental. Dr. James A. Perkins, President of Cornell University and Chairman of the President's Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance Programs, writes in the July 1966 issue of *Foreign Affairs:* "Perhaps no wind of change in Europe is more important than the revolution, just started, that will inevitably lead to the democratization and modernization of the schools and universities. Until this reform is completed, the European educational system will be the bottleneck that shuts off the development of Europe's manpower and shortens the life of its great dreams." And one of the major recommendations of the Deauville conference last May, which was devoted to the "technological gap," was the creation of a European Institute of Science and Technology in order to expand Europe's educational facilities to provide scientific, technological and managerial training. These would graduate not only a large number of scientists of the highest quality, but also a proportionately even larger number of second- and third-level technicians and managers to serve vital supportive functions. For example, by 1970 Europe will need 50,000 additional computer programmers and 25,000 additional systems analysts—increases of 140 and 270 percent respectively over 1966. Further, the modernization and expansion of existing institutions of higher education is essential. A number of other basic steps come to mind. One would be to establish academic chairs, research facilities and student scholarships sponsored by business firms. On the basis of such grants the possibilities of contractual relationships between students and business and between universities and business should also be considered.

4. Organize effective efforts both by government and private business to hire U.S. talent for such purposes as the improvement

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of European communications and other technological infrastructures, the establishment of management training programs and the specific application of R. & D. to the production of marketable goods and services.

In its role as both competitor and Atlantic Community partner the United States should be ready to provide appropriate assistance to such European efforts. American coöperation could take the following forms:

1. Provide tax and other incentives for American corporations to establish additional R. & D. facilities in Europe. Such facilities would provide both primary and secondary markets for scientific, technological and management skills in order to slow down or reverse the emigration of newly trained European talent. It seems to me, as David Rockefeller recently said: "The most important contribution that we can make to Europe's technological development . . . is to do more of our own exploratory research" in Europe itself.

2. Contribute to European education in science, technology and, above all, management training. Financial assistance by American businesses and foundations could be directed specifically to facilitating the exchange of professors between Europe and the United States, especially in the field of management training. The direct participation of American businessmen in European management education can be a rewarding experience for both sides.

3. Reëxamine the Export Control Act of 1949 and its administration. This Act has been repeatedly extended by the Congress in virtually unchanged form. Its existence, and certainly its administration, have made the United States an increasingly unreliable source of supply for equipment ranging from computers to printing presses. As American and European policies on East-West trade have diverged over the past decade, the Export Control Act has caused both annoyance to the Europeans and a loss of export opportunities for American firms. Now that U.S. policy regarding trade with most communist countries is undergoing a fundamental reëvaluation on the part of both government and private business, it would appear an appropriate moment to remove the divisive and often self-defeating aspects of the Export Control Act. The frequently arbitrary decisions made in the name of this legislation have served to reinforce Europe's reluctance to depend on the United States as a supplier of much-

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needed advanced technology. Understandably, this situation is used to justify the uneconomic diversion of European resources into the development of technologies which could be more economically produced and supplied by the United States.

4. Try to achieve a major increase in the financial participation of Europe in U.S. ventures. Of course, this is a two-way street; European banks, businesses and individuals have to be willing to put up the money. None the less, much more could be done to sell the idea of financial partnerships. This would almost surely benefit the investors, improve the international atmosphere and increase political coöperation across the Atlantic.

These suggestions are by no means exhaustive; new ideas and new forms of coöperation inevitably will arise. Purposely excluded are proposals that are primarily political. For example, is the recently initiated E.E.C. effort to achieve technological cooperation politically broad enough to achieve the objectives outlined here? This is for Europe to decide. The form or extent of European integration which would make possible the needed harmonization of legal systems is left open; and how measures taken should be coördinated is best left to the affected parties themselves. In any event, the emphasis should be on European initiatives, with active support by the United States. And the first consideration of our support should be the interest we have in Europe as an equal economic competitor and an effective partner in world affairs.

I believe that the fundamental conclusion which may be drawn from this discussion is that the so-called technological gap should be a reason neither for European isolation nor European backwardness. It is not a manifestation of technological failure which Europe must overcome through the isolated development of its own technology. Rather, it is the result of European political divisions and of disparities in managerial and financial capabilities between Europe and the United States. Also, it is an expression of natural comparative advantage in international economic affairs. It is not a "technological" gap at all. And, if the nations of the Atlantic Community understand and act upon this conclusion, the gap which does exist need not widen nor take on an importance which it does not have.

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PROMISE IN INDONESIA

By Adam Malik

EVERY historical milestone reflects the end as well as the beginning of an era, and since history is continuity in spite of change, so the beginning of an era is never a complete disengagement from the past, either materially or mentally. Such is the case now in Indonesia.

Within her short history as an independent nation Indonesia has experienced systems of government, political outlook and conduct which were more than merely different; they were contradictory. But during both those decades one man remained at the summit of the Indonesian political scene: Sukarno. His character is by no means easy to describe because of its many ambiguities. He is a man who loves the mysteries of the night's darkness, but none the less can enjoy the freshness of a bright day; who knows how to add flavor to protocol by breaking formal rigidities with touches of human interest; who smiles or snubs as he expresses his vivid joys or sorrows to others; who sometimes reveals the positive attitude of an exact scientist or, again, the intuition of an artist; who knows how to saturate the masses with emotion and hold them spellbound, but also how to control them with a minimum of gestures. During serious discussions of problems with his ministers he could appreciate humorous interruptions by high officials in the role of court jesters. My personal recollection of him is of a man rich in ideas and imagination and direct in both his sympathies and antipathies; in short, an unforgettable character.

In spite of the mistakes which Sukarno made during his period as President of the Republic, he succeeded in making himself a rallying point for the Indonesian people in general. It was not easy to build up a leadership image in a polyethnic country like Indonesia. We must admit Sukarno's skill in developing his image as Supreme Leader of the Indonesian Revolution, Extension of the People's Tongue, Bearer of the Mission of the People's Suffrage and so on. He was able to discredit any politicians who did not share his political views. Orders to jail anyone who opposed the President hung like a sword of Damocles above the heads not only of politicians but of intellectuals and artists, indeed anyone and everyone who was in disagreement with him.

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The atmosphere of threat and insecurity became more and more oppressive during the years 1959–60. That was the period in which, with Sukarno's encouragement, the Communist Party (the P.K.I.) gained its great influence in Indonesian politics. The Institution for Building up the Revolutionary Spirit was established to compose the ideas, speeches, slogans and symbols which were to be spread out through the entire nation by means of courses in building cadres, by discriminatory upgrading and downgrading of officials and by mass rallies, campaigns and drives. The Institution's aim was to indoctrinate the Indonesian people with the belief that what Sukarno said was always right and wise and that the body of his teachings actually incorporated undeniable and absolute truth. An order was issued to all newspapers, weeklies and monthlies to reserve columns for the coverage of "the teachings of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution Bung Karno," and they had to comply or be accused of subversion and counterrevolutionary attitudes.

The climate came closer and closer to madness, yet an old discredited politician, quoting Hamlet, remarked "how much system there was in this madness." The idea of revolution, the unfinished revolution, justified any and every sudden change in political behavior. It also justified Indonesia's unpredictability in changing allies and foes in its foreign relations. Similarly, staggering economic conditions had to be accepted as necessary for the sake of building the nation. Nation-building and national identity were the slogans, and they were driven to the point where xenophobia was not just permitted but nourished.

Typical of Bung Karno's views was his speech of August 17, 1959, known as the Manifesto Politik, abbreviated to "Manipol" and later ideologized as "Manipolism." One sentence read, "The whole strength of the people must be canalized into one vast wave of energy . . . into one irresistible wave of heave ho and pull together" (*"Ho lopis kuntul baris"*). It was a period of collective hypnosis. The mass motto of "heave ho and pull together" soon became institutionalized in the form of the *Front Nasional* in which the P.K.I. was definitely given the role of directing the course of Indonesian politics. Its success was due not so much to any majority this National Front possessed or might possibly gain, but to the protective hand of Sukarno who was, alas, its Chairman. Mainly because of this the P.K.I., a minority, assumed the quality of a majority. Some elements tended to co-

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operate with the leftists at least partly out of loyalty to "Bung Karno" and his teaching that "the Indonesian Revolution is a leftist revolution."

Bung Karno's absurd "Nasakom" concept, resulting from his early studies of Marxism, Islam and Nationalism, became (or was made) a political credo which every political party had to accept as beyond criticism. On it he intended to build a stable political platform in Indonesia, even in the whole world, as indicated in his statements following the abortive communist coup of September 30, 1966. Even in the traditional August speech which he made in the summer of 1966 he played with the idea of reviving the Nasakom concept (although he cautiously changed it to "Nasasos," abbreviating Sos from Socialism, and making it more vague by adding "plus whatever sort of Nasa it may be"). That speech was actually the point of no return in the split between Sukarno, protector of the Communist Party, and the anti-communist masses led by students and supported by other political groups.

The Provisionary Consultative Council of People's Representatives has now declared Communism/Marxism-Leninism a forbidden ideology in Indonesia and the P.K.I. has been banned. Months before this decree was issued masses of students and militant youths painted the walls of Djakarta with cynical and insulting statements regarding the P.K.I. and the Nasakom idea. In some places new meanings were given to the term Nasakom, *e.g.* Nas(ution) A(mbil) Kom(ando), meaning "Nasution, yours to command." Political interpreters explained that the reference to General Nasution really meant the armed forces.

General Suharto has moved patiently toward a settlement of the political conflict which followed the abortive communist coup, showing his good will in trying to solve it as peacefully as possible. His intricate and sensitive efforts, conducted by gradual phases, caused a certain amount of confusion and speculation, especially among foreign observers. A comparison might with some reason be made between his methods and our traditional Indonesian shadowplay; but the fact remains that national problems cannot be solved in complete detachment from the prevailing intellectual and cultural climate. It was not hesitation or reluctance that slowed the procedure adopted by General Suharto so much as the complicated character of the person being dealt with. The nuances of feeling and intuition hidden in that intro-

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verted personality presented many riddles and required delicate manipulation.

II

Such was the picture in 1966—a blend of uncertainties and hopes. A new leader had been given to the nation, but the old leader still struggled to postpone his defeat. He was a leader of the past, and his decline and eventual defeat were an historical necessity. Simultaneously with his decline there came into being a new generation aware of its responsibilities. This new young generation had been frustrated by prolonged suppression, but in spite of terror and threats had determined, in a spirit of *l'amour de risque,* to start a history of their own. Calling themselves "Generation-66," the second generation since "Generation-45" to have political significance, they have today become a pillar of the New Order in Indonesia. It is their merit that they were the first to make sure that the New Order was not to be degraded into a mere slogan and to insist that it be given meaning as a new social and political way of life based upon the Constitution.

It is to be hoped that students and intellectuals can continue to contribute to the country's development. They will do this effectively only if they can keep their momentum and at the same time adjust themselves to changing conditions and changing demands. To be useful, they should adapt their methods of struggle to the shifts in aims and objectives as Indonesian society develops. This will not be easy, but it can be done, and I am convinced it will in fact be done in the long years of social, economic and political reconstruction that lie ahead.

"The freedom of assembly and association, of expression of spoken and written opinion, shall be provided for by law," says Article 28 of the Constitution. It sums up the main mission of the New Order: to restore democracy. This is not as easy as many Westerners think. Five to six years of brainwashing and indoctrination have left their traces in the minds of many, even those who are in principle on the side of the New Order. Some fear the consequences of restoring democracy, while others are still under the influence of the political prejudices and poisonous effects of prolonged indoctrination. Time will be needed for complete recovery.

Both Indonesia's leaders and policy-makers and the Indonesian people as a whole must persist in the determination to

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realize the ideal of true democracy. Unless the New Order succeeds in this mission it is doomed to degenerate into mere sloganism. It was born as a response to the challenge of tyranny and terror, and it must maintain that challenge against all forms of absolutism or dictatorship. The system most suitable for governing our widespread archipelago is that of a unitarian democratic republic. Retrogression to a dictatorship ruling by the old methods of force and intimidation would end inevitably in the disintegration of the Indonesian state.

The question now is whether or not the democrats of Generation-66 will be able to restore full confidence in democratic institutions and solve our national problems by the democratic means provided within the context of the Constitution. Those in positions of responsibility in the government administration and the armed forces, and the leaders of political parties, must realize that Indonesia's problems will not be solved by mere exchanges of abuse, by accusations and counter-accusations or by making scapegoats of opponents.

In most countries when the military takes over the running of the government its first act is to abolish or distort the Constitution. This has led to questions being asked about the possibility that the political leadership of the armed forces represented by General Suharto will follow a similar course. The answer to those questions is no. In our case, the armed forces have committed themselves to restore a constitutional government and to revive the democratic spirit. General Suharto and the armed forces have assumed the solemn duty of fulfilling this. I am convinced that General Suharto wishes to do so, as do also, I hope, all the top military leaders. If all who belong to the New Order are aware of the responsibility they share to restore democracy, then the year 1966 will have become in fact a milestone of Indonesia's coming of age socially and politically.

III

It is over a year now since the government started tackling its economic problems seriously and systematically. Substantial progress has been made in controlling inflation, but the economy is still suffering the after-pains of the drastic operation; at best it can be described as being in a state of convalescence.

In October 1966 the government began to correct the ubiquitous controls and gross errors in the allocation of funds which

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had prevailed in the past and had finally produced a runaway inflation. All unproductive spending on monuments and prestige projects was cut off. Foreign trade was freed from the unrealistic exchange controls which had handicapped exports and made imports cheap for those who were lucky enough to procure licenses. Exports and imports were for the first time given a floating exchange rate to protect foreign trade in the still existing inflationary conditions. The very high export taxes concealed in the foreign-exchange regulations were substantially reduced.

During that last quarter of 1966 the government also approached creditor countries, to which it owes more than $2.5 billion, in an effort to secure a rescheduling of current debt obligations. Intergovernmental groups met successively in Tokyo and Amsterdam to discuss the problem. Impressed by the Indonesian Government's serious intention to put its own house in order, they agreed to reschedule current debt obligations and to furnish $200 million to support the budget and to ease our balance of payments in the first year of the stabilization effort. The government insisted that these fresh loans be given in the form of multi-purpose commodity loans, primarily to support the budget rather than to finance projects. This form of international aid is not common, but fortunately the creditors agreed to it. In all of this, the assistance and counsel of the International Monetary Fund were invaluable.

The government also submitted to parliament a budget in which expenditures and revenues (inclusive of foreign aid) were in balance. It had been a very long time since an Indonesian government had presented a balanced budget, or indeed a well-prepared budget of any sort. Although the government had no illusions that a rigid balance could be maintained throughout 1967, it was determined to introduce budgetary discipline, begin setting new rules for sounder budgetary practices and make sure that government budgets should no longer be the source of inflation as in the past.

A new round of economic measures was undertaken in February 1967, this time aimed at abolishing subsidies to public utilities and national oil companies; unless this was done, the budget would never be in balance. The cost of gasoline, kerosene and diesel oil went up eightfold and, partly as a consequence, public utility rates had to be raised twentyfold in order to break even. These rate and price adjustments were a severe shock to

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the economy and inevitably had political repercussions, but there seemed no alternative.

Since then the economy has been painfully trying to accommodate itself to the new rules and to move from hyperinflation and excessive government controls to a more stable market economy. The rate of inflation is still 65 percent per year, but the government is avoiding price and foreign-exchange controls in an effort to make the policies stick.

The ordeal of stabilization is being widely felt. The deflationary forces resulting from reduced government spending and from higher transportation costs and public utility rates have brought hardship to many of our still-infant domestic industries. The high priority accorded to exports and the increasing stability of the currency have already produced a stream of imports; the "empty-shelves economy" of the past is over. This means that domestic industry still has to make further painful adjustments to the new competitive situation.

In the final analysis, the success of the stabilization and rehabilitation program depends on our obtaining sufficient foreign aid. Budget expenditures had to be cut substantially in the past year due to shortfalls in foreign aid receipts. Instead of $140 million worth of development expenditures, only $95 million will have been spent. As a result, the government could carry out only the most necessary road repairs and complete one or two high-priority agriculture and irrigation schemes and certain industrial projects already long under construction.

The 1967 budget for salaries was very inadequate. The total sum available for salaries, to be distributed among some two million employees, the armed forces included, amounted to only $240 million. The average salary per government worker thus is about $120 per year. Low wages create a temptation to government employees and others to make up the difference between their salaries and the minimum necessary for subsistence for themselves and their families by taking second jobs or by various devices, legal or illegal. This poses a problem which only the capacity to raise salaries gradually can bring under control.

The salary scale in 1967 represented an improvement over the preceding year, and the reduced rate of inflation adds to the protection of persons with fixed incomes. Nevertheless, a further improvement is vitally necessary. The new régime has put great stress on bettering economic conditions. Although it is not giving

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the people rosy promises, it nevertheless is creating expectations. In 1968, a pre-election year, the new régime will be measured above all by its performance on the economic front.

The government enjoys several obvious advantages in dealing with its problems. General Suharto has given it determined leadership; major political dilemmas have been solved with tact and without creating unnecessary turmoil. It has struck a happy balance between continuity and change. Its major support is the military establishment, at the moment the strongest political entity in the country. A broad consensus exists about the general direction in which the New Order should move even though there is ample criticism of the way specific changes are being managed. Meanwhile the opposition is not very vocal and is not well organized. All this makes for a relatively strong government with good chances for survival. The fact remains that the régime has to score substantial successes in the economic field; it has to "deliver the goods."

For the fiscal year 1968 (which coincides with the calendar year) we need a larger budget in order to permit improvements in salaries and larger investments in development. Our first effort will be to cover routine expenditures by raising domestic revenues some 27 percent in real terms. If we can achieve this, it will be the first time in Indonesia's history. In addition, in order to cover a higher development budget, we need increased foreign aid, if possible the equivalent of $250 million in the same form as the past year—that is, multi-purpose commodity aid.

Outside the regular operating budget, we will introduce direct project aid in the form of equipment and capital goods, mainly to rehabilitate infrastructure projects: roads, harbors, rivers, railways, generating plants, airways and irrigation facilities. None of these has had proper replacements since 1961 and most are in very bad repair. Thus 1968 will be an "infrastructure year," aimed at repairing facilities in order to revive the economy, boost exports and lay a more solid foundation for the long-range development which we intend to start in 1969.

Ideally, we hope aid may come from the United States in the calendar year 1968 in the amount of $50 million under Public Law 480, $50 million in the form of commodity credits and, say, $30 million in the form of capital goods for rehabilitating the infrastructure. Since we are a nation of 110 million people, such governmental aid would amount to a little over $1 per head.

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By comparison with the $65 million of American aid in the current year, the new figure might appear too hopeful, but if it is enough to bring stability to a vital region of the world it could be considered a modest investment.

In addition to governmental aid, Indonesia is hoping for a good measure of American equity investment. Our foreign investment policy is an integral part of our overall economic and development policy. The law passed as a high priority measure in parliament as early as the last quarter of 1966 provides ample guarantees against expropriation and undue government interference in management. It provides also for the free transfer of profits as well as legitimate costs such as expenses for patents, royalties, insurance and part of the salaries of expatriate employees. After the tax holiday is over, repatriation of capital will be allowed. Indonesia's great natural potential and its large domestic market can be developed effectively by private enterprise, and in this foreign capital can play a very important role. The government will confine itself to investments in roads, harbors, rail transport, communications, agriculture, schools and other requirements for social development and will leave the rest of the economy open to the initiative of private enterprise. The government also realizes that since it cannot count on the flow of foreign aid capital continuing indefinitely, self-help measures are necessary to mobilize the domestic capital which will one day have to take over the role now being filled by international aid.

In developing countries, however, foreign equity capital should work in a coöperative manner with the host society. Foreign investment must become a truly international venture; that is, it must produce a blend of Western technology and management with local human and social capacities. Trouble comes if foreign investment creates isolated islands of modernity in an underdeveloped native sea. Along with the influx of foreign capital we have to develop an indigenous middle class, which in time should be as strong as the foreign business class, indeed preferably stronger. This is imperative if we want to preserve social and political stability. In Indonesia there is as yet no strong and established middle class, save for the semi-alien Chinese business community. That is why the government prefers joint enterprises or joint ventures rather than foreign investments which remain fully controlled from abroad; but because of the scarcity of Indonesian capital and entrepreneurs it will not insist on these

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in the beginning. We want to develop indigenous entrepreneurs through education and employment, and for this purpose foreign enterprises are required to train Indonesians and employ local skills to the extent they are available.

IV

We must give evidence of progress toward maturity in our handling of international as well as national problems. In our foreign relations, I regret to say, policy-makers of the past régime destroyed much good will or at the least did not respond adequately to evidence of it. The task of the Indonesian Government now is to regain the confidence of some of the nations which have experienced mistreatment by our predecessors. It will make every effort to restore relations with other nations in the Indonesian people's genuine spirit of good will, so long suppressed.

We believe that no nation in this age of rapid technological progress and scientific advances can live in isolated self-sufficiency. Even if for the time being we put more stress on our domestic problems, we are aware of our role among the other nations of the world. The fact that so much has to be done at home to improve social welfare and develop natural resources does not indicate any lack of interest in foreign affairs.

Indonesia's main problem today is to reëstablish her position as a respectable and respected nation based on a policy described usually as nonalignment. This means that Indonesia will not become a member of any international bloc, either political or ideological. It does not mean, however, that Indonesia will take up an attitude of indifference toward world problems and world conflicts. Indonesia will join with other nations to promote world peace and good international relations. I must admit that our good will has not as yet been fully reciprocated; policies of the past régime have left a certain residue of mistrust abroad. That is why I am making it my mission as Minister of Foreign Affairs to regain what good will we may have lost, not by promises but by proving Indonesia a reliable partner in political as well as business matters.

In this context we are working toward the establishment of regional coöperation in Southeast Asia. The initiative is not a new one. The Asian nations, and especially those of Southeast Asia, are aware of the necessity of coöperation not just for political ends but for the sake of mutual development. The exchange

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of experience in nation-building in a world of rapid social change and technological progress is fruitful not so much because one can copy from another as because a comparative analysis can prevent the repetition of mistakes.

The primary reason for regional coöperation is the necessity for modernization. The developing nations themselves have the primary responsibility for accelerating the speed of their recovery and improving their standard of living. Yet other more developed nations have a duty to help on ethical grounds. Today national leaders must consider the good not of their nations but of humanity in general. The cultural differences among the peoples of the world present problems of a quite secondary order compared with the problems arising from the discrepancies in the basic needs for human survival. Especially in our region, the question of war or peace is not the only problem. There is a desperate struggle, too, against poverty, disease, illiteracy and many other ills. It is a struggle which can be won if the will exists, by which I mean if the nations of the world will pay enough attention. With this in mind we look on the establishment of regional coöperation in Southeast Asia as part of, and in harmony with, international coöperation in general, the overall object being to improve our standard of living and our intellectual capacities so that we may keep pace with modern progress or at least not stay too far behind.

In view of the tremendous growth of the idea of regional cooperation, which resulted in the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it might seem logical that part of the foreign aid given to Indonesia or other countries in the area should be diverted to multinational regional projects. The fact is, however, that the aid given directly to Indonesia or other countries of the area is much smaller than their needs. Because of this, and also because aid varies in kind and purpose from country to country, a diversion of any part of it does not seem feasible without curtailing the programs already under way. Such aid as might be provided for multinational regional projects ought not to interfere, therefore, with what is given to national economic programs.

No Asian country can detach itself from anything that happens in Asia. Although Asia is composed of many nations, with varieties of culture and political and ideological outlook, every part feels the pulse of every other part. The Chinese Cultural

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Revolution is an Asian problem, as the Viet Nam war is also a problem for other parts of Asia. The same is true of the industrial progress of Japan, which affects certain aspects of the national economy of other Asian nations. But in a general way we can almost say that the Asian problem is caused mainly by the fact of transition—transition from traditional society toward a modernized society, from colonialized nations toward independence, from more or less tranquil isolation toward international involvement. Nor are the problems involved rational only; some of the inhibiting factors are basically emotional in nature. Psychologically, the situation can be stated in terms of a traumatic experience—the attempt to achieve self-responsibility in a community of nations where interdependence is a must.

The idea of regional coöperation is not, of course, inconsistent with coöperation with other nations in the world, and for this Indonesia believes that the United Nations is indeed the most suitable forum. Since its establishment in 1945 the United Nations has undergone drastic changes in nature and structure, for the world itself has changed, and many problems not foreseen in those early days of postwar fatigue and hope have arisen as results of new conflicting forces and ideologies. It is not enough to blame each other for the present sorrow in the world. We are all to blame, and each will be blamed by tomorrow's generations unless each does his share to end it.

To those nations which belong to the family of the affluent I would like to make an appeal: transcend limitations of national or local interest and dismiss feelings of superiority. The relationship of the affluent and the impoverished but developing societies must not be based on such assumptions and cannot be contrived by political manipulation. The better world we hope for will be inhabited by men possessed of their full dignity and rights and conscious of their plain duty. To fulfill that hope should be the ethical purpose of the United Nations, which is the institutionalized manifestation of the society of man.

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HOW IT BEGAN

By Charles W. Yost

THE recent Six Day War in the Middle East grew out of the sterile confrontation to which the peoples of the region had committed themselves over the past twenty years. Both parties had frequently proclaimed their intention to go to war under certain circumstances. It seems unlikely, however, that any of them plotted and planned war for 1967. It seems more likely that they blundered into it.

Both sides might on many occasions have moved to end their confrontation by compromise, but this neither side showed the slightest willingness to do. The Israelis, feeling themselves beleaguered by fifty million hostile neighbors, acutely conscious of the recent fate of six million Jews in Europe, believed any significant concession would merely whet insatiable Arab appetites and start Israel down the slippery slope to extinction. The Arabs, looking upon the establishment of Israel as the latest in a series of imperialist occupations of their homeland, of which the presence of a million Palestine refugees was a constant reminder, found it emotionally and politically impossible to accept Israel as a permanent fact of life or to forego harassing it and conspiring against it.

This common intolerance and mutual harassment had brought on war in 1956. It is pertinent to note that, in his "Diary of the Sinai Campaign" published in 1966, General Dayan wrote that the three major objects of that campaign from the Israeli point of view were "freedom of shipping for Israeli vessels in the Gulf of Aqaba; an end to the Feydayen terrorism; and a neutralization of the threat of attack on Israel by the joint Egypt-Syria-Jordan military command." With slight variations, these were the issues that brought on war again eleven years later.

II

Through the latter part of 1966, so-called "El Fatah" incursions into Israel, sometimes carried out by Palestinian refugees, sometimes moving through Jordan or Lebanon, but for the most part mounted in Syria, grew in numbers and intensity. In October two particularly serious incidents in which several Israelis were

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killed caused Israel to appeal, as it often had before, to the U.N. Security Council. However, a relatively mild resolution proposed by six of its members, calling on Syria to take stronger measures to prevent such incidents, was, as on previous occasions, vetoed by the Soviet Union in the supposed interests of its Arab friends.

A new and more radical Syrian government had come to power by coup d'état earlier that year. It enthusiastically supported the claims and machinations of the so-called Palestine Liberation Army which mobilized and inflamed the refugees and carried out some of the raids. The Syrian Prime Minister declared in a press conference in October: "We are not sentinels over Israel's security *and are not the leash that restrains the revolution of the dis*placed and persecuted Palestinian people." Early in November, moreover, a "defense agreement" was concluded between Syria and the United Arab Republic, involving a joint military command and other measures of "coördination and integration" between the two countries.

It had long been Israel's practice, whenever it judged that Arab raids had reached an intolerable level, to retaliate massively. It did so on November 13 against Es Samu in Jordan where, according to U.N. observers, eighteen Jordanian soldiers and civilians were killed and fifty-four wounded. The fact that moderate Jordan rather than extremist Syria was the target of retaliation seemed ill-judged to most of the world but was excused by Israel on grounds that there had recently been thirteen acts of sabotage committed on Israeli territory from Jordanian bases. Be that as it may, the consequences, in and out of the region, of this disproportionate and misplaced retaliation were considerable.

The U.N. Security Council, by a vote of fourteen to one abstention (New Zealand), censured Israel "for this large-scale military action in violation of the U.N. Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan" and emphasized to Israel "that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts."

Perhaps more important in its effect on subsequent events, the Jordanian Prime Minister in a press conference charged the U.A.R. and Syria, which had been denouncing King Hussein's government, with failing to bear their share of the confrontation against Israel. He accused the U.A.R. of failing to supply prom-

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ised air cover and urged that Egyptian troops be withdrawn from Yemen and sent to Sinai on Israel's southern flank. The U.A.R. Commander-in-Chief of the Arab Command replied publicly with similar recriminations but the charges must have struck home to a régime so peculiarly sensitive to face and prestige.

From January to April 1967 the Syrian-Israeli frontier was agitated by an ascending series of clashes ranging from potshots at tractors plowing to exchanges of fire between tanks, artillery and aircraft. These clashes were primarily caused by the refusal of both sides, at different times, to permit the U.N. Mixed Armistice Commission even to mark the armistice line at disputed points and the insistence of both parties on farming and patrolling disputed areas.

On April 7, 1967, one of these clashes escalated into what in retrospect appears to have been the curtain-raiser to the six-day war. An exchange of fire between tanks gave rise to intervention first by Israeli and then by Syrian aircraft. This led by the end of the day to the appearance of Israeli planes over the outskirts of Damascus and to the shooting down of six Syrian planes.

The most serious aspect of this affair was that for the second time in six months Arab forces suffered a very bloody nose at the hands of Israel without the "unified Arab Command" in Cairo lifting a finger. President Nasser, who aspired to be leader of the Arab world and who had formally established a military apparatus at least for the containment of Israel, had sat quietly by while first his rival and then his ally had been conspicuously and roundly chastised. Neither the rival nor the ally hesitated publicly and privately to point out this dereliction. Nasser could of course reply, and perhaps did, that the El Fatah raids were excessive and untimely, that the Arabs must not be provoked into fighting before they were ready, and that the U.N. Emergency Force standing between his army and Israel blocked its coming to the rescue of his Arab allies. These excuses, however genuine and well-founded they may have been, were quite clearly wearing thin in the eyes of the Arabs after the April 7 affair. Those knowing President Nasser's temperament could hardly have felt any assurance that he would hold aloof a third time.

III

Yet the respite was brief. A month later, on May 11, the U.N. Secretary-General declared at a press luncheon: "I must say that,

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in the last few days, the El Fatah type of incidents have increased, unfortunately. Those incidents have occurred in the vicinity of the Lebanese and Syrian lines and are very deplorable, especially because, by their nature, they seem to indicate that the individuals who committed them have had more specialized training than has usually been evidenced in El Fatah incidents in the past. That type of activity is insidious, is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Armistice Agreements and menaces the peace of the area."

On the same day, May 11, Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol was saying in a public speech in Tel Aviv that his government regarded this wave of sabotage and infiltration gravely. "In view of the fourteen incidents of the past month alone," he said, "we may have to adopt measures no less drastic than those of April 7." In a radio interview two days later he declared: "It is quite clear to the Israeli Government that the focal point of the terrorists is in Syria, but we have laid down the principle that we shall choose the time, the place and the means to counter the aggressor." Eshkol went on to say that he intended to make Israeli defense forces powerful enough to deter aggression, to repel it and to strike a decisive blow within enemy territory.

It would appear that a senior Israeli military officer also made a public comment on or about May 12, the exact text of which it has not been possible to find but which, whether or not correctly understood, significantly contributed to Arab apprehensions. President Nasser referred to it in a speech on May 23, saying, "On May 12 a very important statement was made. . . . The statement said that the Israeli commanders have announced they would carry out military operations against Syria in order to occupy Damascus and overthrow the Syrian Government."

These Israeli exercises in verbal escalation provoked far more serious repercussions than they were no doubt intended to do and, far from sobering the exuberant Syrians and their allies, raised probably genuine fears in Damascus, Cairo and Moscow to a level which brought about the fatal decisions and events of the following week. Indeed the Secretary-General, disturbed that his statement of May 11 on the El Fatah raids might stimulate Israeli military action, announced on May 13 that that statement "cannot be interpreted as condoning resort to force by any party."

On the same day the Syrian Foreign Ministry summoned ambassadors from countries which were members of the Security

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Council and told them that a plot against Syria was being concocted by "imperialist and Zionist quarters." The Ministry described "the prearranged aggressive role Israel is preparing to play within the framework of this plot" which, it declared, "began with the abortive April 7 aggression" and was revealed by "statements of Zionist Chief of Staff Rabin."

Another component in the accumulating mass of explosive elements was mentioned by President Nasser in the famous speech of June 9 in which he offered to resign. He declared at that time: "We all know how the crisis began in the first half of last May. There was a plan by the enemy to invade Syria, and the statements by his politicians and his military commanders declared that frankly. The evidence was ample. The sources of our Syrian brothers and our own reliable information were categorical on this. Even our friends in the Soviet Union told the parliamentary delegation which was visiting Moscow last month that there was a calculated intention."

There seems little doubt that the Soviets did transmit warnings along these lines to the Syrian and Egyptian governments. Eastern European sources have justified these warnings on the grounds that the Israeli Government itself advised Soviet representatives that, if the El Fatah raids continued, it would take drastic punitive action against Syria. This was of course no more than they were saying publicly, but the Israelis may have hoped that direct notice to the Soviets might induce them to persuade their Syrian friends to stop the raids.

Indeed there is evidence that Israeli officials were at this time disseminating their warnings rather widely. *The New York Times* correspondent, James Feron, in Tel Aviv reported on May 12: "Some Israeli leaders have decided that the use of force against Syria may be the only way to curtail increasing terrorism. Any such Israeli reaction to continued infiltration would be of considerable strength but of short duration and limited in area. This has become apparent in talks with highly qualified and informed Israelis who have spoken in recent days against a background of mounting border violence."

However, these private warnings, coupled with the provocative pronouncements by Eshkol and others, would seem to have backfired by convincing the Soviets, Syrians and Egyptians that a major retaliatory strike against Syria was fixed and imminent. In a speech to the United Nations on June 19 Premier Kosygin

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declared: "In those days, the Soviet Government, and I believe others too, began receiving information to the effect that the Israeli Government had timed for the end of May a swift strike at Syria in order to crush it and then carry the fighting over into the territory of the United Arab Republic."

On the other hand, the Israelis state that on May 12 the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, on May 19 the Foreign Minister and on May 29 the Prime Minister each invited Soviet Ambassador Chuvakhin, who had accused Israel of massing forces on the Syrian border, to visit the area and see for himself, but that in each case he refused to do so. Furthermore, in his report to the Security Council on May 19, Secretary-General Thant had referred to allegations about troop movements and concentrations on the Israeli side of the Syrian border but concluded: "Reports from UNTSO observers have confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line." U.S. representatives in Israel at the time also saw no evidence of the alleged troop concentrations. Moreover, on May 15 the Israeli Government, observing that Egyptian forces were crossing the Suez Canal into Sinai in considerable strength, instructed its Representative at the U.N., Ambassador Rafael, to request the Secretary-General to assure Cairo on its behalf that it had no intention of initiating any military action. The Secretary-General immediately complied with the request.

Nevertheless, it should also be noted that in the May 19 report referred to above the Secretary-General remarked: "Intemperate and bellicose utterances . . . are unfortunately more or less routine on both sides of the lines in the Near East. In recent weeks, however, reports emanating from Israel have attributed to some high officials in that state statements so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the lines." Press accounts of these statements also seemed so inflammatory to U.S. State Department officials that they expressed concern to Israeli authorities.

The situation in mid-May was therefore the following: The aggravation of the El Fatah raids originating in Syria would seem to have brought the Israeli Government to the decision, announced publicly in general terms by responsible officials and confided in more specific terms to journalists and perhaps to

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foreign diplomats including the Soviets, to retaliate sharply and substantially if the raids continued. There is no solid evidence, however, that they intended anything so massive as a drive on Damascus. Nevertheless, this prospect had in both Moscow and Cairo an impact which the Israelis probably did not fully anticipate or correctly assess.

The Soviets had particular reason for not wishing to see the Syrian Government humiliated, defeated and perhaps overthrown. The increasingly radical Syrian governments which had assumed power during the previous eighteen months, though they were far from being communist (the Communist Party was and still is banned), had come to rely more and more on Soviet military and economic aid, to permit increasing numbers of Soviet advisers to be stationed in the country, and all in all to offer the most promising field for Soviet penetration and influence to be found anywhere in the Middle East. The particular Soviet concern for Syria was dramatically shown at the end of the six-day war when the prospect that Israeli forces might then drive to Damascus caused the Soviets suddenly to join in a demand, which they had up to that point stubbornly opposed, that U.N. observers police the cease-fire. It may well have been that by mid-May they genuinely feared massive Israeli retaliation which might topple the Syrian Government and that they therefore spurred the Egyptians on to vigorous counteraction, the full repercussions of which they did not foresee. In fear of "losing" Syria they overreached themselves and urged the Arabs to take action which resulted in much more disastrous losses for their side.

Nasser, for his part, saddled with responsibility for the unified Arab Command which was supposed to protect all the Arab states from Israel, jealous of his already damaged position as would-be leader of the Arab world, having been ridiculed by his allies and rivals for his failure to stir at the time of the Es Samu and April 7 affairs, categorically assured by Syrians and Soviets that Israel was about to attack Syria, for which public statements by Israeli leaders seemed to give warrant, may well have felt that he could no longer stand aside without fatal loss to his prestige and authority.

Israeli public statements between May 11 and 13, therefore, regardless of how they may have been intended, may well have been the spark that ignited the long accumulating tinder. On May 14 the Egyptian Chief of Staff flew to Damascus and, according

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to the Syrian official spokesman, discussed with Syrian officials "important matters concerning joint defense against Israel." On May 16 the Cairo radio announced that the United Arab Republic had declared a state of emergency for its armed forces because of "the tense situation on the Syrian-Israeli armistice lines, Israel's large military concentrations, its threats and its open demands for an attack on Damascus." On that same day, according to the Cairo radio, Foreign Minister Riad received the Soviet, Syrian and Iraqi Ambassadors in separate audiences and Minister of War Badran received the Soviet Ambassador accompanied by his military attaché. The fourth act of the tragedy was about to begin.

IV

At 2200 hours local time that evening, May 16, General Rikhye, Commander of the U.N. Emergency Force in Sinai, was handed the following letter from General Fawzi, Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces: "To your information, I gave my instructions to all U.A.R. Armed Forces to be ready for action against Israel the moment it might carry out an aggressive action against any Arab country. Due to these instructions our troops are already concentrated in Sinai on our eastern borders. For the sake of complete security of all U.N. troops which install O.P.s along our border, I request that you issue your orders to withdraw all these troops immediately. I have given my instructions to our Commander of the eastern zone concerning this subject. Inform back the fulfillment of this request."

Secretary-General Thant received General Rikhye's report at 1730 hours New York time that same evening and an hour and a quarter later (at 1845 hours) at his urgent request received the U.A.R. representative to the U.N., Ambassador El Kony, to whom he presented the following views: (1) General Rikhye could not take orders from anyone but the Secretary-General; (2) if General Fawzi was asking for a temporary withdrawal of UNEF from the Line this was unacceptable because UNEF "cannot be asked to stand aside in order to enable the two sides to resume fighting"; (3) if General Fawzi was asking for a general withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and Sinai the request should have been addressed by the U.A.R. Government to the Secretary-General; (4) the U.A.R. Government had the right "to withdraw the consent which it gave in 1956 for the stationing of

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UNEF on the territory of the U.A.R."; (5) if the U.A.R. Government addressed such a request to the Secretary-General he "would order the withdrawal of all UNEF troops from Gaza and Sinai, simultaneously informing the General Assembly of what he was doing and why"; (6) a U.A.R. request for a temporary withdrawal of UNEF from the Line would be considered by the Secretary-General "as tantamount to a request for the complete withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and Sinai, since this would reduce UNEF to ineffectiveness."

Early the next morning, May 17, Egyptian troops began to move into and beyond some UNEF positions along the Armistice Line. At noon G.M.T. that day General Fawzi conveyed to General Rikhye a request that the Jugoslav detachments of UNEF (which occupied the main portion of the Sinai Armistice Line) be withdrawn within 24 hours, adding, however, that the UNEF Commander might take "24 hours or so" to withdraw the UNEF detachment from Sharm el Sheikh (which commands the Straits of Tiran but is far distant from the Armistice Line).

Space permits only the briefest summary of the events which followed in rapid succession. On the afternoon of May 17 in New York the Secretary-General consulted with representatives of countries providing contingents to UNEF (Brazil, Canada, Denmark, India, Jugoslavia, Norway and Sweden). According to his subsequent report to the General Assembly, two of them expressed serious doubts about complying with "a peremptory request" for withdrawal and suggested reference to the Assembly, whereas two others maintained the United Arab Republic had the right to request withdrawal at any time and that request would have to be respected regardless of what the Assembly might say. Later that afternoon the Secretary-General presented to the U.A.R. Representative an aide-memoire reiterating the points he had made the previous evening and concluding that, if Egyptian troop movements up to the Line were maintained, he would "have no choice but to order the withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and Sinai as expeditiously as possible."

The next morning, May 18, Foreign Minister Riad informed representatives in Cairo of nations with troops in UNEF that "UNEF had terminated its tasks in the U.A.R. and in the Gaza Strip and must depart from the above territory forthwith." At noon New York time the Secretary-General received a formal request from the Egyptian Foreign Minister to the same effect.

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That afternoon he met with the UNEF Advisory Committee where he encountered the same divergence of views as at the meeting the previous day but where the members finally acquiesced in his belief that, in the absence of any proposal to convene the Assembly, he "had no alternative other than to comply with the U.A.R.'s demand." He did so that same evening by a message to Foreign Minister Riad and by instructions to the UNEF Commander.

The immediate reaction of Israel also deserves mention. On the morning of May 18 the Secretary-General received the Israeli representative who presented his Government's view "that the UNEF withdrawal should not be achieved by a unilateral U.A.R. request alone and asserting Israel's right to a voice in the matter." When, however, the Secretary-General raised the possibility of stationing UNEF on the Israeli side of the line, the Representative replied that this would be "entirely unacceptable to his Government," thus reaffirming the position in regard to UNEF which Israel had taken ever since the establishment of the Force in 1956.

The intent and rationale of the decisions taken in Cairo during those critical days in mid-May are still shrouded in obscurity, while those taken in response in New York are still bedeviled by controversy. What seems reasonably clear is that, as so often in the prelude to war, the control of events slipped from everyone's hands and limited decisions hastily taken had sweeping consequences no one desired.

No doubt the Egyptian Government decided sometime between May 13 and 16 that, in view of its assessment of the threat to Syria, it must move some of its armed forces up to the Sinai Armistice Line in order either to deter Israel or to come to Syria's assistance if deterrence failed. Reliable Arab sources maintain that: (1) the U.A.R. Government had as late as May 16 no intention to request the withdrawal of UNEF; (2) it desired merely the removal of several UNEF posts along the Sinai Line which would inhibit the contemplated redeployment of Egyptian forces; (3) it saw no incompatibility between this redeployment and the continuance of UNEF in its other positions *including* Sharm el Sheikh; (4) the implementation of the redeployment was left to the military leaders who failed to consult the civilian authorities, including the President, about either the scope of the redeployment they intended to carry out or the demand ad-

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dressed to General Rikhye on May 16; (5) when the Secretary-General confronted the U.A.R. Government with the naked choice between reversing the redeployment, to which its military leaders had publicly committed it, and requesting the withdrawal of UNEF, it felt obliged to choose the latter; (6) furthermore, when it unexpectedly found its forces once more in possession of Sharm el Sheikh, it felt it could not fail to exercise, as it had from 1954 to 1956, its "belligerent right" to forbid the passage of Israeli vessels and "war material" through the Strait.

As to the decisions taken in New York, the U.N. authorities have maintained that: (1) the indicated redeployment of U.A.R. forces *was* incompatible with the continuance of UNEF since it deprived UNEF of its essential function as a buffer between Egyptian and Israeli forces; (2) UNEF had hitherto been able to function effectively only because of an informal U.A.R. agreement that its forces would be held 2000 meters back from the Armistice Line in Sinai (Israeli forces patrolled right up to the Line); (3) once confrontation between the two forces was re-established, conflict between them was, in the existing state of tension, very probable and UNEF units scattered among them would be wholly unable to prevent it; (4) two of the troop-contributing states, India and Jugoslavia, had made clear their intention to withdraw their contingents whatever the Secretary-General decided and others were likely to follow suit, with the probable result that UNEF would disintegrate in a disordered and ignominious fashion; (5) the U.A.R. Government had the legal right both to move its troops where it wished in its own territory and to insist on the withdrawal of UNEF at any time, just as Israel had the right to refuse it admittance; (6) if the U.N. contested that right, peacekeeping would become "occupation" and other governments would not in the future admit U.N. peacekeeping forces to their territories; (7) a reference of the Egyptian request to the Security Council or the Assembly would merely have produced, as subsequent events proved, a prolonged debate during which UNEF would have either disintegrated or been helplessly involved in war.

No conclusive judgment can be pronounced on these two lines of argument. What does seem apparent is that both the U.A.R. and the U.N., like Israel a few days before, acted precipitately and with little resort to diplomacy. If the Egyptian account is accurate, temporization on the part of the U.N. might conceivably

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have led to some modification in U.A.R. military dispositions which had not been authorized by its own government. It seems very doubtful, however, that in the prevailing state of emotion dispositions once taken, even without full authorization, could have been reversed. By May 17 the crisis had already acquired a momentum which seemed inexorably to sweep all parties toward and over the brink.

Nevertheless, we can hardly fail to note parenthetically the serious shortcomings of a peacekeeping procedure whereby, as in this case, a U.N. force can be ordered out of a critical area at the very moment when the danger of war, which it is stationed there to prevent, becomes most acute. The fault, however, lies not with the U.N. but with the great powers whose rivalries ever since 1945 have blocked the application of the enforcement procedures provided by Chapter VII of the Charter, under which a U.N. military force could be, for example, interposed between two prospective combatants regardless of the objections of either or both. In the absence of great-power willingness to permit the Security Council to apply compulsion of that type, the U.N. has been obliged for many years to rely on a much more fragile form of peacekeeping whereunder a U.N. force, whatever may have been the arrangements under which it entered the territory of a state, can in practice remain there only so long as its government consents. Such was the situation in Sinai before May 16.

V

To return to the concluding events of that month: President Nasser on May 22 announced his intention to reinstitute the blockade against Israel in the Strait of Tiran. This was the final fatal step. Whether, in whatever advance planning did take place, it was contemplated that Sharm el Sheikh would be reoccupied and the blockade reimposed, or whether the military exceeded their orders and one step led to another in dizzy and unpremeditated succession, is not certain. There can hardly have been any doubt at any time, however, about the grave risks involved in restoring the blockade. It seems probable that the Russians were consulted about the redeployment of Egyptian forces and perhaps the subsequent request for the withdrawal of UNEF. Reliable Soviet sources have claimed, however, that they were not informed in advance of the reimposition of the blockade, implying that they would have objected had they known.

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In any case, the reaction in Israel and elsewhere was immediate. On May 23 Prime Minister Eshkol declared in parliament: "The Knesset knows that any interference with freedom of shipping in the Gulf and in the Straits constitutes a flagrant violation of international law.... It constitutes an act of aggression against Israel." On the same day President Johnson declared in Washington: "The United States considers the Gulf to be an international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and potentially disastrous to the cause of peace. The right of free, innocent passage of the international waterway is a vital interest of the international community."

Unavailing efforts were made to persuade President Nasser to revoke, suspend or moderate the blockade but, the action once taken, he did not feel politically free to reverse it, even had he so desired. Equally unavailing were efforts made to forestall a unilateral Israeli response by organizing a group of maritime powers to issue a declaration reaffirming the right of free passage through the Strait and presumably, if passage continued to be denied, to take effective multilateral action to reopen it. Very few maritime powers showed any interest in participating in a confrontation with Nasser and the Arab world, nor did members of the U.S. Congress who were consulted manifest any enthusiasm for risking another conflict in addition to Viet Nam. The exploratory dialogue between the U.S. and the U.A.R., however, continued up until the outbreak of war; as late as June 4 an agreement was announced that U.A.R. Vice President Mohieddin would visit Washington within the next few days and Vice President Humphrey would later return the visit.

In the meantime, however, the crisis had assumed proportions far beyond an argument over maritime rights. The advance of the Egyptian forces to the Armistice Line, the ouster of UNEF and the reimposition of the blockade were received with enormous enthusiasm throughout the Arab world. All the pent-up emotions which had been accumulating for twenty years, and which were continually refreshed by armed clashes, inflammatory propaganda and the presence of a million refugees, erupted in pæans of triumph from Baghdad to Marrakesh.

Nasser's prestige, which had been falling for some time, rebounded overnight. Expressions of solidarity poured in. Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait and Sudan promised troops. In a startling reversal of long-standing hostility, King Hussein of Jordan appeared in

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Cairo on May 30 and concluded a mutual defense pact with the U.A.R. which a few days later was extended to Iraq. The armed forces of Egypt, Jordan and Syria were more and more concentrated around Israel's frontiers and there seemed every likelihood they would soon be reinforced by other Arab states.

This Arab euphoria, moreover, led also to verbal exaltation which could not have been without its effect on Israel. For instance, the Syrian Chief of State, Dr. Al-Atasi, said in a speech on May 22: "Arab Palestinians who were expelled from their homeland now realize that armed struggle is the only way to regain their homeland. . . . The state of gangs [Israel] will not benefit by blaming others for inciting fedayeen activities. The cause of these activities is the aggressive Zionist existence itself. Let Israel know that the Palestinian fedayeen activities will continue until they liberate their homeland." In a speech addressed on June 1 to troops departing for the "frontlines" in Jordan, President Arif of Iraq declared: "It was treason and politics that brought about the creation of Israel. Brethren and sons, this is the day of the battle to revenge your martyred brethren who fell in 1948. It is the day to wash away the stigma. We shall, God willing, meet in Tel Aviv and Haifa."

Yet even at this late date, despite all these verbal pyrotechnics and concentrations of force, there does not seem to have been any intention in Cairo to initiate a war. In reply to a question by British M. P. Christopher Mayhew interviewing Nasser on June 2, "And if they do not attack, will you let them alone?", the President said, "Yes, we will leave them alone. We have no intention of attacking Israel." Similar assurances were repeatedly given the United States by the highest Egyptian authorities.

There seems little reason to doubt them. Nasser had up to that point achieved a spectacular victory. Arab unity seemed closer to reality than it had ever been. Israel had suffered a serious setback in prestige, power and security. The mood in Cairo was an odd mixture of exaltation and fatalism, exaltation over what had been achieved, fatalism before the inescapable realization that Israel might prefer war to a political defeat of this magnitude. There was a clear understanding that Israel might attack at any time, no overweening confidence as to the outcome, but a determination to defend, whatever the costs, the intoxicating gains which had been won. Whether this determination might have been overcome by negotiation over a period of time, for example

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by the visits of the Vice Presidents between Cairo and Washington, cannot be known for certain. In view of the support which the Soviet Union was providing its Arab friends, this seems unlikely.

In any case the Israeli Government obviously decided that it could not wait. All the factors which had induced it to go to war in 1956—a multiplication of raids into its territory, a substantial build-up of Egyptian and other hostile forces on its borders, the blockade of the Strait—had reappeared in even more aggravated form. Efforts of the U.N. and the U.S. to relieve them by international action seemed unavailing. On May 30 Foreign Minister Eban said in a press conference in Jerusalem: "Less than two weeks ago a change took place in the security balance in this region. The two most spectacular signs of this change were the illegal attempt to blockade the international passageway at the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba and the abnormal buildup of Egyptian troops on the Israeli frontier. The Government and people of Israel intend to insure that these two changes are rescinded, and in the shortest possible time." Six days later Israel struck with this end in view; twelve days later it had achieved its objective, and much more beside.

VI

It is not difficult in retrospect to identify the ventures and responses on both sides which over preceding months and weeks, compounding the hatreds which had been allowed to fester for twenty years, led almost inevitably to war.

First were the El Fatah raids, organized from Syria, involving the "Palestine Liberation Army," subjecting peaceful Israeli villages to recurrent jeopardy and terror, building up through the months from October to May, unpunished and, because of the Soviet veto, even uncensured by the U.N. Security Council. Remembering the history of the previous twelve years, it is difficult to see how any Arab or Soviet leader could have failed to realize that this murderous campaign would eventually bring forth a murderous response.

Second were the Israeli "massive retaliations" at Es Samu in November and in the air over Syria and Jordan in April, designed to punish and deter, but disproportionate in size, visibility and political impact, causing also the death of innocent people, condemned by the Security Council in the strongest terms in No-

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vember, as similar disproportionate retaliations had been repeatedly condemned in the past. It is difficult to see how any Israeli leader could have failed to foresee that such repeated massive reprisals must eventually place the leader of the Arab coalition in a position where he would have to respond.

Third were the public and private statements by high Israeli authorities in mid-May which indicated the probability of even more drastic retaliation against Syria in the near future if the El Fatah raids continued. These statements, even though no doubt designed to deter the raids, almost certainly convinced the Syrian and U.A.R. Governments that such retaliation was definitely projected and may well have persuaded them and the Soviets that the Syrian régime itself was in jeopardy.

Fourth was the decision by the U.A.R. Government, presumably encouraged by Soviets and Syrians, to move its armed forces up to the Sinai Armistice Line, thus reëstablishing at a moment of acute tension the direct Egyptian-Israeli military confrontation which had been the major immediate cause of the 1956 war. This redeployment of Egyptian forces was under the circumstances critical whether or not it was originally intended to be accompanied by a demand that UNEF be withdrawn.

Fifth and finally was the decision of the U.A.R. Government, finding itself whether by intent or accident once more in command of the Strait of Tiran, to exercise its "belligerent rights" by reimposing the blockade, thus reproducing the third of the elements which had brought on the 1956 war. The likely consequences of this step were indeed foreseen but, in the climate of fear, passion and "national honor" which by then prevailed, were faced with fatalism and desperation.

It remains, however, the thesis of this article that no government plotted or intended to start a war in the Middle East in the spring of 1967. Syria mounted raids against Israel as it had been doing for years, but more intensively and effectively; Israel retaliated disproportionately as it often had before, but in more rapid succession and in a way that seemed to threaten the existence of the Arab government; Nasser felt his responsibilities and ambitions in the Arab world did not permit him again to stand aside in such a contingency and took hasty and ill-calculated measures which made major conflict, already probable, practically certain. All concerned overreacted outrageously. Yet there is no evidence—quite the contrary—that either Nasser or

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the Israeli Government or even the Syrian Government wanted and sought a major war at this juncture.

Of course the fault of all of them, and indeed of the great powers and the United Nations, lay not so much in their actions or omissions in May and June 1967 as in their failure, indeed their common blunt refusal, to face the facts of life in the Middle East during the twenty years before that date.

There will be no peace there, no security for its inhabitants or for the great powers involved there, until the Arabs recognize that Israel, however unjust its creation appears to them, is a fact of life, that it has as much right to exist as they have, that to threaten and harass it, to arouse among their people false hopes about its dissolution, is actually as much a threat to Arab as to Israeli security, that the two equally have more to gain than lose by peaceful coexistence. On the other hand, there will also be no peace in the Middle East until the Israelis recognize that the condition of their long-term survival as a nation is reconciliation with their much more numerous Arab neighbors, that survival cannot indefinitely be preserved by military force or territorial expansion, that displays of inflexibility and arrogance are not effective modes of international intercourse, and that in particular there will be no security for Israel until, whatever the political and financial cost, the million or more Palestine refugees have been compensated, resettled and restored to dignity.

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THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT

By Bernard Lewis

SINCE the end of the third Arab-Israeli war the vocabulary of Middle Eastern politics has been enriched with a new formula—"the removal of the consequences of aggression." The phrase presents some obvious difficulties of definition concerning the origin of the aggression, the nature of its consequences and the manner of their removal. All these are subject to a wide diversity of interpretations. However, the meaning of the Arab states in putting forward this formula as a demand is quite clear; it is that Israel is the aggressor, that the occupation of Arab lands and the departure of their Arab inhabitants are the consequences of aggression, and that these consequences should be reversed.

It is possible that in certain circumstances the conquerors might be willing to give up their conquests; it is even conceivable that the refugees might return—though this would make them unique among the countless millions in Europe, Asia and Africa who have fled or been driven from their homes in our brutal century. But far more has happened than the occupation of lands and the movement of peoples, important as these may be. In the world of reality, events cannot be unmade, and their effects persist, even when their results vanish. Sometimes these events are of such dimensions as to involve radical reassessments: governments reassess policies at the periphery of their interests and people at the center of crisis reassess their governments. It seems likely that the war and crisis in the Middle East in the summer of 1967 formed such a turning point. The four chief parties concerned—the Arabs, Israel, the Soviet Union and the West—must have been pondering the significance of these events and the lessons to be learnt from them.

The Russians were involved in the crisis from the start—indeed, without descending to the conspiratorial conception of history or returning to the polemics of the cold war, we can say with reasonable assurance that they had no small part in creating it. One contribution, which they shared with other powers, was the dispatch of large quantities of modern, sophisticated weapons to the area; another, more distinctively their own, was their un-

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swerving support for the Arab states in any and every encounter, irrespective of circumstances. A good example of this is the recurrent problem of clashes on the Syrian-Israeli border. Most observers—and governments—were content to treat each incident on its merits and to blame one side or the other as seemed appropriate. But the Soviet Government invariably supported the Syrians, even when they were palpably in the wrong, and on several occasions even used its veto in the Security Council to save the Syrians from a mildly critical resolution. On November 3, 1966, the veto was applied against an inoffensive resolution sponsored, among others, by two African states—a remarkable indication of how far the Soviet Government was prepared to go in support of its Arab protégés.

This kind of action would in itself have led Arab governments to form a high—and, as it turned out, exaggerated—assessment of Soviet willingness to stand by them in a crisis. There is, in addition, some evidence of Soviet help at a more intimate level than the politics of the United Nations. Syrian gunnery on the border, it is said, showed a degree of professional efficiency out of accord with the previous and subsequent performances of the Syrian army; Syrian diplomacy, on both border issues and questions of oil transit payments, was conducted with a professional finesse that suggested greater reserves of skill and experience than are normally available to short-lived governments in Damascus.

In his television address on Friday, June 9, President Nasser explained how the crisis had begun. On May 15, he said, it had become clear from Israeli statements that they intended to attack Syria. This was confirmed by information from Syrian sources and also by reports from the Egyptian intelligence services. Moreover, "our friends in the Soviet Union informed the parliamentary delegation which visited Moscow early last month that there was a premeditated intention to attack Syria. It was our duty not to stay with our arms crossed. It was a duty of Arab solidarity, and also a guarantee for our national security." It was for this reason, said the President, that he had sent his forces to the frontier. This had led successively to the withdrawal of UNEF, the Egyptian occupation of Sharm el-Sheikh, and the declaration of a blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, since "the passage of the enemy flag in front of our troops was intolerable, and inflicted the deepest wound on the feelings of the Arab nation."

President Nasser of course acted, as always, by his own choice,

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but we may believe him when he says that the original impetus came from Syrian and Russian warnings. Both Syrian and, what is more important, Russian spokesmen have throughout taken the same line. But were these warnings based on a genuine danger —or even on a genuine belief that such a danger existed? The evidence adduced, apart from vague references to information received, consisted of two points: an alleged concentration of large Israeli forces on the Syrian frontier, and menacing speeches by Mr. Eshkol. Neither piece of evidence amounts to much. The speeches were no more than routine warnings of reprisals in what had become a standardized pattern, intended to discourage Syrian and soothe Israeli hotheads—an exercise which should have been familiar to Arab leaders. The troop concentration, as is clear from the reports of the U.N. truce observers, never took place. The Syrians may have misread the situation and panicked; the Russians will not have done so, and the conclusion is inescapable that the Soviet Government, for reasons of its own, either planned or connived at the launching of what became a new and dangerous crisis in Israel-Arab relations.

The suggestion has been made that the Soviet purpose was to provide a distraction in the Middle East and thus relieve the pressure on Viet Nam. This would assume, first, that they intended, from the start, to create a major international crisis, involving the powers and especially the United States, and, second, that they counted on the willingness of the United States to become involved. Both assumptions seem unlikely. A more probable explanation is that they aimed at something much more limited and local, a scare rather than a crisis, and that its purpose was to save the tottering Syrian régime from collapse. The Soviets had invested a good deal of time, effort and money in the left-wing Baathist government and had achieved a closer relationship with it than with any other government not under communist control. In May 1967, that government, and with it the Soviet position in Syria, was in grave danger. It was already more than a year old —a dangerous age in Damascus. Based on an uneasy alliance between members of Muslim religious minority groups, it was unpopular with the Sunnis,[1] and further weakened by the split between Alawis and Druzes. Worst of all, some of its supporters had gratuitously antagonized the powerful Islamic establish-

[1] At one time the Baathist government was known as the *'Adas* (lentil) régime—an acronym of 'Alawis, Druzes and Isma'ilis.

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ment. Like other "revolutionary" and "progressive" régimes in the Arab world, the Baathists had confined their radicalism to politics and economics and had usually refrained from attacking Islamic beliefs, traditions or institutions. They had therefore encountered nothing more than the grumbles of a population accustomed to acquiesce in the vagaries of authoritarian government. There are, however, limits to acquiescence, and at the beginning of May the publication in an army-sponsored magazine of an article denouncing religion and belief in God evoked a menacing wave of popular resentment against a régime which now seemed to be threatening the most cherished values of a Muslim people. The government beat a hasty retreat, attributing the article to the C.I.A., but the damage was already done. The Baathists and their Russian backers may well have decided that a little diversion, based on the unfailing theme of Palestine, might be useful. As the crisis developed, and seemed to be tending toward a diplomatic victory for the revolutionary Arab states, and therefore for Russia, wider and more tempting prospects appeared—the collapse of Western influence, the consolidation of Russian influence in the revolutionary Arab states, and its extension to the remaining Arab states in the Middle East and North Africa.

In backing them so far, the Russians were clearly assuming that the Arabs would win—if necessary in a war, but probably without one. The West would be hypnotized into accepting Arab demands; Israel, abandoned by her Western friends, perhaps even under their pressure, would be forced to give way. The dispatch of a Russian fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, of a strength obviously insufficient to confront the U.S. Sixth Fleet, can only have been intended to overawe Israel, with American acquiescence. The world would learn that the friends of the Soviets prosper, while the friends of the West do not.

For a while the world seemed to be learning just that. The West faltered and fumbled; Israel, unsure of Western attitudes, hesitated; President Nasser, triumphant, threw caution to the winds. After nationalizing the Suez Canal in 1956, he had astutely sat back, declared himself satisfied and left the next move to his opponents. After closing the Straits of Tiran, he declared explicitly that this was a preliminary to the final confrontation with Israel, for which he was now ready. The other revolutionary Arab states were with him; even his Arab enemies felt obliged to

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make the necessary accommodations. That the Russians encouraged him to go so far is unlikely; they certainly did not prevent him.

The six-day war and its sequel showed that the Russians had failed badly in their military and political intelligence and assessments—not perhaps of the West, but of Israel and the Arabs. No doubt they were misled about the one by their own anti-Semitic stereotypes, about the other by the wishful thinking of their Arab informants. The correction of error is difficult in a dictatorship. By Monday evening, June 6, informed opinion—by Tuesday almost everyone in the free world—knew how the battle was going. It was not until Tuesday night (Wednesday morning in the Middle East) that the Soviet delegate to the U.N. agreed to an unconditional cease-fire. The extra time he had striven to gain for the Arabs served only to consolidate their defeat.

From Wednesday morning the signs multiplied that the Russians were engaged in a reappraisal—probably agonizing. They were surprised, disconcerted and very angry. Their public fury was directed against Israel; in addition, they were probably not unmoved by the swift collapse of Arab arms and by President Nasser's attempt, through the false charge of American and British participation, to drag them into war.

The Russians had reason to be angry. Soviet prestige—the reputation of Soviet arms and guidance, the value of Soviet friendship, the credibility of Soviet warnings—had received a damaging blow, with far-reaching repercussions. The Russians had suffered this blow because, through the extent of their commitment to the Arabs, they had in effect entrusted the safety of Soviet prestige to the keeping of Arab governments over which they had no real control. They had taken great chances, which turned out badly; they had done so for very dubious gains. The Arab leaders were very unwise to assume that the Soviets would accept, for their sake, risks which they had not accepted for Berlin or Viet Nam. This miscalculation was disastrous for the Arabs; it was also most unfortunate for the Soviet Union.

The root of the trouble was that the Arab governments, even that of Syria, were not satellites, and were therefore ultimately uncontrollable. The Soviet Government, in dealing with the Middle East, found itself in a position of responsibility without power—a reversal of its normal experience. It is not surprising that they were disturbed.

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In this predicament, the Soviet leadership had, basically, a choice between two policies: either to consolidate its hold on the revolutionary Arab governments and transform them into satellites, or to attempt some measure of disengagement. This in turn is linked with the larger, global choice before them, between détente and coexistence, on the one hand, and active hostility toward the United States on the other. Both choices are affected by changing and conflicting pressures within the collective leadership which succeeded Khrushchev.

One of these pressures is that of the so-called Stalinists—more precisely, the exponents of repression and chauvinism. These circles are strongly affected by old-fashioned anti-Semitism, which can become a powerful factor in determining attitudes both toward a Jewish state and toward its enemies. The point is sometimes made that Jewish or pro-Jewish sentiments can lead to unbalanced and unrealistic policies. This is of course true. It is equally true, though less obvious, that anti-Jewish sentiments can have the same effect. The hysterical violence and traditional anti-Semitic symbolism of Soviet attacks on Israel show that the offenses of the Israelis, in Soviet eyes, were greatly aggravated by the fact that they were Jews. These Soviet reactions also suggest that one of the motives of a pro-Arab policy may have been a desire to hurt the Jews, and that this emotional impulsion may have warped the judgment of policy-makers and led them to a degree of indulgence to Arab wishes which was ultimately harmful to Soviet and even Arab interests. This phenomenon is not unknown in other countries; in the Soviet Union it was not countered or corrected by any pressure, emotional or otherwise, in the opposite direction.

II

Anti-Jewish prejudice may have pushed the policy of supporting Arab nationalism to ill-judged extremes; it was not of course the sole or even the main motive for this policy, which rested on a fairly realistic assessment of the condition of the Arab world and the importance of the Middle Eastern bridgehead for Soviet activities in Asia and Africa.

This importance was enhanced, rather than reduced, by the Arab defeat, and for the moment there was much to tempt the Russians into a closer involvement. The régimes they had supported were in danger of overthrow, with further damaging effects

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to Soviet prestige. China seemed ready to usurp Russia's place as the patron of Arab nationalism, and was gaining the support of Arab communists. The blow to Western influence, on the other hand, was far heavier than to Russian influence, and affected even those countries that were under conservative régimes. For a while the Russians seem to have toyed with the idea of establishing communist régimes in the Arab lands—and then to have abandoned it as too dangerous.

It is not difficult to see why. To transform the Arab countries into satellites would be an expensive, difficult and hazardous operation, and would never be safe unless the régimes were sustained, as in Eastern Europe, by the threat or presence of Soviet force. Even in Eastern Europe, this policy has become precarious; it would be still more so in countries that have no land frontier with the Soviet Union. Moreover, such an intervention in the Arab lands would endanger the new, hard-won and greatly valued understanding with Turkey and Iran—both of them, despite their recent rethinking, still members of Western-oriented alliances. In addition, it soon became clear that the Chinese menace was not yet a serious factor, and that the collapse of Western influence was by no means as complete as had at first appeared. The Syrian episode had shown that Islam was still the strongest loyalty of the people, and that outraged Islamic feelings could still shake or destroy a government which really tried to enforce its "progressive" and "revolutionary" principles. An attempt to create "popular democracies" could arouse very powerful forces indeed.

Finally, and most important of all, the danger of a direct confrontation with the United States remained. It was this danger that had induced the Soviet Government, at the height of the crisis, to draw back from armed intervention to save the Arabs. An adventurous policy in the Middle East could easily lead to a new danger of confrontation—and to another withdrawal, with even more damaging effects on Soviet prestige. In avoiding an entanglement with the Arabs and a collision with the United States, the Soviet leadership would be faithful to tradition. During the centuries of expansion, by which the principality of Muscovy grew into the great Russian Empire, the greater Soviet Union and the still greater Soviet bloc, two principles were almost always respected: to advance by land into adjoining regions to which troops and settlers could easily be moved, and to avoid a clash with a superior or even an equal power.

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The dilemma of the Soviet Government was acute. A closer involvement in the Middle East was too dangerous—yet disengagement seemed politically impossible. The collective leadership could not make the sudden changes of policy that were possible for Stalin or Khrushchev; the internal pressures were too strong, and the status of the Soviet Union as a superpower was heavily committed. The Russian demand to Egypt, at the time of President Podgorny's visit, for a purge of bourgeois elements in the Egyptian Government and army, could be interpreted either way—as a prelude to Bolshevization or to abandonment. As an emergency measure, an airlift of arms was organized, to save the Nasserist and Baathist régimes from collapse. But while Soviet prestige clearly required that these régimes survive the war and its immediate aftermath, it did not necessarily require their indefinite continuance, and there are some indications that the Soviets have begun to regard President Nasser as expendable. It is still too early to assess the future development of Soviet policy in the Middle East, nor indeed is it certain that this policy has yet been decided. Much will obviously depend on the attitudes of the Western powers and, above all, of the United States.

There are, however, some signs of its probable direction. The Soviets will certainly continue to give vociferous support to the Arab case against Israel, especially at the United Nations. They will try to salvage their battered prestige and hope that, as on previous occasions, they will find someone in the West to help them in this task. But in all probability they will take care not to get into a position again where their prestige can be endangered by governments and armies which they do not control. The most likely development is a policy based on relations with individual Arab states rather than on Arabism, and aimed at the kind of relationship that they have sought to establish with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The question is how far they will be allowed to extricate themselves if they desire to do so.

Like the Soviet Union, the Western powers have been able to draw certain inferences from what has happened. For a while it seemed that the West, and particularly the United States, had been outmanœuvred. The ring was closing around Israel; even pro-Western Arab rulers, whatever their real feelings, were lining up behind President Nasser. Communist Russia could support Arab nationalist demands to the full; the United States and Britain, captives of their own freedom and their own standards, could

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not, and were thus forced to appear as enemies of the Arabs. Their only choice was of what kind: as enemies to be respected and conciliated, or to be despised and ignored. For the United States, a far more terrible choice was being prepared—whether to abandon Israel to destruction, or to be trapped in a land war in Southwest as well as Southeast Asia.

Fortunately for the United States, no such choice was needed. Through no particular wisdom or merit of their own, the Western powers emerged from a dangerous situation with what turned out to be only minor injuries. Like the Russians, they had learned that their control over their friends was very limited. They were fortunate in that the state which was generally regarded as their protégé did not need to be rescued. The danger remained.

For a while, it seemed that despite their failure against Israel, the Russians had won a considerable political success against the United States and Britain, which found themselves being ignominiously evicted from most Arab countries. But even this was deceptive. The two most powerful Arab weapons against the West —the oil boycott and, for Britain, the sterling balances—both proved ineffective. The stoppage of oil exports did greater and swifter damage to the sellers than to the buyers. Arabian money transferred from London to Switzerland, at low or no interest rates, found its way back to London, to earn high interest for its new custodians. Even the closing of the Suez Canal did less harm than was feared, and for the United States even brought some marginal advantage—some additional exports and the slowing down of Russian supplies to North Viet Nam. The inconvenience to Britain was more serious, but much of this was of a transitional nature, until new arrangements could become fully effective. The heaviest sufferers were India, some other Asian and East African states, and above all the Egyptians themselves.

As the flames and the dust subsided, there were signs that the damage to Anglo-American diplomacy was less severe than had at first appeared. Some Arab leaders were beginning to wonder whether they were wise to identify themselves entirely with one camp in the global conflict, and whether indeed they had chosen the right one. Before very long, several Arab states began to make overtures to the West, and even President Nasser flew a kite, no doubt expecting, on the basis of past experience, that Western governments would respond with eager gratitude to the opportunity once again to feed his people and sustain his régime. This

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time, however, he had overestimated the American capacity to absorb calumny, abuse and injury, and the response from Washington was disappointing. In London he fared somewhat better, though the extent of British complaisance, and its value to Egypt, are still not clear.

That President Nasser should have found it necessary to seek London's good offices—for pressure in Jerusalem or intercession in Washington—is a measure of the failure of another kind of Western policy, that of General de Gaulle. Previous French policy toward Israel had been based on the assumptions that nothing could be achieved with the Arab states, and that one small ally in the Middle East was better than none at all. In a calculation unconnected with the Middle East, both assumptions were now abandoned. By supporting the Russian and Arab line against Israel, the General incurred some immediate losses—in the political and commercial good will of Israel, and in the confidence of Europe, at a time when the credibility of his friendship was rather important to him. In compensation, he gained warm words from Moscow and the Arab capitals. Whether he will gain any more from them is dubious. They for their part have already learnt that his support made no real difference to them; they are unlikely to pay for more than they receive.

III

In the West as in Russia the question that arises is a basic and simple one—how much trouble is the Middle East worth? On both sides there seems to be a growing appreciation of the advantages of disengagement—as far as is feasible—from an area of high risks, great costs, dubious returns and, above all, of diminishing importance, as it is being bypassed by strategic, economic and technological developments and overshadowed by the urgent problems of East Asia. These must, increasingly, dominate political and strategic thinking in Washington and Moscow.

For the powers of the Communist and Western blocs the possibility exists, however remotely, of extricating themselves from the Middle Eastern quicksands. No such possibility is open to the countries of the Middle East, which must make the best they can of conditions in their area—including, for as long as may be necessary, the policies of the great and not-so-great powers. The lessons of the war will thus appear to these countries in a somewhat different form.

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What Israel learnt is what victors always learn from victory—that is, that they were right all along. On two points in particular the crisis and war confirmed Israeli beliefs: that their survival depended, ultimately, on their willingness and ability to fight for it, and that they could not trust the United Nations, where their enemies had a built-in position of advantage. The Soviet veto in the Security Council is always available to the Arabs, even on the most trivial matters; the combination of the Communist bloc and the quaintly named "nonaligned" states in the General Assembly is sufficient to prevent any solution acceptable to Israel, if not to enforce one acceptable to the Arabs. "If the Arabs table a resolution tomorrow that the earth is flat," said an Israeli minister, "they can count on at least 40 votes."

Reliance on their own military and political strength in the Middle East and mistrust of "United Nations auspices" are two basic Israeli conclusions from recent events. A third is that, of all the powers of the outside world, the only one that really matters to Israel is the United States. Even in the euphoria of victory, Israelis know that American good will is fundamental to them. Basically, there are three things that Israel wants from Washington: first, to deter the Russians, as in June 1967, from direct military intervention against them; second, to refrain from imposing, alone or with others, a solution which Israel judges contrary to her interests; third, to ensure that Israel's armaments do not fall dangerously below the level of the Arab states. In other words, they wish to be sure that the Americans will neither undermine their position nor allow Russia to do so. Given this assurance, they feel confident that they can cope with their Arab neighbors. The ultimately more serious problem of their Arab subjects, with its implications for the whole future of their state, society and ethos, remains unresolved, and there is little sign of agreement, inside Israel, on how to tackle it.

A victory, said the Duke of Wellington, is the greatest tragedy in the world, except a defeat. The Arabs suffered this greater tragedy, and the problems confronting them—problems of understanding and of action—have a terrible urgency quite different from the milder dilemmas of the Americans, the Russians, even of the Israelis.

The first and obvious question was—what went wrong? Why had they suffered a double defeat—a military defeat in the field, at the hands of a nation inferior in numbers, weapons, territory

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and resources, and a political defeat at the United Nations, despite every appearance of overwhelming political superiority? At the moment of crisis and war, it was the Arab states which found themselves isolated from world opinion, and even some of those governments which supported them were clearly acting against their own public opinion at home.[2] Even the full mobilization of the Soviet regular and auxiliary forces in the General Assembly failed to secure the necessary majority for the resolutions that the Arabs wanted. It was a political defeat hardly less striking than the military defeat which had preceded it.

War and defeat are the classical motors of social and political change. Sometimes they lead to major transformations, as in Germany and Russia after the First World War; sometimes to a mood of sullen resentment and withdrawal, as in the South after the American Civil War, and in Spain after 1898. Defeat is especially cogent when inflicted by the carriers of another civilization with a different and challenging religion or ideology. The defeat in Palestine in 1948 was the first such shock suffered directly by the Eastern Arabs. The earlier defeats at the hands of West and East European imperialism had been sustained by the Turks and Persians, who, as the dominant peoples of Islam, had shielded the Arabs from the realities of politics and war. The vague encounters of the Anglo-French period added little of value to their experience; on the contrary, by providing easy victories over embarrassed and halfhearted opponents they fostered a dangerous illusion of strength.

The shock of defeat in 1948, in place of the expected victory parade, was all the greater in that it was inflicted, not by the mighty imperial powers, but by the despised and familiar Jews. The *nakba* (disaster), as the Arabs called it, gave rise to an extensive literature, much of it concerned with the political and military blunders of Arab leaders, but some of it, as for example the well-known works by Mr. Musa Alami and Professor Constantine Zurayk, attempting to penetrate to the deeper social and cultural causes of the Arab failure.

Politically, the defeat was seen as a failure of the régimes—the parliamentary and constitutional monarchies and republics—which had conducted the war. The lesson learnt was the need for a more radical and more violent approach. The traditional and

[2] The line-up raises difficult problems for those who believe that economics and ideology, not politics, are the determining factors in international as in other affairs.

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authoritarian régimes, as in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, managed to survive, but the régimes in Syria, Egypt and Iraq were swept away. They were succeeded by military governments, with programs of revolutionary change, later designated socialism, and of Arab nationalism. In international relations, their anti-Western attitudes gradually became pro-Soviet, when the Soviet Union finally emerged as the most serious and dangerous antagonist of the West and of Western civilization.

The second defeat, in 1956, brought no comparable soul-searching or upheaval. This was because the military defeat was compensated by a great political victory, and because the significance of the struggle was blurred by myths. Three beliefs, in particular, shaped Arab thinking on these events: first, that Egypt was defeated by France and Britain, not just by Israel; second, that a cause of defeat was Arab disunity, which left Egypt alone to face the tripartite attack; third, that Egypt was saved from the consequences of defeat by the intervention of Russia, her new friend since the previous year.

The third of these is an obvious myth—a successful combined effort of delusion and self-delusion. The record of October and November 1965 makes it quite clear that the Soviet Government did not speak out until the American President and other spokesmen had explained, not once but several times, that the United States did not support Britain, France or Israel, and disapproved of their action. Then and only then did the Soviets take up the Egyptian cause and utter dire threats against the aggressors. And even after that, they were powerless to secure the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, which was brought about by the American Government alone. Yet the myth of the Soviet rescue became an article of faith, and was reaffirmed by King Hussein in Moscow as late as October 3, 1967.

The military myths were more excusable, and were, in part at least, solidly based on fact. Egypt had indeed fought alone; Israel had not. The Egyptian interpretation of events was further encouraged by a flow of revelations and confessions.[3] The study of these revelations may well have contributed to President Nasser's—perhaps also to Moscow's—misjudgment of the relative military and political strengths of Israel and Egypt.

[3] Notably by General Dayan's "Diary of the Sinai Campaign" (Hebrew, 1965; English translation 1966) and by the publication in the spring of 1967, in *The Times*, of London, of Mr. Anthony Nutting's account of the Suez crisis, later brought out in book form, "No End of a Lesson: the Story of Suez."

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The myth of 1956—Egypt, alone, embattled and ultimately victorious against three enemies—stood for more than ten years. The events of 1967 should finally have dispelled it. This time the defeat was political as well as military. Three Arab states on Israel's borders, with help from others, were overwhelmed by Israel alone. There have been attempts to refurbish the old myths and create new ones; they have had only limited success.

There is still little willingness to face the facts—far less than in 1948–49, when discussion was still free and often realistic. The relatively minor defeat of that time was called *nakba,* disaster. The far greater defeat of 1967 is firmly labelled *naksa,* setback. This word is used even in press translations or summaries of foreign comments, and serves to render such terms as defeat and disaster, which are tabu. The universal adoption of this word is a striking example of the nationalization of language and its use to control thought and conceal reality.

Discussion so far has been mainly on the tactical level, and has concentrated on such things as military and political errors and unwise propaganda. In some Arab countries, as for example, in North Africa and South Arabia, rulers and leaders have been quick to draw inferences from the new balance of power within the Arab world, and to realign their policies accordingly. There are as yet few outward signs of any desire to examine the deeper causes of the Arab predicament: the basic weaknesses of Arab society in an age of disruption and transition; the inadequacy of Arab political structures and ideas;[4] the widening sociological and therefore technological gap.

What are the prospects of peace in the Middle East? In the outside world, the realists, like other people, are divided into two groups: the pro-Arab realists, who say that it is unrealistic to expect the Arabs to recognize Israel, and the pro-Israel realists, who say that it is unrealistic to expect Israel to relinquish her gains without substantial guarantees. Stated in this form, the two views are mutually exclusive—and both could well be right. There is, however, a faint hope that the Arabs may in the last resort prove less implacable than the pro-Arabs in their hostility to Israel. One Arab leader, President Bourguiba, was prepared, however reluctantly, to accept the fact of Israel's existence even before the war.

[4] It is striking that, of the three Arab armies engaged, the Jordanian, with every disadvantage of numbers, terrain and armament, acquitted itself best. Simple, old-fashioned tribal and monarchical loyalties were more effective in maintaining morale than the revolutionary nationalism of Egypt and Syria.

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Other leaders in the East may be coming to the conclusion that some form of recognition is the least disagreeable of the alternatives that face them. The problem remains whether, in a context of unstable régimes, contested succession and external incitement, they will have the courage and ability to act on such beliefs.

In the past, it has sometimes been argued that the Arab-Israeli conflict prevents great-power agreement, sometimes that the great-power conflict prevents the Arabs and Israelis from coming to terms. Certainly outside intervention has more than once increased tensions, provoked crises and prevented solutions. The effect of the United Nations on problems in the Middle East and elsewhere has often been like that of modern medicine on major diseases—enough to prevent the patient from dying of natural causes, but not enough to make him well. Chronic invalidism is not a happy state.

It may well be that the best hope for the Middle East lies in its diminishing importance, which may in time lead to the great powers losing interest in the area. This would not be the first time. The decline of European interest in the Middle East in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and its effects, are well known. An earlier example may be found in the fourth century A.D., when the last of a long series of wars between Rome and Persia came to an end. While the struggle between the two great powers of the ancient world continued, both were active in Arabia—politically, militarily, commercially. During the long peace from 384 to 502 A.D., both lost interest. During the centuries of neglect, the trade routes were diverted, the caravan cities abandoned and much of Arabia reverted to nomadism.

It would not be easy for the great powers to lose interest and might well be painful for the Middle East, where the final fulfillment of the long-standing demand for the end of imperialism could have disconcerting political and economic effects. Without foreign stimulation, there would be grave danger of deterioration and regression; without foreign irritants, there might also be some hope of peace.

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ISRAEL'S ADMINISTRATION AND ARAB REFUGEES

By Don Peretz

ISRAEL'S decisive victory in the Six Day War of June 1967 radically altered the dimensions of the Arab refugee dilemma. It is no longer the same dilemma which has confronted the Middle East, the United Nations and the United States for some twenty years. Almost overnight Israel became the principal refugee host country, with approximately half the total number of registered refugees under its control. This is an ironic turn in the history of the problem, since Israel had always insisted that the refugees be resettled beyond its frontiers in the neighboring Arab territories of Jordan, Egypt and Syria. Now that it controls parts of those countries, it is directly confronted with responsibility for more than one million Arabs—about half of them refugees of 1947–48. Any settlement of the Palestine conflict which Israel would find acceptable will bring many of these territories and a substantial number of their Arab inhabitants under its permanent jurisdiction.

Israeli public opinion, press comment and government attitudes are daily becoming more intense in their determination that there be no return to the prewar boundaries. Each day that passes without tangible indications of a major change in Arab policy toward Israel further entrenches the new status quo and whets Israeli appetites for retaining larger slices of the "new territories." Jerusalem, with its borders greatly extended into Hashimite Jordan, has already become "non-negotiable," and the city's 65,000 Arabs have been declared residents of Israel. Responsible leaders of all political parties except a pro-Arab faction of the Communists have declared other areas such as Gaza, the Syrian Golan Heights, Sinai and western Jordan negotiable only with guarantees that they will never again threaten Israel. Since these areas include half the Palestinian Arabs, their future will be determined by Israel's plans for the territories.

The dimensions of the new territories are startling. They are about four times the area of Israel within its 1948 armistice frontiers. The Jordanian West Bank includes most of the major towns

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in the Hashimite Kingdom. In addition to Jerusalem, other cultural and economic centers lost were Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Jericho, Tulkarm, Ramallah, Kalkilya and Bethlehem. The Jerusalem-Bethlehem tourist center was a mainstay of the Jordanian economy, providing about 25 percent of the country's foreign currency earnings. According to official Jordanian estimates, the West Bank contributed 40 percent of the country's gross domestic product. Investment in the West Bank represented about 95 percent of total Jordanian investment in tourism, 60 percent in private construction, 52 percent in government buildings, 48 percent in municipal and rural development schemes and 44 percent in highways and roads. Although less than a third of Jordan's cultivated land was on the West Bank, the region produced 87 percent of the country's olives, 80 percent of its fruits and 45 percent of its vegetables. More than half of the government-financed coöperative societies were established on the West Bank.

At the same time that the Hashimite Kingdom lost a third to a half of its economic productivity, it acquired between 150,000 and 220,000 Palestinians who left their West-Bank homes to become nonproductive refugees on the eastern side. Nearly half of these Palestinians were refugees for a second time, having left their original homes, now in Israel, during 1947–48. Israeli policy toward the new refugees soon became linked with an overall peace settlement. The more distant such a settlement became, the more remote became the possibility of their return to their homes on the West Bank. Immediately after the June war, the Israeli Government had indicated a willingness to permit the controlled return of a limited number of the new east-bank refugees. But as the political situation froze, Israel's willingness to permit even a limited return rapidly cooled. Recent official policy has been to permit repatriation across the Jordan River only in special cases of family reunion. Last August, when an official repatriation scheme was authorized, only 14,000 well-selected Palestinians were permitted to return to the West Bank. Excluded from this number were Jerusalem residents and refugees from 1948.

More than 90 percent of the Palestinians under Egyptian jurisdiction lived in the Gaza Strip, occupied until June by the Egyptian army. Refugees there were not permitted to abandon the Strip. Their sense of Palestinian identity was kept alive by many devices. The area was never incorporated into Egypt, but retained the framework of law and administration existing when

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it was part of British mandatory Palestine. Palestinian rules and regulations remained in force and many mandatory officials, including many mayors, judges and other government officers kept their posts. For a short time Gaza was the seat of a Palestinian government in exile, but several years ago it quietly withered away. Meanwhile, a combination of circumstances contributed to an economic revival in Gaza; life promised to become viable for most residents, including the refugees. The expanding citrus industry was exporting between 1.5 and 2 million crates of fruit per year, providing wages for several thousand Palestinians. With their hard-currency earnings, Gaza citrus merchants purchased European luxury goods which they sold through the new free port established by President Nasser. Both the United Nations Emergency Force of three thousand to five thousand men and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) brought substantial infusions of foreign currency. The town of Gaza was beginning to bustle with the activity of hundreds of shopkeepers and middlemen who also employed refugees, providing them with attractive increments to supplement their UNRWA rations and services.

The June war shattered Gaza's pattern of emerging economic viability. No longer is it, nor is it likely again to become, an Egyptian free port. UNEF is gone and the future of UNRWA there is uncertain. Only the citrus production continues, but earnings will now be subject to rigid Israeli currency regulations, and profits will be taxed at considerably higher rates than before June 4. The economic setback has led growing numbers of Palestinians to take advantage of the new freedom given by Israel to travel out of the Strip and to leave for good if they so desire.

Gaza remains the center of zealous Palestine Arab consciousness and strong pro-Nasser sentiment. Since its population is very dense and very ardent in their fervor to redeem the homeland, Israel's defense authorities are interested in breaking up the refugee concentrations there. Recent reports are that several thousand Palestinians are to be transferred from Gaza to abandoned refugee camps and towns on the West Bank. Indeed, a first stream of Gaza residents has begun to cross the Jordan, adding to the number of West-Bank refugees now in the Hashimite Kingdom. Although the Israeli government has not announced its plans for the Strip, it has declared that Gaza was never part of Egypt and will never again be returned to Egyptian control.

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Its experience since 1956 has made it determined to prevent Gaza from again becoming a corridor through which an enemy could penetrate deep into Israel's vital coastal strip.

The policy adopted toward the Gaza Strip is gradually being extended to the Sinai Peninsula. Israel has not made any claim to Sinai, but there has been an increasing number of non-official statements that Sinai never was really an integral part of Egypt. Nor has the lack of an official policy deterred Israeli scientists and engineers from making surveys of the mineral resources of the area or prevented the government from exploiting its petroleum fields. Other than some 100,000 Bedouin, the only substantial population in the peninsula lived in East Kantara on the Suez Canal and in el-Arish, both now Israeli military outposts. Most of the Egyptian population in these towns was evacuated and their homes and streets are now deserted.

Of the three countries which lost land in the June war, Syria suffered the least. However, the loss of the Golan Heights created a large new Syrian Arab refugee problem. Estimates are that 80,000 to 100,000 Syrian Arabs fled to Damascus and other Syrian towns during the fighting, leaving behind fewer than 7,000 inhabitants, mostly Druze villagers. Syria's loss of the Jordan Valley headwaters is a serious blow to Arab plans to disrupt Israel's development by diverting waters for Arab use. The Arab League's scheme has been spoiled, Israel has gained control over substantially more water than it had before and it now is drafting plans to channel water from the Hasbani and Banias Rivers into an irrigation system of its own design.

II

Military strategy is the dominant consideration in shaping Israeli policy toward the occupied territories. The new borders give Israel every strategic advantage its military leaders ever sought. For the first time in the history of Zionist establishment in Palestine there are only a handful of Jewish settlements which can be directly threatened by an organized Arab armed force. Paradoxically, too, the territorial expansion has shortened the borders. The Gaza Strip has been eliminated as a military threat to central Israel, and the military frontier with Egypt has been shortened by several hundred kilometers to the relatively short and easily defensible east bank of the Suez Canal.

Israeli army chiefs considered the frontier with Jordan as the

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most sensitive area in any possible military confrontation. The two countries faced each other across 330 miles of border adjoining the most heavily populated Jewish cities, towns and agricultural settlements. The Jordanian army outposts at Kalkilya were only a few minutes' tank ride from Natanya (midway between Haifa and Tel Aviv), which military observers considered to be Israel's most vulnerable spot. For 20 years, Jewish Jerusalem, the country's third most populous urban center, had been under threat of bombardment if not seizure. Now Jordan's military frontier has been pushed back across the river, where it is dozens of miles from most Israeli settlements. In the south, the Negev Desert separates Jordanian armed forces from Israeli population centers.

In the north, Syrian guns on the Golan Heights have been spiked or turned eastward, toward Damascus. The labyrinth of former Syrian fortresses and tunnels is in Israeli hands. Kuneitra, once a city of 20,000 people and the command post of Syria's southern armies, was abandoned by Syria and ransacked by Israel. Only one or two hundred bedraggled survivors remain there. For the first time since they were established, Jewish settlements from Lake Tiberias to Lebanon feel secure.

Although military strategy outweighs other factors, custom and emotion have become increasingly significant in Israeli policy toward the occupied areas. The longer oil from the Sinai is used, the more difficult it becomes to give it up. The more integrated Israel's economy becomes with Gaza and the West Bank, the more difficult it is to sever the new commercial, agricultural and trade links. And the more Israeli tourists visit biblical sites, such as Rachel's tomb in Bethlehem and the tomb of Abraham in Hebron, the more painful becomes the thought of their surrender.

Before June 4 only the Herut wing of the Gahal party made acquisition of territory beyond the 1949 armistice frontiers part of its ideology and dogma. Now, only the Arab Communists and Mapam, a leftist-oriented party in the coalition government, have taken a stand against retention of some occupied regions. Although Mapam's six-point peace proposal includes the return to Jordan of most of the West Bank, its leaders demand that all Jerusalem, Gaza and the ridges of the Golan Heights become part of Israel. Mapai, the kingpin in the coalition, has not made public its official policy regarding the refugees, the new territories or

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their populations, and its members are divided in sympathy between a "winner-keep-all" approach and a modified version of the Mapam program. Other political party leaders and most of the press have called for some form of annexation or federation on a larger or smaller scale.

The Israeli Government and the military occupation authorities, by assuming a wide variety of responsibilities in the new territories, have indicated that the occupation will not be short. In Jerusalem, the Jordanian educational, judicial and administrative systems have been uprooted and replaced. This has not occurred without friction. Israeli authorities point out, however, that their object was not to avoid friction but to "integrate" east Jerusalem (the term "annexation" has been studiously avoided). Arabs who cannot accept "integration" are invited to leave; those who passively resist are warned and closely watched; active opponents are removed or otherwise forcibly apprehended.

The former Arab mayor and several municipal councilmen of Jordanian Jerusalem were invited to participate in a greater Jerusalem town council with a large Jewish majority. There is disagreement between Israeli officials, who assert the invitation was made in good faith, and Arab leaders, who charge it was a deception to obtain Arab acquiescence to Israeli domination. In the meantime, all municipal services have been taken over by Israeli officials although several hundred minor Arab employees remain in their posts. Nearly all barriers thrown up during the past twenty years have been removed so that it becomes increasingly difficult to locate demarcation lines between the former Israeli and Jordanian cities. The international élan that existed in Jerusalem before the 1948 partition is rapidly being restored. As the two parts of the city become fused, to separate them will be difficult if it is not already impossible.

The new freedom of the city is not valued equally by all Jerusalem Arabs. Many merchants have welcomed the influx of Jewish tourists, but former Arab municipal leaders, Jordanian government officials and high-ranking clerks, the Muslim hierarchy and other Arab notables still regard themselves as Jordanians, not Israelis. Despite the humanitarian attitudes and good will of some Israeli officials, the hasty decisions on important issues taken by Israeli municipal, central government and military authorities alienated many Arabs. They considered projects

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to "modernize" or "improve" parts of Arab Old Jerusalem more callous than efficient—for instance, the overnight decision to create a great plaza before the Wailing Wall. This meant displacing some two hundred Arab families, who were given only a few hours' notice before being forced to evacuate their houses. Many could find no new homes and became refugees on the east bank, while others found refuge in makeshift shelters provided by UNRWA.

Problems created by the great disparities between Jordanian and Israeli economic and administrative systems were less immediately pressing but nevertheless disconcerting. Wages, taxes and the cost of living are far higher in Israel than in Jordanian Jerusalem or than in the other occupied territories. Taxpayers in east Jerusalem have been assured that the application of Israeli rates will be gradual and merciful, but sooner or later the Arabs of east Jerusalem will have to contribute a far larger share of their income to their new government. Authorities in Israeli Jerusalem and the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) have taken steps to balance the substantial wage differences between Arab and Jewish Jerusalem.

All Arab education in the new territories and east Jerusalem is now supervised by the Arab department of the Israeli Ministry of Education, and much tension has resulted. In east Jerusalem the former Jordanian system has been replaced by that used in Arab areas of Israel. This involved reorganizing the whole structure of education, including curricula, texts and forms of administration. Jordanian textbooks were replaced by those produced in Israel and references regarded as derogatory to Israel, Zionism and Jews were eliminated. Many Arab teachers and intellectuals insist that the Israelis are seeking to wipe out Arab national consciousness. Israeli educationalists assert that education throughout the Arab world has had a "fascist outlook" which sought to "militarize" Arab youth. They insist that the time has come to rectify the educational mistakes which led Arab youth into hatred and self-delusion about the realities of life in the Middle East. They maintain that only a unified educational system can smooth the process of integration between Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem.

Among the million Arabs who fell under Israel's control in June there are many former cabinet ministers, ambassadors, judges and other high Jordanian government officials as well as physicians, lawyers and engineers. While many refuse to accept the

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consequences of the Arab defeat, a few recognize that there can be no return to the prewar status quo. This does not necessarily mean that they are willing to become collaborators with Israel. However, some Arab leaders see possibilities of coöperating on a basis of equality in the economic revival of the occupied territories, and Arab experiences in Jerusalem are considered to be a test of such possibilities.

Day-to-day policy for the occupied territories other than Jerusalem is determined by the three military governors for the West Bank, the Golan Heights and Gaza and Sinai, each of whom has assumed the authority and responsibility for his area formerly exercised by the Jordanian, Syrian and Egyptian governments. Official ordinances for the West Bank are now issued in the name of Israel's General Narkiss instead of King Hussein; and West-Bank law courts issue their judgements in the name of "justice" rather than in the name of the King. Within each of the military governates, local military governors, who are Israeli army officers, are responsible for the cities, towns and rural districts.

III

The fundamental principle underlying Israeli policy is the restoration of local Arab administration. Mayors, municipal officials and judges have been requested to continue their functions under supervision of the military governors. Substantial numbers of former Jordanian officials remained in their posts, but many have become inactive or resigned in protest against the occupation authorities. In both Gaza and the West Bank differences over education similar to those in Jerusalem create friction. Prior to school-opening last fall, nearly half the old textbooks were purged. The Israeli Ministry of Education found objectionable passages in nearly everything, including mathematics, science, grammar and religion. Thousands of Arab students and hundreds of teachers protested by boycotting government schools. In some towns, schools remained closed for months; in others, the protest strike gradually flickered out. The military government, reasoning that the Arab community itself would be the only victim of the protest, refrained from trying to open the schools by force.

Military policy toward the occupied regions differs from that in Sinai and Gaza during 1956–57. Instead of destroying roads and military installations, the army is improving and extending vital arteries. Definite encouragement is given to Israeli civilian

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government workers attached to the army to develop and improve agriculture, to modify crop patterns so that they will complement those of Israel, to explore and where possible utilize mineral resources, and to "modernize" government services in social welfare, health and sanitation. Israeli post offices using Israeli stamps have been opened in many of the major occupied towns and villages. Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian army and police posts have been incorporated into Israel's security system. If the Israeli Government should ever seriously consider evacuating occupied territory, it would face a complicated task in dismantling the new installations. The speed with which these areas were acquired is no longer a measure of how quickly they could be peacefully evacuated.

The military have not become directly involved in the great debate about the future of the occupied territories. Long-range planning is left to government civilians, and to deal with the subject the Prime Minister's office has established a bewildering number and variety of committees. There are committees of ministers, directors-general of ministries, university professors and specialists such as agronomists, urban planners, statisticians, demographers, agriculturists, hydrologists and engineers. One group of committees deals with political, another with economic plans. General economic surveys have covered possibilities for future development of the occupied territories within a variety of political contexts including, on the one hand, the return of the West Bank and Sinai to Arab control, or, on the other, their full integration within the framework of the Israeli economy. The economic and social implications for Israelis and for the Arab inhabitants are considered in each possibility. Microeconomic planning takes place within small committees of technicians who survey possibilities of rural resettlement, urban housing and development of infrastructure. Plans for refugee resettlement in Israeli-held territory are considered within the context of regional economic development along the lines of the broad scheme discussed by former U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.

One theoretical scheme for refugee resettlement, called "Model A," envisages rehabilitation of 2,000 Palestinian families, two-thirds in farming and one-third in other rural services. Former Jordanian state lands would be utilized and irrigation would be introduced. Details such as the number of land parcels per family, types of irrigation and crops, probable crop yields and income,

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estimated increase in production over the next decade, and potential markets are projected. As a preliminary, two anthropological studies were made in refugee camps to determine how Palestine Arabs might adapt to "Model A."

None of the nearly 200 planners involved in these committees is Arab because Israeli officials believe it is "too early" for Arab involvement. They assert that, when the broad outlines of their plans have been drawn up and the government is ready to implement them, Arab participation will be invited.

Israeli plans for refugee resettlement in the occupied territory have made its relations with UNWRA quite delicate since the international agency will be directly involved in any matters related to the displaced Palestinians. Although UNRWA has been permitted to continue operations in Gaza and the West Bank, the Israeli press and many government officials have not disguised their mistrust of it. They charge that most of its 11,500 employees are Palestinians who deeply resent, if they do not hate, the Jewish State. The walls of many UNRWA schools are still decorated with maps and slogans calling for "return to the Arab homeland."

Israeli and UNRWA officials disagree over even such fundamentals as the number of refugees. UNRWA estimates of the refugee population have been sharply criticized in Israel ever since the agency was first established. Israelis charge that Jordan's refusal to permit UNRWA to count its refugees resulted in the agency's ration rolls being greatly inflated. In September a census conducted by the Israeli Government showed that the number of refugees in the occupied regions was 40 to 50 percent below the UNRWA estimate.

Israelis regard UNRWA's operations and its very existence as obstacles to Israel's plans for the occupied areas. Since the solution of the refugee problem is seen as part of their larger scheme for economic rehabilitation, they contend that it cannot continue to be treated in isolation from the problems involved in the total development of the occupied areas. Integration and rehabilitation will replace refugee relief. Then, according to Israeli planners, UNRWA services will no longer be necessary in Gaza and the West Bank. What if parts of the West Bank should be returned to Jordan? Any rehabilitation plans already made or implemented will not have been wasted effort. If refugees are resettled and the general economy improved in areas returned to Arab control, the whole region, including Israel, will benefit since there will be fewer refugees.

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Although the United States Government has not been directly involved in drafting these blueprints for the future of the occupied areas, they are of more than academic interest to Americans. The Israelis who have been drafting them estimate that the cost of implementation might reach more than $100 million a year over a ten-year period, and they are hoping to raise a substantial part of this sum from the U.S. Government. Their calculations are based on the fact that approximately 70 percent of UNRWA's annual budget is now provided by the United States. By removing West Bank and Gaza refugees from UNRWA care, the costs of maintaining the agency would be cut in half, saving the U.S. Government approximately $12 to $15 million a year; this could be applied to rehabilitation of the occupied areas. The Israelis argue that by shifting its contribution from UNRWA to the Israeli rehabilitation plan, the United States would contribute to a solution of the refugee problem rather than to its indefinite perpetuation.

To succeed, these plans must have more than passive acceptance from the Arab population. If there is active resistance, or if the plans are sabotaged by guerrilla warfare, they will probably remain mere blueprints. Active Arab coöperation in developing the Israeli plans should be a prerequisite for American support. Unless plans are accepted by the Arabs who live in the occupied regions and by the refugees who will be the subjects of Israeli pilot projects, American policy-makers will find difficulty in regarding them as anything more than an academic exercise.

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A REGIONAL SOLUTION FOR VIET NAM

By Vu Van Thai

THE theory of the falling dominoes in Southeast Asia has been the subject of heated debate. Yet few sensible observers would deny that a settlement in Viet Nam will have a significant impact on the overall course of political evolution in the area and, conversely, that changing political conditions in Southeast Asia will affect the outlook for a permanent settlement in Viet Nam. Even in the shorter perspective, the chances of finding a stable compromise solution acceptable to the fighting parties appear greater when seen in the broader framework than when we view the problem in its strictly Vietnamese dimensions. For in the narrow context of the two Viet Nams there seem to be no conceivable alternatives which do not imply a significant victory for one side and a defeat for the other.

Despite the diverse ethnic, cultural and economic patterns in the small independent countries of Southeast Asia, where more than 100 million people live, political conditions are strikingly similar: everywhere tensions prevail and the interests of world powers clash.[1] The Viet Nam conflict represents only the most acute manifestation of the turmoil.

The main factors at the root of the Viet Nam crisis and the conflicting outside interests which have raised it to its present intensity are not Vietnamese alone but are features of the whole region. Everywhere, internal instability creates latent or open conflicts which the competing interests of the major world powers could escalate into international crises of the Viet Nam type. In fact, all the manifestations of Southeast Asian unrest since World War II—the Huk revolt in the Philippines, the insurgency in Malaya, the endemic insecurity in Burma, the war in Laos, the pre-insurgency situation in northeast Thailand—all arise from the same tensions. Historical circumstances have simply made Viet Nam the most extreme instance.

One principal origin of the local tensions is the combination of

[1] In this article I define Southeast Asia as including Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, the Republic of Viet Nam (Saigon), the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (Hanoi), Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The insularity of the Philippines gives her a special situation compared to the continental countries. Indonesia is omitted because both by her size and her insularity certain features of the present analysis do not apply to her.

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exacerbated nationalist feelings and unfulfilled expectations. A sense of national identity and patriotic pride have long existed in these lands of ancient culture, but now they have been reinforced by expectations of social and economic betterment springing directly from the struggle against alien colonial rule. Although the nations concerned have recovered their political independence, none of them has yet succeeded in getting rid of the kind of extractive economy which they look on as having been the basis of their exploitation. Achievement of political independence thus has left their social and economic expectations unfulfilled; and the resulting unrest has become general because, while there were enough cadres to start popular revolts, there were not enough technocrats to take up the task of building modern nations rapidly and speeding economic growth.

Another factor is that the countries of Southeast Asia are not overpopulated and that although the people are poor they do not live at such a low level of subsistence as to have become fatalistic about their lot. In searching for an appropriate form of nationhood many nationalists became fascinated with Marxist social doctrines and the alleged efficiency of communist techniques. Not surprisingly, then, each country emerged into independence with a relatively important and well-organized communist party. Interestingly, the only country which did not experience popular unrest after World War II was Thailand, which alone had not been under colonial rule; the turmoil there is now only in its formative stage.

Decolonization and the growth of rising expectations have resulted in clashes among social groups such as the old governing élite, the emerging technocrats, the military, the students and religious elements. An added source of turmoil, which might erupt into armed rebellion at any time, is the presence in every country of ethnic groups which have not been absorbed and which resent the majority rule and often oppose the central government. The chances of local armed conflict are further increased by the fact that following the collapse of Japanese rule and the achievement of independence guerrilla organizations were in existence in all the countries concerned; they included experienced cadres which could be enlarged as circumstances became favorable and foreign support was offered.

In addition, relations among these countries are damaged by memories of the long, bloody history which they have had in

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common and by the rivalries created by the present surge of hypersensitive nationalism. Often national leaders have succumbed to the temptation of escalating small incidents into international crises in order to divert popular dissatisfaction with domestic stagnation and mismanagement. This can be done easily because, as national economies are not often complementary, the severance of relations usually has no practical consequences. Thus Cambodia has broken relations with Thailand and South Viet Nam; Laos has experienced many ups and downs in her relations with her neighbors Cambodia, Thailand, North Viet Nam and South Viet Nam; and Malaysia and the Philippines interrupted relations over the issue of North Borneo. Burma has practically closed her door to the outside world. And North Viet Nam, in addition to military operations in South Viet Nam, supports armed actions in Laos and Thailand.

Southeast Asia's strategic location gives it political significance far out of proportion to its size, economic resources or populations. It lies between the two worlds of India and China which comprise half the population of the world. It commands the sea routes between Europe and East Asia and Australia. In the postwar period it has played a large part in the process of decolonialization, setting the pattern of relationships between the underdeveloped and the developed worlds and patterns of nonalignment and socialist nationalism.

Above all, as the Sino-Soviet rift develops, international crises in Southeast Asia and on the Indian subcontinent are progressively changing from bipolar to triangular confrontations. The Laotian crisis of 1961–62, the Chinese invasion of India, the Indo-Pakistani conflict and the war in Viet Nam not only illustrate the clash of interest between the Western world and the communist world but also reveal the gathering intensity of the Sino-Soviet competition—although as long as the Viet Nam war goes on and the communist world as a whole is under challenge it is difficult to imagine either China or the Soviets making a final break.

II

It is in a most complex context, then, that we must attempt to assess how much a settlement in Viet Nam will affect the policies and attitudes open to the main interested parties inside and outside the region.

North Viet Nam is thoroughly aware that a negotiated settle-

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ment would mean a cooling off of its relations with China. Time and again China has reaffirmed her opposition to any form of compromise; in fact, her public stand has so frozen the issue that by now world opinion and the various communist parties will interpret any settlement as a clear success for Russian influence and a serious setback to China. For the Communist Party of Viet Nam to agree to negotiate (even for purely tactical purposes) will mean that it has accepted the risk of a break with China or at least the prospect of a phase of cold relations.

Hanoi's concern for Chinese sensitivities is probably a main reason for the rigidity of its position, in sharp contrast with the tactical flexibility displayed at the time of the Viet Minh's fight against the French. During that period the North Vietnamese lost no opportunity of winning international sympathy, undermining Western support for France, dividing French opinion and eroding the French will to fight by hinting at possible concessions and keeping their own goals ambiguous. A year ago they showed some signs of this former flexibility by introducing some ambiguities regarding their preconditions for talks; but it was ended after a visit by Ho Chi Minh to Peking and the hardening of U. S. attitudes. More recently, an article in *Hoc Tap* which openly criticized the cult of personality and the cultural revolution was the first firm indication that Hanoi was concerned about the course of events within China.

The turmoil in China undoubtedly introduces an element of uncertainty into Hanoi's calculations, not only as regards political action but also its economic prospects. China is North Viet Nam's main trading partner. Although the Cultural Revolution seems so far to have had little effect on the Chinese economy, it brings into question China's ability to continue that role in the long run, particularly her ability to meet the growing food deficit in North Viet Nam. Thus North Viet Nam may find it necessary to turn some of her trade toward the Southeast Asian countries. In any event, considering the risk that China may react sharply to a willingness by Hanoi to negotiate, the North Vietnamese leaders may feel a need to find alternative trading partners as a means of meeting eventual economic pressure from China.

Thus North Viet Nam has several alternatives open to her in the aftermath of a negotiated settlement. In view of China's predictable opposition to a settlement, she may choose a policy that draws her away from China and closer to Moscow and that looks

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to Southeast Asia for regional trade. Or she may try to mend her relations with China and align herself again with Peking in the joint purpose of communizing and dominating Southeast Asia. Or she may try to reëstablish good relations with China while maintaining her present ties to Moscow and developing new ones with Southeast Asia.

It seems unlikely that the North Vietnamese government will adopt the first alternative. It has always displayed a clear determination to maintain its own independent line, yet the prospect of facing a huge and hostile neighbor, even with Russian backing, will seem too much of a risk, particularly as this policy offers few advantages compared with the others. In addition, this course would increase Hanoi's dependence on a Southeast Asia which may be under predominantly U.S. influence.

The second alternative, *i.e.* realignment with China, is the most likely course in the event that Hanoi feels compelled under U.S. military pressure to accept a cease-fire or a settlement on U.S. terms as a provisional tactical retreat. Realignment with China in these circumstances will most likely lead to their jointly preparing wars of liberation in all countries of Southeast Asia.

On the whole it seems most likely that Hanoi will consider the third alternative course as the most advantageous. In the first place, it offers the greatest degree of flexibility. Inside a triple set of relationships—with Moscow, Peking and Southeast Asia—North Viet Nam might be able to pursue parallel policy objectives with Russia or China without being dependent on either. She might even find herself in a position to arbitrate to some degree where the interests of the two communist giants clash in Southeast Asia. In addition, such a policy will allow North Viet Nam eventually to quarantine herself from China in case the present turmoil there degenerates into chaos or civil war. It does not imply that the Vietnamese Communist Party will give up its ambition to be the dominant factor in the communization of Southeast Asia; simply, being less doctrinaire and more pragmatic than the Chinese, it may opt temporarily for a strategy of peaceful coexistence rather than persevering in an armed subversion which does not pay in existing circumstances.

III

China's reaction is the most unpredictable. It seems plausible to suppose, however, that an end of the war in Viet Nam may

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bring a real break between the Chinese and the Russian brands of communism. As already stated, the war has deepened the rift but at the same time has constituted the main obstacle to a break. In all likelihood, if a settlement in Viet Nam occurs, it will be the result of negotiations bypassing Peking. China cannot but oppose such a settlement; yet it seems unlikely that she would send troops into North Viet Nam in order to try to prevent negotiations unless she felt that the settlement foreseen would endanger the very existence of the communist régime there or that Hanoi was preparing to shift away from her orbit and join a United States-Soviet alliance in the making. Short of military intervention, however, China would use all means of pressure to coerce Hanoi into continuing the war, if only on a token scale. If that failed, relations between China and Hanoi would become strained at the time of settlement, but if Hanoi made a sufficient effort they could again become friendly even though, probably, never as cordial as when Hanoi was in the Chinese orbit.

In the face of a setback to her policy and doctrine in Viet Nam, China would redouble her efforts to control Southeast Asia. She is not likely to give up her role of emerging world power and champion of pure communist doctrine; nor is she likely to turn inward and concentrate on her problems of development. Thus we must expect increased Chinese efforts to spread revolution and trouble, and these will be directed chiefly toward Southeast Asia. There are many reasons for this, in addition to considerations of security and spheres of influence.

For years to come, although China will most likely try to intervene in international confrontations the world over, she is unlikely to have either the economic or military capabilities to be a determining factor in crises in faraway places. Her nuclear capability will be relatively limited for some time to come and will be credible to the world powers only in confrontations directly involving her own security. But in Southeast Asia, her nuclear capability will be more credible and her ground forces will also be a potent factor. She can carry out there what Kenneth Young, former American Ambassador to Thailand, has termed "aggression by seepage," avoiding direct collision with the United States while organizing proxy parties in neighboring countries and offering them privileged sanctuaries. She also could profit from the various tensions in the area, backing one country or another in ways that tend to expand her influence.

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Another reason why China will put emphasis on Southeast Asia is that there, of all areas of the world, the cultural background and the prevailing economic and social frustrations offer a most favorable terrain for her to spread her brand of communism. The traditional distrust of Southeast Asians for China is largely compensated for by the Asian pride which is part of the nationalistic fervor. The extent to which the Chinese brand of communism prevails over the Russian in the Indian communist movement is a case in point.

To sum up, in Southeast Asia, China may find herself either in parallel action with Hanoi or in direct competition. What will happen in the long run depends on the evolution of Southeast Asia itself and on American and Soviet policies there when hostilities finally end.

IV

When the war in Viet Nam ends, the Soviet Union will enjoy more freedom of action in Southeast Asia than at present, since its policy will not be handicapped by so many dilemmas and contradictions. The present façade of communist unity will not have survived a negotiation in which China is necessarily bypassed. Soviet Russia is most unlikely to consider Southeast Asia of secondary importance and leave it as a field of competition between China and the United States.

For a certain time at the end of the Khrushchev era, the Soviets seemed to have lost their position in Southeast Asia and to be concerning themselves less with events there; but since then they have made a noticeable comeback, not only in Viet Nam but in other countries of the area as well. The present political offensive of the Soviets there indicates that they hope that in the long run their brand of "goulash communism" will appeal to Asians, whom they suppose to be growing fearful of both China's revolutionary crusade and the American policy of military containment in Viet Nam.

To achieve an apparently moderate posture between the Chinese and American extremes, the Russians are focusing largely on economics. They have recently established diplomatic relations and signed a commercial agreement with Malaysia. They must be far from happy about General Suharto's vigorous anti-communism in Indonesia, yet they nevertheless have rescheduled the Indonesian debt of some $1.5 billion and are

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quietly working to improve their ties with Djakarta. The Philippine Government has recently authorized two commercial missions to Moscow and has just rescinded an old ruling prohibiting private firms from doing business with communist countries. Soviet moderation is particularly visible in the case of Laos, where Moscow loyally supports Premier Souvanna Phouma even though his government has evolved from its original neutralism to a position more to the right. The Soviets have also patched up their relations with Cambodia, which came near to a break at the end of 1965.

Thus it appears that in the aftermath of a settlement in Viet Nam, although the Soviet Union may be expected to take more positive steps toward a détente, it will not necessarily pursue a policy parallel to that of the United States and will not be primarily concerned about Chinese aggressive designs; rather, if it could, it would leave this task to the United States and try to exploit both Chinese and U.S. excesses. (In a moment of acute crisis threatening world peace, the Russians nevertheless would probably take parallel action with the United States to reduce tensions.) Although the Soviet Union would be likely to direct its policy mainly to strengthening its influence with governments, it would simultaneously support North Viet Nam in her subversive activities among Southeast Asian communist parties.

The chances of a more positive Russian policy depend mainly on two factors: (1) The state of Russian relations with China: if the relationship becomes very tense, Moscow will have to seek American coöperation in winning over Southeast Asia in an effort to contain China. (2) A possible change in U.S. policy: if American policy shifts away from military involvement in Southeast Asia following a Vietnamese settlement, Moscow may be induced to seek international guarantees for the security of the area.

V

In principle, it appears that a negotiated end of the war in Viet Nam might clear the way for the United States to make new policy approaches in Southeast Asia. In practice, because of its past commitments and the responsibilities it has assumed for the maintenance of world stability, any shift in the U.S. policy poses many delicate problems. In particular, the American military presence in Southeast Asia cannot be terminated over a short

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period of time without creating serious difficulties. It seems virtually certain that American troops will be replaced in Viet Nam by some international peacekeeping machinery following a cease-fire. But it would be unrealistic to expect that the U.S. military presence in other parts of the area will be replaced by some international force, nor can we count on a rapid build-up of some system of regional collective security sufficient to deter communist subversion. Under these conditions, any early withdrawal of the American military presence elsewhere than from Viet Nam is sure to prolong turmoil in the area and may even endanger the implementation of whatever Vietnamese agreement has been signed; and this in turn would risk ushering in a serious international crisis.

To say that the United States should keep a military presence in the area does not mean necessarily that it should continue its present policies; on the contrary, in the climate created by a Viet Nam settlement there will be opportunities to undertake new positive actions to complement the policy of containment and to make this policy, in time, less and less necessary. Although there are many variations, the alternatives for American policy can be grouped into three broad lines:

1. To withdraw from Southeast Asia, leaving it to Chinese influence.

2. To continue a military presence, complementing it with economic aid to non-communist countries in order to strengthen their capacity to resist communist internal subversion.

3. To encourage the diversification of external influences in Southeast Asia and regional coöperation among the countries of the area, leading toward a system of collective security and a policy of coexistence.

The first alternative, withdrawing from Southeast Asia, will probably be unacceptable to the great majority of Americans in the light of all the efforts and sacrifices made in defending South Viet Nam. In addition, the political victory which this would mean for Communist China might result in a wild struggle between the Soviet Union and China for control of the world communist movement, with unpredictable results regarding the position of each toward the West.

The second alternative—military alliance coupled with economic aid—risks being adopted as a result of inertia. To work out a new constructive solution would require time, patience and

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imagination. Faced with a long and consistent effort, the United States might fall back into an easier line of policy. Pressure from Southeast Asian anti-communist governments and the tendency to react directly to communist moves would encourage this trend. Also, if the likely détente with the Soviet Union occurs once the war in Viet Nam is over, there will be an increased chance of maintaining a status quo through parallel U.S. and Soviet moves. Such a policy would work only if the military build-up were continued, and it would be at the risk of some new military involvements. It would not lead to the progressive removal of tensions in Southeast Asia or improve the chances of co-existence. As China's economic and military capabilities grow, it might even lead ultimately to a very tense situation.

The third alternative has already been enunciated in broad principles by President Johnson in his address at the Johns Hopkins University, April 7, 1965. The favorable public reaction to this speech would indicate wide public support for this option. It represents, to my mind, the best course, but there are many difficult obstacles in the way of implementing it, as the following pages will indicate.

VI

We have seen that a settlement in Viet Nam could end a phase of hot confrontation in Southeast Asia but that it would not remove the cause of tensions. Existing elements of domestic instability would remain, and so would the external factors that make the area a field of intense international competing interests. But although the end of the war would thus be essentially in the nature of a cease-fire, it could provide a starting point in a long-range effort to bring peace to the area by promoting regional co-operation. This could contribute to stability and decrease tensions through the following long-term actions:

1. Accelerate economic development by removing a number of limitations at present hampering economic growth.

2. Gradually eliminate internal factors that create tension and domestic conflicts.

3. Diversify the Asian forms of communism, thereby promoting peaceful coexistence.

Although most of the countries of Southeast Asia are not over-populated and ratios of man to land are relatively favorable (compared with India, China and Japan), they have been un-

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able to diversify their economies. They have had to continue developing their agriculture in patterns set during colonial times, concentrating on producing subsistence foods and a few primary products. Industrialization has been restricted to relatively simple industries which are not competitive. Malaysia and Thailand have been able to maintain a satisfactory rate of economic growth (above 5 percent), but even there the present rate will be difficult to maintain without fundamental breakthroughs. The fact that the countries are small and their markets limited has been a main handicap in their development of basic industries. In addition, none of them can afford to establish the network of technical facilities necessary to train the many kinds of foremen and specialized workers needed for embarking on a general course of industrialization. Neither are they able to develop the research centers necessary to sustain rapid economic growth.

All these factors show that regional integration is necessary for the area's rapid growth. Not only will the development of markets across national frontiers enable the countries to acquire new regional specializations, but the enlarged regional market also will help them toward specialization in the world market. Further, development of the industrial sector will create a market for new agricultural products and thus diversify agriculture. Regional coöperation will in addition facilitate the build-up of training facilities to provide the cadres and the skills to feed the industrial process and the research facilities to support self-sustained growth. The first steps in that direction will create new economic prospects, thus improving the political climate; and the improvement of the political climate will in turn improve the economic prospects.

It is also possible that extreme nationalistic feelings will be tempered as a sense of Asian solidarity develops. National leaders will be less tempted to escalate small incidents into major crises since the severance of relations would cause significant economic disturbances for the countries involved. Finally, the problem of minorities will be less acute in a regional context than in a single country where one ethnic group is preponderant. For example, coöperation between Singapore and Malaysia will be less difficult in a regional framework than when discussed on a bilateral basis.

In the case of Viet Nam, Vietnamese communists and non-communists would find coöperation more acceptable in a broad

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Southeast Asian context than if they were left to face each other inside national boundaries. The participation of a communist North Viet Nam and a non-communist South in a Southeast Asian common market might even render some form of confederation possible.

Hanoi's willingness to enter into serious negotiations to terminate the war may itself depend on some prospect of broad regional coöperation, for the North faces very narrow choices at present. Negotiations as of now might leave North Viet Nam either in regional isolation facing her huge Chinese neighbor or forced to rely on trade and other forms of partnership with her immediate neighbors who, except for Cambodia, are presently under U.S. influence. In such circumstances Hanoi would have to depend on U.S. faith and good will. Hanoi's dilemma would be relieved if it could have some assurance that the end of the war would lead to a form of regional coöperation not dominated by U.S. political influence.

Thus the prospect for regional coöperation and the hope for a settlement in Viet Nam seem linked together in a kind of vicious circle. The chances for regional coöperation appear remote so long as the war in Viet Nam continues; and the chances for a settlement of the war would be increased if regional coöperation became more feasible.

VII

The idea of Southeast Asian regionalism has been hailed with enthusiasm and has encountered skepticism. The obstacles indeed appear formidable. There is no historic precedent for regional organization in the area; in fact its history is a long succession of bloody disputes that even the common threat of invasions from powerful neighbors to the North or the East was unable to end. Cultures and religions are almost as varied as the ethnic groups; languages are numerous. In addition, the economies are competitive since they often produce and export the same primary products. Political structures range from democracies to military dictatorships and from free-enterprise societies to socialism; political attitudes range from communism to neutralism and anti-communism. Nationalism appears so strong and power groups in many countries are so entrenched that any encroachment on national sovereignty in favor of regionalism seems hardly possible.

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Despite these handicaps, a trend toward regional coöperation is clearly discernible. It started with the upsurge of nationalism and the end of colonial rule. Shortly after Burma regained her independence, the Burmese leader Aung Sang proposed an Asian "Potsdam Conference" and the formation of an Asian commonwealth with India as one entity, China another and Southeast Asia a third. Within this frame he proposed an economic union of Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, Indochina and Malaya. The attempt ended with Aung Sang's death. In the late forties and early fifties, several attempts were made by Thailand to arrange conferences to discuss a Southeast Asian union. When Malaya became independent, Tunku Abdul Rahman became a proponent of a Southeast Asian common market. Prince Sihanouk, despite shaky relations with his neighbors, did on several occasions refer to a Southeast Asian or an Indochinese common market as a solution to the political tensions of the area. Even in the midst of the dispute over the formation of Malaysia, there were discussions among Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines about the feasibility of "Maphilindo" as a possible solution to their differences. Finally, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand established in 1961 the Association of Southeast Asia for mutual economic, cultural, educational and other non-military purposes.

If these first attempts did not lead to any practical results, there also have been a few success stories. The establishment of Malaysia is a case in point, despite the subsequent withdrawal of Singapore. The Mekong River project is another of great significance. The four countries involved—Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and South Viet Nam—situated in the most troubled part of Southeast Asia, decided in 1957, in spite of their political differences, to coöperate in harnessing one of the world's major rivers and to do so along lines of common interest. This coöperation has survived many disputes among them, and wars in two of them, despite the fact also that the preliminary studies strained their resources and the immediate returns were almost negligible. Thus it appears that parallel to the awakening of nationalistic feelings there has grown up an aspiration toward Southeast Asian solidarity.

Is effective regional coöperation really possible? In the immediate postwar period, when France and the Benelux countries were still wary of Germany, the chances of their associating

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closely with her seemed as remote as coöperation between the Southeast Asian countries seems under present conditions. The assumption that there was a greater political maturity in the European countries than in Southeast Asia does not stand critical examination. Examples of irresponsible decisions that shook the Common Market to its foundations are not lacking; it is only because the cumulative process in time became irreversible that the Common Market is still alive and progressing slowly toward the final stage of integration. This contrasts with the behavior of the four Southeast Asian partners in the Mekong project; political clashes between them have abounded but no one of them threatened to "walk out."

Two factors are necessary to start the coöperative process: local initiative and external encouragement. Why did the Mekong project become operative while another, the Association of Southeast Asia, did not get under way? The difference seems to lie in the fact that the Mekong project aroused considerable international support and involved a disinterested third party, the United Nations, while A.S.A. was almost unnoticed and did not benefit from the presence of a disinterested arbitrator.

There undoubtedly does remain, nevertheless, a most serious handicap for Southeast Asian regionalism as compared with the European pattern: the international context. Whereas the European Economic Community was established by relatively like-minded countries, a Southeast Asian association would include at this stage both Western-oriented and nonaligned countries, with the prospect that a communist country, North Viet Nam, would also become a full partner or be associated in some way. Whether this obstacle can be overcome will depend largely on two factors: the cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam and the possibility of drawing in diversified assistance from outside under the aegis of an international body such as the United Nations. Already the Asian Development Bank established last year provides an example of a grouping of variously aligned countries.

I do not mean to suggest that some steps cannot be initiated before the end of hostilities in Viet Nam. On the contrary, any step taken now will increase confidence that regionalism can become a real force at the end of the war and thus improve the chances of a settlement itself by enlarging the alternatives for compromise open to the belligerents. Projects such as a regional university, common research centers and further steps in the

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implementation of the Mekong scheme (particularly if Cambodia and Laos are active in initiating them) could create a better political climate and help produce the conditions for a satisfactory Viet Nam settlement. An improvement in the relations of Thailand and South Viet Nam with Cambodia is a key to progress in this respect.

Diversification of external assistance to the region could also make a regional solution more feasible. Increasing use of the United Nations to channel assistance will demonstrate that the purpose of foreign aid is not to create political influence but to achieve regional peace and stability. Assistance programs should be designed to foster better relations among the countries. It would also be helpful if such countries as Japan and France would play a more important role in those programs.

To sum up: The chances of achieving regional coöperation in Southeast Asia are real and the contribution it would bring to a stable settlement in Viet Nam could be significant. It seems a necessary element in world stability and in helping to provide a process for the peaceful emergence of China as a world power. But the obstacles are not to be underestimated. A change in the political climate cannot be brought about overnight; what is involved is an evolution not over years but over decades. The United States has an enormous role to play in helping to promote this evolution in Southeast Asia; and to my mind the stake of the United States in its success is enormous also.

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THE AMERICAN STYLE: OUR PAST AND OUR PRINCIPLES

By Stanley Hoffmann

ALTHOUGH the notion of national character has turned out to be of dubious validity, the notion of a national style holds greater promise. It is a postulate and a construct. It attempts to establish order in a chaotic mass of features by positing that a nation perceives the world, and its place in it, in a fashion which is never quite that of any other nation, just as no individual ever faces the world as anyone else does. This way is a procedure of selection, and therefore inevitably one of exclusion, and it is a procedure of distortion, because things that may be important are left out and also because the things selected are refracted through the prism of the nation's or individual's character.

Three aspects of America's singularity are relevant to the study of foreign policy: its past, its principles and its pragmatism. All three are part of a national experience whose relevance to the outside world is uncertain, because the conditions in which it has taken place have been so different from conditions anywhere else. And yet, Americans have never stopped projecting into their foreign policy the three facets of this experience: its historical component (the lessons learned and the mental habits derived from their country's unique situation); the American way of thinking, of apprehending the world mentally for judgment and for reform (a kind of rationalization of the American experience); and the American way of acting, of apprehending the world instrumentally, which consists of the tools that have made the American experience a success.

In this article I will leave out American pragmatism and concentrate on one aspect of each of the other two features: What has been the legacy of America's past to America's attitude toward history? And what is the nature of America's principles?

It might be amusing for amateur explorers of national psyches (there are no others) to establish a typology of national attitudes toward history—ranging, perhaps, from the new nations' often mythical, Rousseauistic sense of a long-buried golden age followed by the long night of corruption that preceded the recent dawn of independence, to the old nations' sense of history as an

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ocean with a patternless record of storms and lulls. In most cases, history is seen as a struggle—either a succession of melees with no final meaning or discernible order, or a slow, painful emancipation from various forms of enslavement to varying degrees of enlightenment. For the philosophers and ideologues who pretend to find a pattern in the record, a meaning in the jumble, history is a bruised witness constantly to be called to the bar; for historical agnostics, history is a burning garment that clings to our skins, a storybook that proves nothing.

The American attitude to history strikes me as quite different; we tend to view it placidly and from a distance. Americans know that they are in it, that the garment burns, but they do not quite realize how impossible it is to shed the garment or wear it without discomfort. The attitude is one of complacency, but the complacency is threatened.

In the United States, where conservatism is the conservation of progress, there has been—in contrast to Europe—a kind of happy simplicity that is both a domestic blessing and an obstacle to understanding, a source of inner strength and a mental and emotional impoverishment. The European response to crisis and challenge has been endlessly varied—Europeans are used to ups and downs, twists and turns, good and bad breaks. Consequently, they are skeptical about the possibility of success in applying recipes, abroad or even at home, that worked once in a particular circumstance. They are not sure enough that their history has been a success to want to extend its lessons to the universe. But Americans, whose history is a success story, tend to believe that the values that arise from their experience are of universal application, and they are reluctant to recognize that they are tied to the special conditions that made the American success possible.

The long experience of the United States in self-reliance has been followed by global entanglements which, while often brilliantly managed, have brought enormous disappointment and frustration. These would have been less if the expectations engendered by America's happy past had been more modest; as they are, they have in turn perpetuated a lingering nostalgia for a past that could not have been more different from the present. This has not paralyzed American foreign policy; it has, however, created a permanent tension between the needs of the external situation and America's inner psychological needs and hopes, and

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it has shaped the mood and manner in which the United States has picked up the challenge.

II

One manifestation of Americans' detached view of history is the tendency to discount the weight of the past. This intellectual act of faith in "modernity" is not merely the mark of a Lockean society raised on liberalism, for liberalism and belief in progress are not Siamese twins. It is the sign of a society which reads its own history as a kind of long prologue to the present and future, whose long isolation has meant that the history of others has been learned rather than experienced; whereas in Europe every nation's history is so weighty, and so closely interlocked with the history of other nations, that the legacy of monuments and memories is deeply imprinted in everyone's consciousness. It is also the sign of a society whose faith in progress takes on forms unknown elsewhere, looking forward as it does not so much to a gradual (or cataclysmic) improvement and transformation of history—bad parents engendering better children, who in turn will raise even better ones, etc.—as to a shedding of history, a perpetually renewed historical virginity. In contrast with their psychological difficulty in coming to terms with the inhabitants of Latin America—descendants of Europeans whom the United States had rejected and Indians whom in their own country Americans destroyed—the enthusiasm shown by many American students for "meeting Africa" may well be due to some affinity of one *tabula rasa* for another.

America's threatened complacency about history assumes many guises. One, often discussed by writers on American foreign policy, is the presumption of ultimate and stable harmony—a happy blend of liberal and conservative ingredients. Statesmen who view international relations as a permanent test of wills incur reprobation. International stability is the goal or concept toward which innumerable proposals for arms control or world policing measures have striven; indeed, the aseptic notion of a world purged of power politics—or in which the instruments of power are sufficiently blunted for international politics to become like the marginal quarrels, symbolic contests and incremental compromises of orderly consensual democracies—can be found in the most surprising contexts, such as the sophisticated arms-control discussions of recent years. History is a plain on which the

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pilgrims of progress move forward, it is not a mountain range with neither summits nor valleys in sight; foreign policy is seen not as a fluid interplay of kaleidoscopic forces and individuals, a continuum of conflicts and crises, but as an activity designed to deter and avert occasional nuisances that might slow down the march, as a series of rescue operations designed to bring the stranded traveler back into the plain; "trouble avoidance" and "crisis coping" define the task; it is a kind of "solutionism" that dies hard.

Obviously, though, this complacency is troubled by the intractability of the issues. And, since it is inevitable that events will not fulfill expectations, Americans tend to blame the world (*i.e.* others) rather than their expectations. In particular, a people that has never experienced defeat will be more likely to view the very possibility of even localized defeats as a catastrophe than peoples that are used to alternations of success and failure and whose expectations are more gloomily modest.

This distance from history and complacency about it converge in the frequently expressed conviction that we are on history's side, or vice versa, and our enemies are not. Other nations also tend to believe that they are history's favorites. In America's case, this conviction is remarkable because of the contradiction between the implied determinism—we appear to know what history will condemn to the graveyard and what it will choose for the future—and the irony or wrath that a comparable determinism provokes when expressed by Marxist opponents. Yet, whereas Marxist convictions rest on an analysis (however lopsided and crude) of economic and social processes, and belief in them can thus be called an empirically grounded act of faith, in the American case the empirical grounds are usually of the wishful-thinking variety, and the act of faith is a kind of whistling in the dark.

Another paradox of America's historical experience which affects the relation of the United States to other nations is the difficulty in coöperating with other nations as equals. American society was "born free" of the inequalities of feudalism and the hierarchical class consciousness of post-feudal industrial society, yet its encounter with the rest of the world has not been equalitarian. In this respect, the story is virtually the opposite of that of major European countries, which are far less equalitarian at home but of necessity much more so in the society of Europe.

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Here, there are three effects of the American legacy. In the first place, whereas all past great powers (including Russia) have been great powers during periods in which there were no fixed amities or enmities (even the Franco-German antagonism did not become hereditary until 1870), the United States' involvement in world affairs has always occurred in a revolutionary period of total hostility, although, to be sure, the enemy has not been the same. Instead of a succession of limited antagonism and limited coöperation, characteristic of moderate periods, the United States has experienced a succession of unlimited enmities. Germany became an ally after having been a hated foe, not because the world contest cooled off but because a "total cold war" against a new foe replaced the total hot war. As antagonism toward the Soviet Union lessens, it is replaced by antagonism toward Red China. In other words, the potential equal was the former enemy, not the ally.

Second, those with whom the United States has been friendly have not been its equals: they have been dependents, ranging from Latin America since the eighteenth century to Britain during World War II—various kinds of dependents, to be sure, from subordinates to clients, but always sufficiently secondary to deprive the United States of the experience of a coalition of equals. The one time the United States was a member in such a coalition, in 1917–19, the experience seemed unbearable; isolation finally prevailed; America went home.

Third, the long tradition of noninvolvement in foreign affairs gave to American diplomacy a certain rigid limitation which the sudden veering to the extreme of total involvement in an unlimited contest did not completely overcome. The American tradition was one of unilateral action (largely by force) and of highly traditional diplomacy—stately representation and observation at the highest levels. The resistance of so many elderly Foreign Service Officers (those who have reached the memoir-writing stage) to the innovations required by the "total diplomacy" of the 1960s—propaganda, economic aid, the Peace Corps, public relations, etc.—is significant. This was not what they were trained for, but this is precisely what a policy of coöperative international involvement entails today.

It can be highly irritating to have to coöperate with others whose relative immunity from or vigorous resistance to pressure may give them a kind of compensatory equality, despite one's

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own size and predominance. But to others (especially in Europe) interdependence is the world's oldest story. They have always lived like sardines in a can—and are only too used to having someone behave at times like a shark. To Americans, interdependence is a kind of decline in sovereignty, and a contribution to overcoming the nation-state. For other states, interdependence is the norm and does not really affect the core of sovereignty; what affects sovereignty is *dependence* (as Rousseau so well understood), being subject to the demands and commands of others. To us, sovereignty seems eaten away and diminished by entanglement; to them, it is lost, not in coöperative arrangements, but only through transfers of power.

III

America's past has bred expectations and shaped perceptions that can be detrimental to free choice and effective action in foreign affairs. But because America's history has been one of a national "melting pot," and because it has been so blessed with rewards, it has also bred a set of beliefs that together serve to gild the historical lily; moreover, they serve the function or dysfunction of providing norms for evaluation and action.

The United States is not an ideological nation, and its policies are not ideological ones, if by ideology one means a body of ideas, emotions and symbols that aim at presenting a systematic and global vision of the world and its history, that serve as a commitment to, a guide for and a legitimization of action, and that are institutionalized in an organized political movement. An ideology in this sense is intensely operational, because of its institutional transmission belts, its dynamism and what I would call its outer-directedness—supposedly putting into the hands of its champions a key or a set of keys with which to unlock doors, a lever with which to move men and mountains. Moreover, it provides categories for the ordering of data, explanations for events and behavior, sometimes projections for illuminating the future.

On the other hand, American principles do not provide the kind of non-ideological guidelines or traditions that some nations preserve in their foreign policy—rules of thumb defining certain objectives, such as the preservation of the balance of power, in the British case, or the so-called tradition of natural borders or of *l'alliance de revers* in the French. What distinguishes Ameri-

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can principles about foreign affairs from such guidelines is, in fact, something they share with ideology.

Guidelines are ordinarily conservative, and by that I mean either (*a*) designed to maintain the overall status quo in accordance with the nation's interest, or (*b*) designed to further revisionist ambitions within a system of international relations believed to possess a permanent or necessary pattern. Ideologies, in so far as they deal with international affairs, are, typically, revolutionary—whether the revolution consists of pushing the hands of the clock forward or back. The system itself must be burned down, and the ideological nation is deemed the carrier of the torch.

American principles share two features with ideologies: one negative—their supposed transcendence of national interests (*i.e.* they are not designed primarily to further peculiarly American ambitions or interests, even if their success has that result); the other positive—in that, in foreign affairs, they go beyond the narrow universe of interstate manœuvres, and express general views about man and society.

Yet these principles differ profoundly from ideology. They are not institutionalized: no single party, no committed state machinery is there to carry the torch and burn the nonbelievers. They do not have the cohesion and interrelatedness of ideological dogmas, and normally they do not inspire the same degree of fervor, although it would be imprudent to generalize on this point. Most important, the vision they express is reformist rather than revolutionary, and they are not so historically grounded as ideologies. While the United States hopes to revamp political life along certain lines, while it envisages global change, its purpose is improvement without apocalypse. The American vision lacks the prophecies and "valued revelations" of ideologies and contents itself with embellishments and ameliorations on a basically accepted design, rather than a repudiation of this design altogether. Ideologies are historically rooted—by which I mean not that they correctly interpret historical trends and provide foolproof instruments for action, but simply that they provide historical explanations as well as ends, means for action and fuel for faith.

Now it is true that America's principles are, in two respects, deeply historical. For one thing, "the idols Americans worship are . . . the idols of their own culture transposed upon the world

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scene,"[1] the fruits of America's early beliefs and historical experience. But the trouble with this is precisely this inner-directedness, for, as we know, the American scene and the world stage profoundly differ. For another, some of the principles do reflect the United States' more recent foreign-policy experience. But the trouble here is that what ought to be a flexible and conditional guideline becomes a dogma that loses touch with historical realities and complexities.

America's principles fall into two categories: first, abstract dogmas and moral imperatives, deeply felt and widely shared, setting goals and defining rules for conduct; second, assumptions about behavior that purport to provide methods of action to achieve the stated goals. These imperatives and postulates explain the unique ambiguity of American foreign policy.

They are a source of strength, precisely because they do express intensely cherished beliefs and experiences, because they are so close to the American essence. They give to the United States its evangelical force, its missionary tone. To be sure, for a long time, the notion of the "chosen people" was interpreted as requiring severance from the world, but as soon as that severance became impossible, then action in the international arena was considered justifiable provided its aim was reform through the promotion of these principles. We often hear about the French idea of a *mission civilisatrice* (as a foreign-policy goal it extended only to France's colonies); in the American case, we would have to speak of an emancipating mission—first *from* the outside world, then *of* this world. The deliberate transposition of policies decided on grounds of power or national interest into the language of principle thus corresponds to two characteristic assumptions: that this is the language that best moves the American people because it is its own; and that it is likely to be the most effective abroad. The first assumption reflects an experience, the second only a conviction.

But these principles are also a serious source of weakness in international affairs. They are like bottles thrown upon the wave, flares in the night, calls through the fog, for one never knows whether they will be recognized or heard. Sometimes they are, because they happen to fit a given situation. Then the success encourages the United States to try them again and again. Surprise or dismay is the reaction when the battle is lost, when the

[1] Max Lerner, "America as a Civilization." New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957, p. 920.

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flare illuminates no landscape, when the call is answered only by its own echo. For America's principles are disembodied. They are like a wine that intoxicates the vintner, but that all others find lacking in body. While they have a considerable *a priori* element, their norms are nevertheless grounded more in American political and social realities.

Now, both ideologies and guidelines indicate concrete goals, reveal connections, point out relevant sectors for action, designate concrete enemies. This may explain why the revisionist and the revolutionary are often allies, why the status quo conservative and the revolutionary may agree on an occasional truce, negotiated at cross-purposes but in the same language of political history. The reformist vision, on the other hand, which often shares lofty universal goals with the revolutionary, is not sufficiently grounded in history to be fully operational, nor is it Machiavellian or flexible enough to provide the kind of management of power relations in which status quo conservatives or revisionists excel. Typically, it consists of ends without means—shopping lists without the prices marked—or of oversimplified notions about means. The Declaration of Independence is not a sufficient charter for policy. The Communist Manifesto and the various programs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union have their share of oversimplification, distortion and illusions; but they also have enough of an analytic method, enough of a grasp of social linkages, enough of a focus on historical trends to be able to correct their own mistakes to a considerable degree.

The United States has been spared the Byzantinism of ideology, but it has not avoided a harmful oscillation from impractical principles and postulates to sophisticated but also inconclusive sociological analyses, which are even less adequate as guides for action than principles or ideologies. Nor has it avoided one of the most paradoxical consequences of the disincarnated nature of principles: the fact that they neither die nor fade away (whereas ideology can be eroded by the routinization of its institutional support, corroded by repeated errors in interpretation and failures in action). Ideological dogma and principles rely on different kinds of faith: one is rousing, demonic, dynamic, activist; the other is simply hope. The first is a high explosive, yet it does not survive repeated failures and turns, then, into cynicism or passive, bitter indifference. But hope springs eternal. . . .

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IV

It is possible here to give only a few examples of the kinds of principles to which I refer. Americans are not alone in believing in them; but they are unique in their determination to act according to those principles as if the only lesson derived from sad experiences was that which Orwell's horse in "Animal Farm" always drew from its failures: "I shall work more" and try harder.

In the category of moral imperatives, two deserve brief discussion: the principle of self-determination and the principle according to which no changes in the status quo should be perpetrated by force (let us call it the principle of peaceful change). They correspond both to domestic American experiences projected into foreign affairs, and to mummified foreign-policy experiences.

The critique of the notion of self-determination is as old as Wilson's Fourteen Points, and there is no need to repeat the arguments often made about the indeterminacy of self-determination, the problem of national minorities, the contradiction between individual and collective rights. What is relevant to our discussion here is that the principle itself represents an admirable blend of ideals and self-interest—the ideal of freedom shared by most of the Western world, and the self-interest in using as an aim and as a goad to others a political notion which corresponds to the prevailing sense of legitimacy and which contradicts the adversaries' reliance on violent action by minority groups, their preference for coercion over consent, or their engineering of some sort of rudimentary consent. However, even if the nature of the unit in which self-determination is to be granted were always clear, or if the problem were one not of nationhood but of régime, there would still remain two headaches which the United States' dedication to the principle arouses.

First, there is the dubious presumption that a worldwide application of the principle of self-determination will always "come out right"—that no nation will ever vote itself into communism, as the cliché goes. This presumption in turn is based on the postulates that no nation ever willingly turns to dictatorship and that to people intent on national independence, communism everywhere and obviously will mean subordination to Moscow or Peking. In so far as all these postulates are open to challenge, blanket support of the principle of self-determination risks a dangerous conflict between the ideal and self-interest. To be sure,

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one could argue that since the postulates are right in the long run and in most cases in the short run too, a better definition of American interests would permit the acceptance of the principle even where and when its application goes against our immediate interest. But the question whether this is a good argument must be answered case by case and not on the basis of the principle alone.

This brings us to the second headache, which is that the principle of self-determination can be worked out only through machinery and institutions; the key question is often not so much whether a people will be able to determine what their government will be as whether it will be provided with the choices and political instruments of choice without which a vote would be a farce. For self-determination, like most ideal values and deities, has to be "mediated." "The people" is a driving force only occasionally; mostly it is a reserve force or a final arbiter. When there are no organized potential winners, where the people is an inchoate mass, or when there is only one organized force, the problem of self-determination is moot.

The principle of peaceful change (which has as its corollary that the United States must support or promote resistance to aggression) presents some of the same profits and problems. Once again, it blends self-interest and ideals. Once again, the main trouble comes in the application. Once again, it may be self-defeating or not operational at all. It may be self-defeating whenever the United States faces a situation in which its interest appears to dictate its crossing a border with forces or by force and without the invitation of the government in power. The argument that a sound definition of America's interest would prohibit any such violation of the principle begs the question. For the competition often dictates its own rules, and there may be an overwhelming need to violate the principle either for "possession" or "milieu" reasons, either to safeguard concrete interests or to uphold a symbolic value such as prestige. To be sure, a casuist can argue that such a move is not aggressive when the purpose is to overthrow a communist régime itself established by force or to prevent a forcible communist take-over. But is the régime then installed any less coercive because it was put in by the champion of the free world? Can one equate a régime established by free elections or by popular revolution, which then drifts into communism, with a régime imposed by force?

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Or the principle of peaceful change may simply be irrelevant. For, as the specialists who wasted their wit and wile trying to define aggression found out, the notion of aggression is applicable only when there is a clear-cut, forcible crossing, by a foreign army, of the border of a well-established state with a government in orderly charge thereof. The very idea of "aggression" corresponds to a neat peaceful dichotomy in international relations and to a situation of domestic stability. Its applicability in an era of "neither peace nor war" is highly dubious—hence the collapse of so many of the rules of international law dealing with civil or interstate war. In the case of protracted conflicts, in which it is almost impossible to find out who struck the first blow, and even more in the case of civil wars fought over shaky régimes, the principle of resistance to aggression tends to become a rationalization invoked easily by all sides. And the notion of peaceful change in one case frequently conflicts with an absence of any channel for the peaceful redress of grievances or settlement of disputes; in the other it conflicts with a principle which Americans ordinarily cherish, the right to revolution. The reconciliation of that right with the dogma of peaceful change is a formidable task.

In the category of American principles that consist of assumptions (containing implicit goals, just as the dogmas rest on implicit assumptions), a few words can be said about two of them. The first is one that pervades American plans and programs for underdeveloped areas; it is the assumption that the central problem the newly independent nations raise is economic development. This presumes, first, that the behavior of the new nation will be determined largely by the level of its economic development; second, that the domestic régime is to a considerable extent a function of the level of development; third, that action in the economic sector of society will, if correct, produce beneficial results in the other sectors; fourth, that the proper goal of a genuine leader of one of these nations should be the development of his country. And the implicit goal in this set of postulates is that the United States ought to concentrate on helping underdeveloped economies reach a stage of self-sustaining growth. Now this is not a wrong objective; but if the postulates are only partly accurate, concentration on it will not necessarily lead to the expected results, or there may be instances in which it ought to be abandoned.

Obviously, economic development is an urgent necessity, and

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political leaders who neglect it are not likely to lead for long. But in the world as it is, only rarely do political leaders consider economic development either as the supreme end or as a goal to be achieved apart from many others, some of which might well curtail development in some way, and all of which tend to imbue this abstract goal with the color and flavor of politics. The experience of today's new nations does not differ so much from that of the nations of Western Europe at a comparable stage: their leaders are moved by a formidable array of motives, among which (for reasons already mentioned) the desire to scintillate on the the world stage, the drive to consolidate domestic control, the determination to integrate disparate elements of the population or to achieve certain social reforms figure as prominently as development.

This means that economic development is often seen as a means to other ends. Consequently, development aid will often be appreciated only to the extent to which it furthers those other ends; or development will be minimized if, in the leader's hierarchy of ends, those for which economic growth is a prerequisite are low or if those that are highest might be compromised by the acceptance of foreign aid. There is much truth in the argument that the absence of development is an assurance of chaos (the counterargument that development often leads to dislocation and trouble, while occasionally true, does not dispose of the case). But it may happen that development will lead to a different sort of irresponsibility—that of a complacent, "inward-looking" society that savors its growing prosperity and leaves the worries to others.

Behind this assumption about economic development, then, one finds less an analysis of the world scene than an idealized projection of America's own experience of economic growth which was accompanied by a large amount of social stability, social progress and political democracy; the projection of a nation where for a long time statesmen did indeed "concentrate on making progress at home instead of trouble abroad,"[2] yet felt no remorse for looking inward, because they found the outside world to be quite ugly. But how can we forget that the United States' resources and social makeup were almost unique; that its institutions preceded and consequently shaped and channeled American economic growth (as shown by the persistent validity of

[2] Arthur Schlesinger, "A Thousand Days." New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 567.

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Tocqueville's analysis, written before the age of mass consumption); that American abundance, the consensus of a "liberal society," and the voluntary limitation of objectives abroad spared the United States those painful choices among equally desirable but not simultaneously attainable goals which confront societies less rich in goods but wealthier in conflicting aims; and that the concentration on domestic issues did in fact entail turbulence and some irresponsible negligence abroad, and in any case was made possible by a completely different international system? For the United States also, economic development was a springboard, a means of action, a prerequisite for world power; but due to their prolonged isolation and their dislike of that power, Americans oscillated between the view that the country's business was business and the view that its business was universal emancipation—two beliefs that tend to isolate the process of economic growth from the pattern of foreign affairs.

Another frequent assumption (or set of assumptions) is summed up in the word "consensus." Americans are convinced of what I have elsewhere called the procedural illusion: that consensus is not only possible, as the outcome of mutual adjustments among men of good will, but the best basis on which leaders can make choices. The implicit goal is, of course, the achievement of consensus. What one finds behind this notion is a certain conception of rationality—a faith in the existence of a single kind of rationality, often obscured by prejudices and bad habits, but, like Rousseau's general will, ready to shine when the layers of dust and dirt have been removed. One also finds the cousin concept of ultimate harmony: just as there is a single rationality between competing biases, there is a potential community behind conflicting interests. Since diversity of views does not preclude the triumph of reason and harmony, it is quite true that community and diversity are twins. Third, one finds the implicitly assumed universe of utilitarianism, which defines values in measurable terms and aims at the greatest good of the greatest number.

These notions lead to a definition of politics as interpersonal relations. There is an implicit vision of a continuum of small groups and international politics; each larger whole appears reducible, and susceptible, to analysis in terms of a small group of claimants groping toward consensus through what has been called partisan mutual adjustment.

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What appears to this writer as a sin of transposition—from one type of social action to a very different kind of reality—is, once again, a projection of the American experience; it is the "liberal ethos" writ large; it is the liberal society superimposed on a state of nature. For at the back of all this, there is a kind of super-model of a community whose members share fundamental beliefs (including this unconditional faith in a certain procedure of adjustment). They haggle over a little more or a little less in the distribution of goods, but they are agreed on the need to agree, and adjustment is facilitated by a network of rules and conventions. In such a community, all that is at stake are indeed what Charles Lindblom has called "relatively concrete choices at the margins," where trading is helped by the knowledge that my loss today will be compensated by a gain tomorrow. The only point in common with the international state of nature is the multiplicity of claimants. But national claimants are under no compulsion, mental or physical, to define values in such a way, to bargain only at the margins, or to reach agreement. In the one case, the lack of any dominant power is an incentive to mutual adjustment, in the other it is a handicap. The intelligence of (a certain kind of) democracy is not that of international relations.

What Pascal said of the quest for God applies to the search for consensus: "You would not seek me if you had not already found me." Consensus is possible when a sufficient basis for community exists at the start. When there is a fundamental harmony on ends and disagreement is only over means, or when the means are abundant enough to reconcile diverging hierarchies of ends, pluralism is effective and creative; the ultimate consensus exudes from the procedural consensus that framed the debate, and it is likely to be sufficiently clear to incite and to guide action. When there is no preëstablished harmony in a world of competing units, each with its own rationality, it takes more than good will and personal relations to establish agreement; the choice is between a verbal consensus that maximizes ambiguity and paralyzes policy, and discord. The United States, especially in its self-idealized version, is to a large extent a Rousseauistic society, moved by a vision of the general will and marked by a strong social pressure toward conformity. But Rousseau, who was a thorough pessimist, never applied the social contract to the international scene.

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WESTERN INTEGRATION AND THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES

By Jerzy Lukaszewski

DURING his recent visit to Poland, General de Gaulle discreetly but repeatedly called upon the Central European countries to assume an independent and creative role. By challenging the unnatural East-West dichotomy in Europe he showed himself again a statesman of vision. Yet, regrettably, while he has a highly desirable political goal he has failed to choose the means most likely to attain it. The French Government in the last few years has not favored the growth and cohesion of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and other common institutions of the West and has sought to raise the independent international status of France. It is essential to the General's plan that analogous processes be stimulated in Central Europe: in his mind the rigid commitments of nations east and west of the Elbe to antagonistic "blocs" impede the rapprochement between these nations, the definitive elimination of the Iron Curtain and the restoration of a "European Europe."

A prominent member of the French cabinet, Edgar Faure, outlined this policy as follows: "One must, moreover, consider with all due concern the problem of the countries of Central Europe, which number 118 million people and which seek to escape from the abnormal situation in which they found themselves as a result of Stalinist policies. We obviously must avoid allowing an immediate political construction of 'Little Europe' to hamper this operation." (*Le Monde,* December 1, 1965.) Thus the views of the French Government about the effect of West European integration on relations with the communist states, although differently motivated, are not far from the official communist position on the E.E.C., according to which its progress—and even its very existence—constitutes a major obstacle to rapprochement between the "socialist" and the "capitalist" nations of Europe.

To someone familiar with the contemporary economic, social, political and psychological realities of Central Europe, de Gaulle's method for moving that region toward a greater self-affirmation, and thereby overcoming the division of Europe, seems quite the opposite of what is needed. In order to recover its independence and to assume its natural role of bridge between the western and

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eastern parts of the Old Continent, Central Europe (by which I mean the "People's Democracies") ought to counterbalance its ties with the Soviet Union by closer relations with Western Europe. And Western Europe itself must provide a strong attraction for both the public and the élites of Central Europe.

Public opinion in the People's Democracies deserves the closest attention. It has been steadily gaining importance since the collapse of Stalinism, and the governments are less and less in a position to neglect it. Whereas the ruling élites of the communist states and the "lines" they espouse are sometimes subject to dramatic changes, public opinion is a constant factor.

The people of Central Europe lost much of their traditional respect for the West before and after the last war. Nor is de Gaulle's message of nationalism and friendship to Central Europe likely to revive the prestige of the West there, in particular among the intelligentsia who traditionally have played the crucial role in shaping public opinion. These people realize that in the past nationalism plunged Europe—and particularly Central Europe—into chaos and paved the way for foreign domination; and that the alliance of their nations with France before 1938 did not avert the disaster.

If anything has restored the West's attraction in Central Europe it is the E.E.C. experiment. Citizens of the People's Democracies watch with respect the adventure which has united onetime enemies through organic coöperation, led to the virtual abolition of frontiers and laid foundations for the real independence of Europe. Subject themselves to restraints on their freedom and to shortages of consumer goods, they cannot but have a high regard for the community of Western nations where the living standard of all classes is high and still growing, freedom of individuals and groups is respected and common problems are resolved publicly instead of in the secrecy of ministries and politburos. Therefore the news about the development of the E.E.C. which comes to Central Europe by Western radio or other means is received with extraordinary interest.

Evidence of this interest is found in the accounts of travelers visiting the People's Democracies, in the rapidly increasing number of official publications aimed at indoctrinating citizens with the governments' viewpoint on Western integration, and even in certain communist pronouncements. Thus one of the Polish experts on the E.E.C. states: "Much is expected from the

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processes of Western European integration. This explains the immense interest in these problems which we also observe in Poland. These problems command the attention not only of the circles professionally concerned by them, such as the representatives of corresponding scientific disciplines and personalities responsible for practical political activity, but also—to no lesser degree—of the large parts of society."[1] Consequently, there seems to be no question that it is not a resuscitation of nationalism, not a "freezing" of the E.E.C., but the progress and consolidation of the Community which can increase the attraction of the West for the general public in Central Europe.

The ruling élites of the People's Democracies also seem most likely to be drawn into rapprochement with Western Europe through the strengthening of the E.E.C. The recent evolution of relations between France and the communist bloc by no means extends to Western Europe as a whole. In fact, the trend toward the multiplication of bilateral contacts between the "capitalist" and the "socialist" states, favored by the policy of Paris, enables the communist governments to differentiate broadly among the Western nations. As long as Western Europe offers any grounds for believing the Marxist dogma about the inevitable "contradictions" in capitalism, as long as it leaves the communist ruling élites any hope of extending their system, there will be no real rapprochement between Western and Central Europe. And an autonomous role for the latter will not be possible. On the other hand, the consolidation of the E.E.C., its transformation into a political as well as an economic entity, the strengthening and democratization of the Community organs will provide irrefutable proof of its vitality and cohesion and thereby oblige the ruling élites of the People's Democracies to abandon doctrinaire policies and seek a durable coöperation with the West.

Economic necessity is pushing the ruling élites of Central Europe toward this coöperation. The People's Democracies are in serious need of credits and investments; they also need to increase foreign trade greatly. The U.S.S.R., itself in economic and political difficulties, is unable to meet all the needs of the People's Democracies. None of the West European nations acting alone can do it either. Trade relations between France and Central Europe are insignificant compared to the total volume of foreign trade of either. With a one-fifth share of the E.E.C. trade

[1] Z. Nowak, "Koncepcja integracji Europy Zachodniej" ("Conception of the Integration of Western Europe"). Poznan, 1965, p. 8.

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with the Soviet bloc, France is today outdistanced by Italy and still further by the Federal Republic, which alone accounts for more than half. Recent contacts between France and the communist states have shown that the possibilities for an increase in trade and economic coöperation are very limited. This is fully recognized in Central Europe. A Polish journalist, for example, expresses this opinion in the important weekly, *Tygodnik Powszechny*: "It is necessary to notice that de Gaulle's Eastern policy emerges from a purely political vision of Europe and so far is not sufficiently based on economic reality. Whatever one may say in purely political terms, the fact is that France's trade with the East is very small. As far as Poland is concerned, one may doubt whether there is much chance for increasing commercial exchanges, even with the best will on both sides."

Only the E.E.C. as a whole—thanks to its huge resources and its role in the economic life of the People's Democracies—can provide economic coöperation and assistance equal to their needs. For example, the Common Market's share in Rumania's foreign trade with non-communist countries is roughly 50 percent, in Hungary's 40 percent, in Czechoslovakia's and Poland's about 25 percent.

II

The successes of West European integration at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties induced the Soviet leaders to revise their position with regard to the Common Market. This seemed to offer Central Europe the opportunity to improve its economic relations with the Six. In an article published in *Kommunist* in 1962, Khrushchev recognized the achievements of Western integration, in effect gave credit to its "objective character" and foresaw economic collaboration "not only between different states having different social systems but also between their economic unions."

Almost simultaneously with the publication of the Khrushchev article, "The Seventeen Theses" on Western integration—worked out in 1957 by the Moscow Institute for World Economy and International Relations to guide the struggle of international communism against the E.E.C.—were replaced by a new document, "The Thirty-two Theses." A comparison of the two shows the evolution of Moscow's attitude. In 1957 the creation of the Community was presented as the work of American imperialism,

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doomed to failure according to the laws of history. Five years later, the Franco-German alliance was identified as "the spine of integration," and the viability of the E.E.C. was recognized as follows: "The pace of economic development having been faster in the Common Market countries than in the United States, there is a resulting increase in their share of world capitalist production, international trade and gold reserves. For the first time in postwar history, the possibility of creating a 'center of attraction' equal or comparable to the United States from the viewpoint of human and material resources, volume of industrial production and foreign trade, is beginning to take shape. . . ."

This trend, however, has not continued in the years since then. Careful observation of Soviet policy on Western integration indicates that Moscow's attitude has been determined by the fluctuations in the integration process itself: the tendency to accept the E.E.C. as a partner in economic coöperation coincided with its initial period of vigorous progress; the subsequent recurrence of the original hostility reflects the crises which have shaken the E.E.C. since the beginning of 1963.

The Central European states have generally imitated the Soviets, although certain nuances in their attitude merit attention. They have largely returned to the conception of the "Theses" of 1957, according to which the E.E.C. is the creation and the instrument of a non-European power. Communist propaganda has presented the E.E.C. as a harmful product of the cold war, divisive of Europe, anachronistic in this period of peaceful coexistence, undermined by contradictions and threatened in its very existence. The E.E.C. was not accorded recognition. Needless to say, this has impeded the expansion of stable economic relations between Western and Central Europe and has fostered the latter's economic dependence upon the U.S.S.R.

One factor determining the attitude of the communist states and parties to the E.E.C. in recent years has been Britain's absence from it. Her entry—unless it substantially altered the Community's character and permanence—would certainly be a striking proof of the E.E.C.'s viability. She has a large share in communist trade with the West; and her entry into the E.E.C. would make recognition of the Community more urgent than it is today. Both the people and the ruling élites of the People's Democracies are aware of this. The above-quoted Polish columnist observes: "De Gaulle may delay England's admission, may

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make conditions and enumerate a long list of difficulties, but he cannot stop the principal tendencies uniting the whole of Western Europe. I am writing this without enthusiasm, for it is easy to deduce that England's entry into the Common Market will further aggravate the situation of our foreign trade. Thus, although I wish General de Gaulle's policy could succeed in this respect, I do not think it has great chances of doing so."

Apart from illustrating Central Europe's serious concern about the possibility of Britain's entry into the E.E.C., this statement expresses the widespread skepticism about the probable success of General de Gaulle's policy—the goals of which the communist states consider to be in their interest. *Polityka,* Poland's principal political weekly, recognized as the spokesman for official circles, commented not long ago: "Has de Gaulle succeeded in stopping certain integrative processes which are, in reality, factors promoting the disintegration of Europe as a whole? Only in part, because some of these processes are irreversible, in particular those corresponding to objective necessities, primarily economic."

This skepticism, and also, of course, the French inability to make a significant economic contribution to the communist states, renders the rapprochement between France and those states particularly fragile. It is not likely to be a determining factor in the relations between Western and Central Europe.

III

The existence of the E.E.C. produces, like a chain reaction, tendencies toward integration in other regions of the world. The growth and strength of the Community could not but reinforce these trends. It is most unlikely that Central Europe could resist for long the E.E.C. example, the idea of a union of the People's Democracies similar to that of the West European nations and a transformation of the present Soviet hegemony into a partnership like that between Western Europe and America.

This idea is now crystalizing in Central Europe, and even the ruling élites may possibly accept it before long—and not only as a result of pressure from below. In a few years, the more intelligent and pragmatic younger generation will take over from leaders schooled under Stalin.

So far, the ruling élites of Central Europe either have conformed, sometimes servilely, to Moscow's line, or have challenged the Soviet hegemony single-handed. Several cases of dissent in

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the Soviet bloc have been interpreted as an upsurge of nationalism in Central Europe. In my view, the proliferation of nationalistic symptoms in the internal and foreign affairs of the People's Democracies signifies an evolution of certain communist parties and ruling élites and not a real change in basic attitudes as they have gradually taken shape among the people during the postwar period. Whatever interpretation one may give to the recent animation of nationalism in Central Europe, it is interesting to notice that this phenomenon has been applauded in many Western countries and particularly in France, where it is considered a happy consequence of the precedents established by Paris.

Even more interesting, and apparently paradoxical, is the benevolence with which the Soviet Union has treated nationalism in Central Europe. Just after the war, the extreme weakness of the communist parties in the newly founded People's Democracies (except for Czechoslovakia and, in a somewhat different sense, Jugoslavia) forced these parties to identify themselves with nationalism in order to establish some common cause with the people. In this they were encouraged by their Soviet sponsors. Of course, its anti-Russian component was damped down, but other "antis" came to the fore: the anti-German factor in Poland, the anti-Hungarian in Rumania and, later, anti-Semitism in almost all Central European countries.

Soviet ideologists and propagandists have taken great pains to glorify the "national state" in Central Europe and to present it as a progressive historical form. The organization of Central Europe on the pattern of "independent national states" after the Second World War had many short-term political advantages for the Soviet Union. Soviet relations with the People's Democracies were strictly bilateral, and in the Stalin era were no more than pipelines for Moscow's orders.

After Stalin's death, Central European submissiveness to Moscow gave way to more normal interstate relations. Despite the anti-Soviet coloration of nationalism in some states, the Soviet policy of supporting the "national state" has remained unchanged, for Moscow's design for hegemony in Central Europe depends on it. As Zbigniew Brzezinski observes: "Nationalism not only inspires but also fragments East European opposition to the Russians, and helps the Soviet leaders in maintaining their predominance in the region by resorting to the ancient device of *divide et impera*. . . . There is no doubt that the inability of the

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East Europeans to overcome their own national antipathies makes them much weaker in their efforts to reassert their independence."[2] This was strikingly illustrated at the Hungarian Communist Party Congress in late 1966. As Brezhnev watched benevolently, Janos Kadar revived the rationale and terminology of prewar Hungarian revisionism to attack the "imperialist dictation of Trianon" and to sling a dart at Rumania.

Westerners who commend nationalism in Central Europe should understand its role in the perpetuation of Soviet control there. Soviet hegemony over the People's Democracies will be transformed into a fruitful partnership only when the Central European states shed the confusion and weakness inherent in competing nationalisms. The goal of integration would also provide the people and the ruling élites of the People's Democracies with a political alternative able to assure the peaceful evolution of Central Europe at a time when communism is faced with the increasingly complex problems of growing industrial societies.

IV

Communism in recent years has been in permanent crisis. In Central Europe the parties have been progressively alienated from society and in particular from the working classes, intellectual élites and youth, as statistics concerning the age, social status and occupation of party members testify. Not only are the parties isolated from the attitudes and needs of the general public, but they are also split internally. Opposition to the official line has appeared in almost all parties, and the most penetrating criticism of the communist system has come from communists from the Central European countries.

Open rebellion against the political order established by Stalin in Central Europe was repressed in 1956 and the following years. The party groups associated with this rebellion, labeled "revisionist" by their adversaries, were defeated, but opposition and revisionism persist. The effervescence among intellectuals, Marxist and non-Marxist, in the last few years has added considerably to internal tensions. The régimes are not today in a position to return to Stalinist controls, but neither have they the courage to undertake democratization or to allow the free play of common sense in the economic and cultural fields, for they fear

[2] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Alternative to Partition." New York: McGraw-Hill, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1965, p. 35.

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that such measures might endanger the privileged position of the "new class." Hence the hesitation between détente and limited repression. If the ferment eating away at the intellectual community spills over to the working class—through the industrial intelligentsia which links the intellectuals and the factories—Europe may be faced with a situation similar to that of 1956.

The creation of a multinational Central European assembly would provide a way of directing these explosive forces to positive and creative uses. It would be a first step toward independence vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R., security vis-à-vis Germany, rapprochement with the West on the basis of equality, economic progress and a higher standard of living. Such a program could capture the imagination of the populace and set meaningful goals for the ruling élites.

Is it realistic to suppose that Moscow will some day permit an economic and political union of the Central European countries? So far it has stubbornly resisted any form of integration in Europe. The Briand Plan was stigmatized by Stalin as a new conspiracy of the bourgeoisie against the Soviet state. Efforts undertaken between the wars by statesmen of Central Europe to overcome the "balkanization" of that area were attacked by Moscow as plots of French imperialism aimed at reinforcing the *cordon sanitaire* surrounding the fatherland of workers and peasants. Later, the federation of Poland and Czechoslovakia prepared by Prime Minister Sikorski and President Beneš and —what is more surprising—the federation of Jugoslavia and Bulgaria designed by such renowned communist leaders as Tito and Dimitrov were categorically vetoed by the U.S.S.R.

However, the Soviet Union cannot continue forever to combat the unity and independence of Central Europe. Actually, the economic and political integration of the area would be profitable for it. A united and hence independent Central Europe would be much more likely to assure the Soviets stability on their western frontier than fragmented Central Europe can today. For behind the present official façade of friendship with the Soviets lurks dissatisfaction, dissent and even potential for violent disorder. Whereas such a Central Europe cannot be a secure partner for the Soviet Union, a united group of countries could well coöperate with its eastern neighbor out of genuine interest rather than coercion. It would also be a more useful link with the West than the present conglomerate of uncertain satellites. Since pragma-

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tism is gaining over obsolete dogma in Moscow, why should not the Soviet leaders recognize this truth, especially as the Chinese giant becomes an increasing menace on their Asian borders?

V

The West could help precipitate the formation of a new Soviet policy toward Central Europe; it could also foster the goal of integration among the leaders and the people in that area. A most important contribution would be to reassure them that Germany will not again be a threat either to them or to the Soviet Union. The reluctance of the Federal Republic to recognize Germany's eastern frontiers and the activities of West German refugee and neo-Nazi groups play an important role in maintaining the stagnation of Central Europe. Many people in that region of the world are really fearful of "revanchists," while others adroitly manipulate that spectre; this impedes the tendency to reject a decayed status quo. The Germans themselves could certainly help to remedy this situation. But their partners in the E.E.C. could, together, do even more by rapidly consolidating the Community.

For it is evident that the only way to resolve the German problem to the satisfaction of Germans as much as non-Germans is to integrate Germany into an economically and politically unified Europe. This idea has long since been accepted in the West and is now beginning to find its way into the minds of Central Europeans. Its power is confirmed by the immense effort of communist propaganda to combat the notion with its obverse argument—that West European integration is a screen for German imperialism.

The other contribution the West could make to the salutary evolution of Central Europe would be to state frequently and without reservation that it has no intention of undermining the socialist base of the Central European economy and society. American leaders have set a good example in this respect, as when Secretary of State Dean Rusk declared in 1966: "Ours is not an effort to subvert the Eastern European governments nor to make those states hostile to the Soviet Union or to each other. No one would benefit from an Eastern Europe that is again balkanized."

Such an attitude is necessary first because of the Soviet Union, which one day may favor the unity and independence of Central Europe provided the basic principles of socialist order are main-

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tained (as the Jugoslav precedent indicates). On the contrary, the restoration of capitalism would amount to a severe defeat for Moscow, and, therefore, the Soviets would energetically oppose any move in that direction. So, too, would the governing élites of Central Europe.

Above all, however, the West must accept socialism in Central Europe out of consideration for the people of the area. Most of the domestic opposition to the present régimes arises not from a desire to restore capitalism but from aspirations for freedom and prosperity within socialism. Surveys conducted during the "thaw" among students of Warsaw University and nine other schools of higher learning in the Polish capital have shown extremely significant results. To the question, "Do you consider yourself a Marxist?", only 1.8 percent of the students answered "Definitely yes" and 11.4 percent "Rather yes." However, to the question, "Would you like the world to move toward some form of socialism?", 24.6 percent chose the answer "Definitely yes" and 44.7 percent "Rather yes."[3] Clearly the Polish students polled had made a distinction between the totalitarianism reigning in their country—identified with Marxism—and socialism.

And obviously the West can make an important economic contribution to the development of Central Europe. The share of the whole Soviet bloc in the foreign trade of the E.E.C. (excluding intra-Community trade) amounts today to hardly more than 6 percent. The E.E.C. evidently could and should strengthen its economic ties with its eastern neighbors. The important speech of President Jean Rey in February 1967 indicates that E.E.C. leaders appreciate the importance of this.

But the effects in the People's Democracies of the E.E.C.'s creation and progress have gone beyond the economic and are becoming a catalyst for intellectual, psychological and political tendencies. These non-economic or non-commercial aspects have not received the attention they deserve in the Commission of the European Communities. If the Commission would cultivate a thorough understanding of the multiple effects that the E.E.C. has and could have in the Central European countries, it could respond to developments there in ways that would aid them in attaining union and independence and rapprochement with Western Europe.

[3] The authors of the survey summed up its results for Western readers in *Esprit* (Paris), November 1958.

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NORTHEAST THAILAND: TOMORROW'S VIET NAM?

By J. L. S. Girling

INSURGENCIES spring from local conditions. Though a truism, this statement is still valuable in helping to determine the probable seriousness of present or threatened communist guerrilla activities. Conditions in Northeast Thailand make it in many ways an obvious seat of insurgency, and the Thai and United States Governments are increasingly concerned.

The area is large, impoverished and, until recently, neglected. Comprising about one-third of all Thailand, it is roughly the same size as neighboring Cambodia and has nearly twice the population. Geographically, the Northeast is a dry flat plateau, with sandy infertile soil, still largely under forest or scrub, and with insufficient water for effective agriculture or even for domestic needs. In consequence, the region is poor and its villages are largely isolated from the more prosperous central region of Thailand, and even—for lack of roads—from one another. The people of the Northeast, like most Thai farmers, own their own land; for example, in the Northeast (population 11 million, over 90 percent rural) some 95 percent of the farmers own their land. Thus there is virtually no problem of tenancy or of absentee landlordism as in Viet Nam, the Philippines or prewar China. But for all that, the Northeasterners have a per capita income only just over half the Thai national average.

The physical problems of the Northeast are enormous. Toward the end of the dry season—particularly from March to May—many of the shallow wells in the villages dry up completely. Then the villagers have to walk from one to three or four kilometers to the nearest deep well, carrying back all the water they need for washing, cooking and drinking. And the onset of the monsoon rains in May or June—lasting until October—is not an unmixed blessing. While at least in the dry half of the year the rough cart tracks between villages can be used by jeeps or motorcycles, during the rains the tracks deteriorate, fill with water and become impassable. As a result, provincial officials are restricted for a large part of the year—unless they care to walk—to the district towns and to those villages which are on or near the main roads. For example, some 40 to 50 percent of the villages

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in the "insecure" province of Sakon Nakorn are cut off in this way. This enforced isolation helps to explain some of the difficulties met in countering the spread of subversion or insurgency.

Seasonal conditions govern the farmers' existence. They are actively at work for only about 120 days in the year, largely engaged in ploughing the rice fields and transplanting the seedlings after the rains have started, and again at harvest time toward the end of the year. In the dry season there is little or nothing to do. With the increase in population, the rice crop nowadays is barely enough for local subsistence, whereas the Central Plain has an ample surplus which provides Thailand's main export. When the rains are poor in the Northeast—and the weather is notoriously unreliable—even this subsistence crop is exhausted long before the next harvest. Then the poorer villagers have to buy rice from merchants at a high price, mortgaging part of next year's crop to do so and becoming trapped in the vicious circle of debt.

The problem of security in the Northeast is an aspect of the economic problem. The area is so large, poor and remote that it would tax even the resources of a modern industrial state to raise its level of development to that of the rest of the country. Until water, roads and better crops are provided, the Northeasterner will remain at the mercy of seasonal conditions, unable to rise above a mere subsistence level. Even worse, he will actually sink deeper into poverty, because of the large and at present practically uncontrolled increase in population, growing in the Northeast at the rate of 3.5 percent a year. Although the Government's long-standing opposition to birth control has just been reversed, many years will pass before there can be any significant effect. Meanwhile, families of six children are considered quite normal and up to ten children not unusual. The land suitable for rice is almost all being cultivated, and the villagers complain that there is not enough for all their children to inherit. One consequence is a great deal of migration from overcrowded villages: to Bangkok and the Southeast to work as laborers or servants; to Northern Thailand to settle on uncultivated land; and especially to other parts of the Northeast which have been opened up by new or improved roads. With the normal seasonal migration to seek extra work at the end of the harvest, all this adds up, in the words of a Thai official, to a "tremendous number of missing people."

The "forest fighters," as the guerrillas call themselves, are not

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ideologically committed, but they have been persuaded by the few who are—the communist cadres who have been working among the villagers for years—that under present conditions they face only hardship and suffering. They hear that the Government is corrupt, oppresses the people and is only interested in Bangkok. Communist agents tell the villagers that they themselves must take the initiative to change the situation, and that if they join the forest army they will get money, training for a good job, land and tractors, schools and hospitals.

In addition to the economic problems, there are historic and strategic reasons for insurgency in the Northeast. The area has long been a center of opposition movements, not necessarily communist, but all suspect in the eyes of a military régime. The Northeast was one of the strongholds of the wartime Free Thai Movement, directed against both the Japanese and the Prime Minister at that time, Field Marshal Phibun Songkram. For a brief period after the war the Northeasterners came into their own, but following the overthrow of the civilian leader, Pridi Phanomyong, by the armed forces in 1947, they were once more thrust into opposition. The years of official neglect of the area, aggravated by local politicians' resentment at their continued exclusion from power, fostered separatist tendencies. The military consequently suspected a plot to reunite the Lao-speaking population of Northeast Thailand with the Pathet Lao-controlled areas of Laos, all under the domination of North Viet Nam.

The alarm shown by the Thai Government, and shared by the United States, was understandable when Laos was the center of international attention and intrigue—during the years of crisis from 1957 to the Geneva settlement of 1962. Now, however, Laos has shaken down into two fairly well-defined areas: the cultivated lowlands by the Mekong, settled by Lao farmers and controlled by Prince Souvanna Phouma's right-wing neutralist coalition; and the mountainous regions inhabited by a variety of tribespeople, adjoining North (and part of South) Viet Nam, occupied by the Pathet Lao forces and strengthened by North Vietnamese. The vital interest of North Viet Nam is to preserve its entry routes into South Viet Nam, while that of Vientiane is to control the Mekong Valley, protecting Thailand. So long as these vital interests are not endangered a precarious status quo can be, and is being, observed.

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This, of course, is hardly satisfactory for Saigon—though little can be done about it without a "wider war"—but it is not unfavorable to Thailand. Unfortunately, whatever advantages the Thais may have gained from the added security of a buffer in Laos have been more than offset by fear of the consequences of a collapse in South Viet Nam. This fear is not restricted to Thailand. Indeed the domino theory convinces global strategists who ignore the differences in local conditions that what happened in Laos (the downfall of former right-wing régimes) has happened in South Viet Nam and will happen in Thailand. This is reflected in the recent statement of a senior American official in Thailand: "I've served in both Viet Nam and Thailand and I'll tell you that things look far worse here today than they did in Saigon in 1960."[1]

II

Examination of conditions in Thailand does not bear out this prognosis. For in Northeast Thailand there is in fact a very limited state of insurgency. Despite unfavorable economic circumstances and years of official neglect, the transformation of discontent into open rebellion has been checked by the evidence of intensified government development activity in recent years and by the communists' failure to achieve immediate results. Only a small minority of the villagers in the Northeast have taken to the hills. For the Thais are practical people. Better living conditions are what they want and they do not care how they get them. What they do not want is to go on living in dreary poverty in backward villages; in fact the excitement of taking up arms in the forest is recognized to be one of the reasons for village youth joining the guerrillas. Conversely, disillusionment with the communists' ability to produce quick results breeds disaffection. Far from leading a heroic or a better life, the guerrillas find themselves separated from their families, forced to remain on the move in the forests, short of rice and other supplies; and when they go to the villages to seek food or information, they are in danger of being shot by soldiers, armed police or local volunteers. Many of the guerrillas, harassed and facing continual hardships, have given themselves up to the authorities; many more would do so if they could be assured of amnesty and a better future. The great majority of Northeasterners, far from seeking the armed over-

[1] Reported by Edgar Klein, "Tightrope in Thailand," *Newsweek*, June 19, 1967.

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throw of the Government, as claimed by communist propaganda, instead want the Government to do more for them.[2]

This is the crucial difference between the situation of Thailand and that of South Viet Nam, where the Viet Minh—still known as such to the villagers, though labeled "Viet Cong" by Saigon—has to all intents and purposes been the effective government of large rural areas for more than twenty years. Three other features of the insurgency in Northeast Thailand reveal the same striking dissimilarity: the virtual absence of sabotage; the paucity of communist attacks on civil officials; and the lack of a rugged terrain.

Official statements emphasize the contrast between the two countries in answer to the pessimistic comparison with Viet Nam quoted above. According to the U.S. State Department's 1961 publication on Viet Nam, "A Threat to the Peace," the Government of South Viet Nam in 1960 stated that about 1,400 local officials and civilians were assassinated by the Viet Cong and approximately 700 persons were kidnapped. In Thailand, however, only 112 villagers and 24 officials were killed by the communists in the 16 months after the "Communist Suppression Operations Command" was formed in December 1965. As for the armed forces, including local militia, it was estimated in 1960 that the South Vietnamese lost 6,500 killed, wounded and captured, and the Viet Cong almost as many. The Thai figure for "officials killed in clashes" (presumably soldiers and police) in the 16 months was 63, with 105 wounded. In fact, military and Viet Cong casualties in South Viet Nam in 1960 amounted to more than the total number of police, military, officials and local volunteers —11,000 men—said to be "actively engaged in communist suppression work" in Northeast Thailand at present.

Again, Secretary of State Dean Rusk revealed on May 4, 1961, that the number of armed communist guerrillas in South Viet Nam in the preceding 18 months had grown from about 3,000 to

[2] Economic programs in the Northeast, in addition to the normal activities of the Agriculture, Rice, Livestock, Irrigation and other Ministerial Departments, include: Accelerated Rural Development, from 1964, mainly road construction (in 1967 the Thai Government contributed the equivalent of $20 million, the U.S. Government $12.6 million, chiefly in construction equipment); Community Development, under the Ministry of the Interior, with limited funds to help villagers build small dams and bridges, repair schools, organize village development committees, etc.; and Mobile Development Units, under the Government's National Security Command, now established in seventeen "insecure" provinces (ten in the Northeast). However, a statistical survey made in September-October 1965 showed that only one village in thirty had been affected by the A.R.D. program in the six most insecure provinces in the Northeast.

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over 12,000. This should be compared with the 1,700 to 2,000 armed terrorists estimated by the Thai authorities to be operating now in the Northeast. Mr. Rusk also pointed out that Viet Cong activities in 1960–61 "took the form of armed attacks against isolated garrisons; attacks on newly established townships, ambushes on roads and canals, destruction of bridges and well-planned sabotage against public works and communications lines." Little of this has occurred in Northeast Thailand.

Violence is still the exception in the Northeast. It is limited chiefly to the remote fringes of a few provinces—and divided in character between traditional forms of banditry, affecting poor and isolated regions, and politically guided insurgency. The damage done has been small in scale. Most clashes with the terrorists, according to the Communist Suppression Command, involve small numbers on either side, usually no more than 20 to 40 men. The communists are said to be reluctant to provoke any incident with the security forces; instead they hang on in the forests in the hope that the Government will eventually weary of the struggle and withdraw. The clashes that do take place—recently about sixteen a month in the Northeast, compared to an average of ten last year—are more the result of increased patrolling by the army and the police than of aggressive activities by the communists. Some wooden bridges have been burned down and sporadic attacks made on village defense volunteers and police posts. There have been few severe ambushes, the most dreaded feature of the Viet Nam campaign. Most guerrilla activities are raids in search of food.

One of the reasons for the relative restraint (at least by Vietnamese standards) shown by the Thai communists is that they are anxious not to alienate the mass of villagers by indiscriminate or widespread terrorism. A second is that they are afraid of provoking intensified military reprisals. A third is that they are thinking more in political than in military terms. Given the absence of good defensive terrain in the Northeast, the communists' only real chance of success is to build up a powerful political organization in the villages. This is far from being achieved.

III

The topography of the Northeast offers only limited advantages to the guerrillas. For the traveller approaching the Thai border town of Nakorn Phanom, the most striking impression,

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toward Malaya. Unlike the mountain strongholds of Southeast the northern and eastern frontiers with Burma and in the south in Northeast Thailand, nor in the entire country except along tains of Laos across the Mekong River. There is nothing like this occasional forests, is of the rugged crags and peaks of the mounafter the miles of flat rice fields interspersed with scrub land and China, where Mao first rallied his peasant forces, and the formidable ranges of North and Central Viet Nam, the few, low hills of the Northeast provide limited cover and are indefensible against sustained assault. Without adequate security, it is unlikely that the communists will be able to organize and train a "main force," which is necessary if they are ever to advance beyond the guerrilla stage. The mountainous areas inhabited by tribal minorities are potentially a much more serious problem; and, indeed, it is from these areas that many of the armed clashes are now reported.

Nor do the guerrillas seem to possess the leadership necessary for the expansion of the insurgency. In China and in Viet Nam the effective organization of party, army and administration on a territorial base was a tremendous achievement; there is no evidence that the communists have reached anything like that stage in the villages of Northeast Thailand. Phayom Chulanont, chief representative of the "Thailand Patriotic Front" in Peking, admitted late in 1965 that the Front was "still in the stage where it must strengthen its internal organization." There is reason to believe that the announcement of Chinese and North Vietnamese support for the insurgency in Thailand early in 1965 has actually proved a disservice, the Thai insurgent organization having been impelled to take action before it was ready for it. There is no sign that the Thai communist leaders possess the experience, determination, flexibility or understanding shown by either Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh. Far from achieving national reputations, Thai Communists have little more than local significance.

One figure of national importance, former Prime Minister Pridi, has been an exile in China for more than fifteen years; but he has carefully kept apart from the Thai communists in Peking. Pridi would be the natural leader of a neutralist régime, should this emerge in Thailand, and it would be reasonable to suppose that the Chinese put more faith in an eminent neutralist who has the possibility of coming to power than in a group of communists of low caliber and with dubious chances of success.

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In addition to these drawbacks there are several reasons why the Thai guerrillas are unlikely to find a strong political following. The communist campaigns in China and Indochina have demonstrated the importance of a national appeal which is both "horizontal," extending over wide areas of the country, and "vertical," embracing various classes. In Indochina there is no doubt that the Viet Minh had a nationwide following by 1945, when the French administration was overthrown by the Japanese, who were soon themselves to surrender. It was then that the "mandate of heaven," according to the Confucian ideals held by the Vietnamese, passed to the government of Ho Chi Minh.

The checkered career of the Chinese Communist movement is even more revealing. So long as the Chinese Communists were limited to an appeal made largely on social and economic grounds—however necessary it was—they were able to maintain only a weak and struggling existence in a remote and backward area of Southeast China; and in 1934 they barely escaped disaster after being blockaded by the Kuomintang. It was the Japanese invasion of North and Central China three years later which transformed the situation. First, it enabled the communists to vie with the Kuomintang for a monopoly of the intense national feelings aroused among the Chinese by Japanese brutality. And second, and perhaps even more important, the Japanese invasion swept away both the Kuomintang forces and the governing administration of large areas which the Japanese could not fully control. Into this vacuum moved the communists, more resolute than the Kuomintang to protect the peasants and more skilled in guerrilla operations against the Japanese.

There are no signs of a broad base developing in Thailand in the immediate future. There is no internal "feudal" oppression to speak of, and the impact of military control at the top is blurred both by civilian administration and by the indifference to politics of the bulk of the population. As for the external enemy, which served to rally large numbers of Chinese and Vietnamese to the communist cause, there is more awareness in Thailand of the traditional threat from Viet Nam and Cambodia—with China now replacing the old enemy, Burma—than of an American "occupation." Indeed the presence of the Americans, however irksome in some ways, can still be considered "benevolent." The breakdown of the existing régime, almost a sine qua

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non of a successful insurgency, has not occurred in Thailand, nor does it seem likely in the near future.[3]

IV

Now there is no doubt that communist activities have increased or at any rate have come more out into the open since 1961, when the first large-scale roundup of communist suspects took place in the Northeast. Two or three larger and more militant bands are reported to be operating in parts of Sakon Nakorn Province, trying aggressively to spread fear and insecurity among the villagers by publicly executing government supporters and boasting of the government's inability to protect them. In some defenseless areas this has led to a "Viet Nam-type" situation in which police and local officials have reached an accommodation with the communists: they are spared provided they do nothing about the communist propaganda meetings and party organizational activities taking place under their noses. The advantage lies, of course, with the communists, who are effectively usurping the authority of the Government; and the villagers know it. The critical question—on which both Thai and foreign opinion, official and lay, is divided—is whether this system is spreading or not. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese are training Thai guerrilla and political cadres—the number increased from 68 in 1962 to 130 in 1965—in seven to eight month courses of weapons training, demolition, jungle survival, ambush drill and so on. Twenty of these cadres have surrendered to the Thai authorities.

But the authorities have also been more active. General Prapart claimed in May 1967 that over 2,000 communists had been captured and 1,800 had surrendered to the authorities since the start of the insurgency late in 1965. (These were almost certainly "sympathizers" or "suspects" rather than active, armed communists.) Yet, to reiterate, the number of communists reported killed is only 184 (compared to 199 villagers, soldiers and officials). In the month of June 1967, which is fairly typical, 11 communists were killed, 77 captured and 10 surrendered. Three officials and 12 villagers were killed and 7 villagers were wounded.

[3] Given Thai history over the past 35 years, the possibility of a coup cannot be ruled out. It is partly to prevent one that so much army strength is deployed around Bangkok—to the irritation of American officials—rather than sent into action in the Northeast. Moreover, divisions within the army as well as continuing military-police rivalry are indicated by the recent army takeover of counter-insurgency operations in the Northeast from the former civil-police-military joint command.

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Activities at this level hardly constitute a threat to national security. And if the potential for increased effectiveness exists for the communists, this is also true of the Government. Until recently only two army battalions were operating in the Northeast (now there is one more). So far few government patrols stay for any length of time in the forest, where their operations would most damage the guerrillas. They tend to stick to their posts and wait for an incident to occur. Also, what is still very much needed is for the Government to send able, active, honest, properly coordinated and sympathetic administrators into the area.

Yet a number of factors favor the growing effectiveness of the Government vis-à-vis the guerrillas. First, and perhaps most important, the concentration of development effort on the Northeast cannot fail in due course to open up the isolated villages and inaccessible forest regions which allowed an unimpeded growth of subversion. Secondly, the Government is recruiting, training and equipping local defense forces which, with appropriate army and police backing, should in time be able to take over the main responsibility for village protection. Thirdly, radio communication with the bigger villages, better transport facilities and more helicopters will provide government forces with mobility needed to deal with the elusive guerrillas.

The combination of the Government's technical superiority and the insurgents' inability to develop beyond guerrilla warfare would appear to be decisive, at least in the military field. But the problems of the Northeast reside as much in economics and politics as in security. And if the Thai Government fails to deal constructively with the conditions that gave rise to insurgency—poverty, isolation and lack of participation in local and national affairs—it may still, in the end, be the loser.

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This is an important work. The authors, in an ambitious effort to assess the role of force in world politics before and after the advent of the nuclear age, display great learning in history, philosophy and law. The book is not a compendium, however. It is a challenging and frequently profound exploration in political thought.

THE COLD WAR AS HISTORY. By Louis J. Halle. New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 434 p. $6.95.

The central thesis of this fair and admirable effort at historical interpretation: "Since the end of the eighteenth century four great wars have been fought to maintain or restore the European balance of power. The fourth was the Cold War, which began almost immediately after World War II."

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE COLD WAR. By Paul Seabury. New York: Basic Books, 1967, 171 p. $4.95.

The author locates the beginnings of the cold war—which he regards as a specific historical phenomenon—in 1946 or 1947. The book complements the one by Louis J. Halle. While factually not as thorough, it is conceptually somewhat more daring. (Prepared under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard.)

A WORLD OF NATIONS: PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL MODERNIZATION. By Dankwart A. Rustow. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967, 306 p. $7.95.

A first-rate comparative analysis of modernization as a political phenomenon. The book is empirically solid and written in good clear English happily devoid of technical jargon.

BEYOND VIETNAM: THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA. By Edwin O. Reischauer. New York: Knopf, 1967, 242 p. $4.95.

NOTE—By special arrangement with World Affairs Book Center, readers of Foreign Affairs may obtain, *post free*, any book published in the United States (except paperbacks) at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, with check or money order, to Desk FA, World Affairs Book Center, 345 East 46 Street, New York, N.Y. 10017.

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A cogent and reasoned plea for a less haphazardly conceived foreign policy in Asia by the former United States Ambassador to Japan. Though the book betrays haste in places, it presents a persuasive case, especially in the chapters on Japan.

A STRATEGY OF PEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD. By Arthur N. Holcombe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 332 p. $7.95.

It is a pity that some of these fine essays, all of which have been published before, were not brought up to date for this occasion. The essay on "The Role of Politics in the Organization of Peace," for example, contains valuable methodological tools for the analysis of voting patterns in the U.N. General Assembly.

IMPERIAL AMERICA. By George Liska. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, 115 p. $2.25 (Paper).

This book powerfully argues a challenging and original thesis: America today is an imperial, though nonimperialistic power, analogous to ancient Rome. The war in Viet Nam is "the first imperial war of the United States, fought at the remote frontier of empire." The need is to recognize this fact and rationally plan for the "international politics of primacy."

VIETNAM TRIANGLE: MOSCOW, PEKING, HANOI. By Donald S. Zagoria. New York: Pegasus, 1967, 286 p. $6.95 (Paper, $1.75).

In the rivalry among Washington, Moscow and Peking, each, the author argues, is anxious to keep the others apart. The Viet Nam problem is discussed against this background in a highly sophisticated analytical essay.

WORLD ORDER AND LOCAL DISORDER. By Linda B. Miller. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University), 1967, 235 p. $6.50.

A good factual account of the role the United Nations has played or failed to play in internal conflicts. Somewhat lacking in analytical depth.

THE QUEST FOR PEACE THROUGH DIPLOMACY. By Stephen D. Kertesz. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, 182 p. $4.95 (Paper, $2.45).

A fairly straightforward descriptive account with emphasis on modern multilateral diplomacy in the United Nations and in Western Europe.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. By E. A. Landy. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1967, 268 p. $12.50.

A scholarly study of the supervisory machinery and activities of the International Labor Organization during the last thirty years.

NUCLEAR WAR, DETERRENCE AND MORALITY. By William V. O'Brien. Westminster (Md.): Newman, 1967, 120 p. $3.75.

A Roman Catholic view of various aspects of the nuclear dilemma.

EXPERIMENT IN INTERNATIONALISM. By John H. MacCallum Scott. New York: Hillary House, 1967, 223 p. $7.50. (London: Allen and Unwin, 42/.)

A sympathetic, though on the whole objective, account of the history of the Liberal International by one of its moving spirits.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH: PROBLEMS OF EVALUATION AND ADVANCEMENT. By E. Raymond Platig. Santa Barbara: Clio Press (for Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1967, 211 p. $6.50 (Paper, $3.50).

A most useful and comprehensive analytical overview of the state of international relations as a discipline.

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THE LAW OF THE SEA. Edited by Lewis M. Alexander. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1967, 321 p. $12.50.

A very useful though somewhat uneven symposium on offshore boundaries, fisheries, the sea-bed, continental shelf and other problems of sea law.

THE POLITICS OF SPACE COOPERATION. By Don E. Kash. Lafayette (Ind.): Purdue University Studies, 1967, 137 p. $4.95.

A good survey, despite minor inaccuracies, of NASA's record and of U.S. space projects with the Soviet Union and the United Nations.

THE LIMITS OF POWER: AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD. By Senator Eugene J. McCarthy. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, 246 p. $5.95.

The Senator from Minnesota argues for a more restrained foreign policy in Asia and for more discriminating use of the C.I.A. and of arms sales. He also urges larger roles for the Senate and for international agencies as vehicles of United States foreign policy.

JOURNEY INTO POLITICS: SOME INFORMAL OBSERVATIONS. By John V. Lindsay. New York: Dodd, 1967, 152 p. $4.00.

A collection of essays written during Lindsay's seven years as a member of Congress. A brief concluding chapter offers reflections on his present commitment as Mayor of New York City.

COMPETITIVE INTERFERENCE AND TWENTIETH CENTURY DIPLOMACY. By Richard W. Cottam. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967, 243 p. $5.95.

"Competitive interference" is a mixture of counter-insurgency, and political, economic and psychological manipulation. The author discusses its increasing importance in modern diplomacy, primarily in theoretical terms though with special reference to the American experience in Iran.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE YEAR 2000. By Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 431 p. $9.95.

The authors, both mainstays of the Hudson Institute, have undertaken to create "a framework for speculation on the next thirty-three years," under the auspices of the Commission on the Year 2000. The bulk of the book consists of "scenarios" ranging from "surprise-free" to "nightmare." There is creative imagination here and there are fruitful methodological innovations. But as a whole the book contains more technical brilliance than political wisdom.

PEACE AND THE STRATEGY CONFLICT. By William R. Kintner. New York: Praeger, 1967, 264 p. $6.95.

A closely reasoned though turgidly written plea that the United States maintain its strategic superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The book contains a number of recommendations, including the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system against both China and the Soviet Union. The best of the "forward strategy" books.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR: A MILITARY HISTORY. By Basil Collier. New York: Morrow, 1967, 640 p. $8.95.

A very handy, reasonably accurate précis of events from Munich to Hiroshima by a British scholar, containing useful maps and appendixes.

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SEA WARFARE 1939–1945. By Captain John Creswell. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 343 p. $7.95.

A succinct, strictly factual overview of World War II at sea. Admirably complements Collier's military history. (A revised edition of a work originally published in 1950.)

THE CODEBREAKERS: THE STORY OF SECRET WRITING. By David Kahn. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 1,164 p. $14.95.

An utterly engrossing, probably definitive, history of "secret communication from ancient times to the threshold of outer space." But it seems as if the author exaggerates the effect of code-making and -breaking on history just a bit.

ARMS CONTROL AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: EUROPE FACES COMING POLICY DECISIONS. By Karl W. Deutsch. New York: Wiley, 1967, 167 p. $5.95.

The author has employed quantitative research methods and élite interviews in Germany and France to arrive at his findings.

THE SUBMARINE AND SEA POWER. By Vice Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet. New York: Stein and Day, 1967, 278 p. $12.50.

A most thorough analysis of the role of the submarine in the last two world wars. The author sees the nuclear submarine as the supreme arbiter in any future struggle for control of the sea.

THE ADMIRALS LOBBY. By Vincent Davis. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967, 329 p. $7.50.

A valuable study of the Navy's officer corps as a political pressure group.

BEWAFFNETE NEUTRALITÄT. By Hans Rudolf Kurz. Frauenfeld: Huber, 1967, 150 p. Swiss Fr. 16.80.

A good exposition of the military implications of Swiss neutrality.

ARMS CONTROL FOR THE LATE SIXTIES. Edited by James E. Dougherty and J. F. Lehman, Jr. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1967, 265 p. $8.50.

A work based on papers presented at the Third International Arms Control Symposium, held in Philadelphia in 1966.

THE ESPIONAGE ESTABLISHMENT. By David Wise and Thomas B. Ross. New York: Random House, 1967, 308 p. $5.95.

A chatty survey of spying in the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States and Communist China.

General: Economic and Social

THE DOLLAR AND WORLD LIQUIDITY. By Robert V. Roosa. New York: Random House, 1967, 367 p. $7.95.

The major papers which the former Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs published while in office trace the development of U.S. policy toward international monetary reform during the crucial years of the early '60s. Now a private banker, Mr. Roosa adds a commentary on that period and an important new chapter giving his assessment of the alternatives the free world faces.

FREE TRADE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: THE POTENTIAL ECONOMIC EFFECTS. By Ronald J. Wonnacott and Paul Wonnacott. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 430 p. $9.00.

For a century Canadians have debated whether free trade with the United States

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would be a boon or a danger. Now the debate will be better informed by this cool and careful analysis by two Canadian brothers now teaching economics, one on each side of the border. They have little to say about agriculture but conclude that in industry and the production of raw materials Canada would benefit from free trade but would have to go through some significant adaptation.

WHY GROWTH RATES DIFFER: POSTWAR EXPERIENCE IN NINE WESTERN COUNTRIES. By Edward F. Denison assisted by Jean-Pierre Poullier. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967, 494 p. $12.50.

This is one of the most interesting of the recent books on comparative economic growth. Mr. Denison looks separately at a number of sources of growth in eight European countries. That most of them grew faster than the United States between 1950 and 1962 was not the result of superior policies, he concludes, but of different circumstances and opportunities.

AUSTRALIA, BRITAIN AND THE EEC, 1961 TO 1963. By H. G. Gelber. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 296 p. $10.40.

This first-rate historical analysis of a rather neglected subject makes use of much unpublished Australian material. Though Professor Gelber is fairly critical of Australian policy at the time, the worry and analysis created by Britain's attempt to get into the Common Market seem in the end to have been educational for Australia and to have stimulated new ideas about its place in the world.

A STUDY OF GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE. By K. R. Gupta. New Delhi: S. Chand, 1967, 239 p. Rs. 20. (Mystic, Conn.: Verry, distributor, $7.50).

A full, careful and usually quite balanced account of what GATT has done, with special attention, naturally, to the interests of the less developed countries.

ALTERNATIVE COMMERCIAL POLICIES—THEIR EFFECT ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY. By Mordechai E. Kreinin. East Lansing: Michigan State University, Graduate School of Business Administration, 1967, 154 p. $6.00.

A careful effort to measure the effects on the U.S. of the creation of an Atlantic Free Trade Area and comparisons with some alternative courses. The interesting conclusions have only modest policy implications because of the limitations inherent in this kind of effort.

L'AIDE BILATÉRALE: ASSISTANCE, COMMERCE OU STRATÉGIE? By Paul Masson. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1967, 332 p. Fr. 17.

General reflections built around useful summaries of the aid policies of more than a dozen countries (not including France).

U.S. AND U.S.S.R. AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF INDIA, TURKEY, AND THE U.A.R. By Leo Tansky. New York: Praeger, 1967, 192 p. $15.00.

Interesting comparisons and useful data on Soviet aid occupy relatively small space compared to more general accounts of the three countries' development.

COMECON: INTEGRATION PROBLEMS OF THE PLANNED ECONOMIES. By Michael Kaser. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1967, 279 p. $5.60.

Two years and a growing literature have made possible substantial additions to this basic work, first published in 1965.

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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS. By M. A. G. Van Meerhaeghe. New York: Wiley, 1967, 404 p. $8.00.

Essentially a handbook that summarizes organizations and agreements and provides a compendium of concepts and theories.

STRUKTURWANDLUNGEN IM WELTHANDEL, 1950–1960/61. By Helmut Hesse. Tübingen: Mohr, 1967, 425 p. DM. 64.

Remarkably comprehensive effort to account for changes in the share of world exports provided by nine groups of countries over the decade of the '50s. East-West trade is not included.

The United States

THE INVENTION OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES. By Roy F. Nichols. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 416 p. $8.95.

This is the definitive study of the birth of the American two-party system. The author shows its European antecedents and then leads us with a sure hand through the numerous improvisations that marked the evolution of the system from its beginnings in mid-nineteenth century Virginia to its consolidation a century later.

SKETCHES IN THE SAND. By James Reston. New York: Knopf, 1967, 479 p. $7.95.

A fine and sensitively balanced selection of Reston's writings, largely drawn from his column in *The New York Times*. Far from being a "mortuary volume," this book shows the great American reporter at his pragmatic best.

PRIVACY AND FREEDOM. By Alan F. Westin. New York: Atheneum, 1967, 487 p. $10.00.

A penetrating analysis of major unresolved conflicts between the right to individual privacy and modern technological devices to invade it. The author makes thoughtful suggestions on how to restore the balance. An important book.

ADLAI STEVENSON: A STUDY IN VALUES. By Herbert J. Muller. New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 338 p. $6.95.

A fine and sensitively done, though frankly admiring, political biography. The best of the books on Stevenson to appear thus far.

THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON. Edited by Arthur S. Link. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, 2 v. $15.00 each.

These two volumes (vol. 2: 1881–1884; vol. 3: 1884–1885) in the projected forty-volume edition of the letters and papers of the twenty-eighth President of the United States cover Wilson's first year as a graduate student in political economy at the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. More than half of the two volumes consists of love letters—many of them beautiful—exchanged between Wilson and his fiancée, Ellen Louise Axson. When did he study?

THE HEIR APPARENT: ROBERT KENNEDY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER. By William V. Shannon. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 309 p. $5.95.

A sympathetic though balanced political biography—the best to date on R.F.K. —written by a member of the editorial board of *The New York Times*.

HENRY CABOT LODGE. By William J. Miller. New York: James H. Heineman, 1967, 449 p. $8.50.

An adoring, quite shallow biography.

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BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA. By Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton. New York: Random House, 1967, 198 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

A powerful statement of the authors' revolutionary position. A searing indictment of "White Power" and a fierce call to the black community to "become their own men and women . . . by whatever means necessary."

"THOSE PECULIAR AMERICANS": THE PEACE CORPS AND AMERICAN NATIONAL CHARACTER. By Lawrence H. Fuchs. New York: Meredith Press, 1967, 232 p. $4.95.

In this rich case study gleaned from the author's personal experience as Peace Corps Director in the Philippines, we have at last a first-rate piece of empirical analysis of the Peace Corps in action.

F.D.R.'S UNDECLARED WAR, 1939 TO 1941. By T. R. Fehrenbach. New York: McKay, 1967, 344 p. $6.50.

A superficial book "revealing" F.D.R.'s plans to lead the American people into the Second World War which, in the author's view, he felt was inevitable.

PATHS OF DIPLOMACY: AMERICA'S SECRETARIES OF STATE. By Deane and David Heller. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967, 192 p. $3.95.

Thumbnail sketches from the careers of twenty Secretaries of State from Thomas Jefferson to Dean Rusk.

STUDENT POLITICS. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset. New York: Basic Books, 1967, 403 p. $8.95.

Fifteen social scientists examine student political movements ranging from Berkeley to France, India and Latin America.

CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY: THEIR ROLE IN MODERN TIMES. By Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and Alfred De Grazia. Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1967, 192 p. $4.50.

The book is the result of a debate between the two scholars, with Schlesinger generally favoring a strong executive and De Grazia arguing that the presidency today has too much power.

THE AMERICAN REVISIONISTS: THE LESSONS OF INTERVENTION IN WORLD WAR I. By Warren I. Cohen. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967, 252 p. $7.95.

An exposition of the thought of five Americans—H. E. Barnes, C. A. Beard, C. H. Grattan, W. Millis and C. C. Tansill—who considered United States intervention in World War I a mistake.

HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE RUSSIANS 1945–1953. By Herbert Druks. New York: Speller, 1967, 291 p. $7.50.

A scholarly survey of President Truman's major confrontations with Stalin.

The Western Hemisphere

OUR TROUBLED HEMISPHERE: PERSPECTIVES ON UNITED STATES–LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS. By Robert N. Burr. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967, 256 p. $6.75.

In this historical study the author concludes that solutions for improvement lie in a stronger O.A.S., a strengthened Alliance for Progress and a better understanding of our hemispheric neighbors.

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FIVE YEARS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS. By Simon G. Hanson. Washington: Inter-American Affairs Press, 1967, 210 p. $7.95.

A respected observer of hemispheric economic development examines in detail the impact which the Alliance for Progress has had upon Latin America. His thoughtful, highly critical assessment is that the program has been used "to reward rather than to penalize resistance to change."

THE POLITICS OF CONFORMITY IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Claudio Veliz. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1967, 291 p. $7.00.

These well-written essays examine power élites, from military officers to spokesmen for emerging political sectors. In general, the studies conclude that stability characterizes the Latin American value system and that integration into existing structures rather than violent revolutionary change is the goal of diverse social groups. A contemplative, important study.

MÉCANISMES DU POUVOIR EN AMÉRIQUE LATINE. By Luis Mercier Vega. Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1967, 229 p. Fr. 15.45.

A French journalist topically examines the diversity of Latin America's peoples and institutions, giving particular emphasis to the forces of change.

BETWEEN MAULE AND AMAZON. By Arnold J. Toynbee. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 154 p. $5.00.

Despite some factual slips, these pleasant vignettes, gleaned from past travel experiences in Latin America, are strengthened by the world view of a renowned historian.

THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION: FEDERAL EXPENDITURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE SINCE 1910. By James W. Wilkie. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 337 p. $7.50.

Drawn from a careful examination of projected and actual budgetary expenditures, this study attempts to measure revolutionary myths against social realities. Using statistics and bibliographical supplements, the author concludes that while much has been accomplished, "there is still much remaining to do before Mexico is a socially integrated nation."

STEEL AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MEXICO. By William E. Cole. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1967, 173 p. $6.00.

A detailed study of the Mexican steel industry and the role which the government has played in its development. Statistical and bibliographical materials supplement a scholarly analysis of the industry's impact on the economy.

FINANCING URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN MEXICO CITY: A CASE STUDY OF PROPERTY TAX, LAND USE, HOUSING, AND URBAN PLANNING. By Oliver Oldman and others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967, 356 p. $11.95.

A detailed and careful examination of the impact which fiscal and legal policies have had upon the growth of Mexico's capital. Further strengthened by documentation and an appendix which contains translations of relevant Mexican laws.

BRAZILIAN PLANNING: DEVELOPMENT POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION. By Robert T. Daland. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967, 231 p. $6.00.

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An attempt to examine the role of "planning" in a developing society such as Brazil's. The author's premise reflects his belief that "the relation between planning and consequent development patterns is yet to be established."

1932: A GUERRA PAULISTA. By Hélio Silva. Rio de Janeiro: Editôra Civilização Brasileira, 1967, 398 p.

This fifth volume of Hélio Silva's extended study of the era of Vargas deals with the 1932 Constitutionalist Revolution in São Paulo. Useful documents and source materials; limited interpretation and analysis.

THE MODERN HISTORY OF PERU. By Fredrick B. Pike. New York: Praeger, 1967, 386 p. $7.50.

A readable, concise history of Peru since independence—the stress is upon political considerations.

CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES: LONG-RANGE PERSPECTIVES. Edited by John Plank. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967, 265 p. $6.75.

Provocative studies examining varied aspects of the Cuban situation. The emphasis is upon the need for the United States to understand the revolutionary nature of today's developing nations. Of particular interest are the essay by Henry Wriston dealing with the historical framework and Bayless Manning's overall summarization of the Cuban problem.

CUBA: CASTROISM AND COMMUNISM, 1959–1966. By Andrés Suárez. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, 266 p. $7.50.

A thoughtful assessment of the Cuban revolution, by a former member of the Castro government. Based upon a close study of the Cuban press and personal experiences, the author views a charismatic Castro's reluctance to delegate authority and institutionalize the revolution as a reflection of his personal love of power.

KUBA UND DER WELTKOMMUNISMUS. By Robert K. Furtak. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1967, 194 p. DM. 19.80.

A solid study of the Cuban revolution. The author argues that Havana has become the fourth autochthonous center of world communism, next to Moscow, Peking and Belgrade, and describes the growing reliance of Latin American communists on Cuban leadership.

THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN THE WEST INDIES: STUDIES IN NATIONALISM, LEADERSHIP, AND THE BELIEF IN PROGRESS. Edited by Wendell Bell. Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1967, 232 p. $8.95.

Part of a projected series dealing with political and social change in the British Caribbean, these essays examine the nature of the élite and the impact nationalism had upon the region during the more optimistic early 1960s.

Western Europe

LE PARLEMENT EUROPÉEN DANS LA CONSTRUCTION DE L'EUROPE DES SIX. By Anne-Marie Houdbine and Jean-Raymond Vergès. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1966, 184 p. Fr. 14.

Two short, scholarly studies on how democratic and how effective the European parliament is.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. VOLUME II. 1901–1914: YOUNG STATESMAN. By Randolph S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton, 1967, 763 p. $10.00.

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In the second volume of this magisterial biography, Churchill moves to the center of prewar politics in Britain. His personality continues to dominate these pages and bears out his own remark to Violet Asquith in 1906: "We are all worms, but I do believe I am a glow-worm."

WORKERS, UNIONS AND THE STATE. By Graham Wootton. New York: Schocken Books, 1967, 173 p. $6.00.

A wide-ranging, thoughtful and suggestive inquiry into the present-day conditions of political obligation and competing loyalties, exemplified by the relations among workers, unions and the government in the face of major questions of national policy, such as inflation.

WESTERN EUROPE: A HANDBOOK. Edited by John Calmann. New York: Praeger, 1967, 697 p. $20.00.

Uneven articles on individual countries and common trends, supplemented by useful statistics.

A B C DE L'EUROPE. TOME PREMIER: L'EUROPE POLITIQUE. By François Visine. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit, 1967, 334 p. Fr. 33.90.

A compendium of present-day European institutions, including several useful chronologies of postwar Europe.

PARLIAMENT, PARTIES, AND SOCIETY IN FRANCE, 1946–1958. By Duncan MacRae, Jr. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967, 375 p. $10.00.

An analysis, much of it statistical, of the travails of the Fourth Republic. By a well-known political scientist, writing chiefly for students of political behavior.

PIERRE MENDÈS-FRANCE. By Jacques Nantet. Paris: Éditions du Centurion, 1967, 272 p. Fr. 18.

A fascinating biography of the former Premier, who has retained his great appeal in France and outside. Based on ten long conversations with him, and full of the drama of his life.

MÉMOIRES POLITIQUES. By François Mauriac. Paris: Grasset, 1967, 476 p. Fr. 24.50.

A collection of his articles, originally published between 1933 and 1953. These controversial essays furnish an elegant commentary on the great political themes of those years.

LA GUERRE SECRÈTE DES SERVICES SPÉCIAUX FRANÇAIS, 1935–1945. By Michel Garder. Paris: Plon, 1967, 522 p. Fr. 25.

The dramatic exploits of the French secret service, continued clandestinely under the German occupation. By a former member who unfortunately gives few indications of his sources and hence leaves many questions unanswered.

HISTOIRE DE LA CAPTIVITÉ DES FRANÇAIS EN ALLEMAGNE (1939–1945). By Pierre Gascar. Paris: Gallimard, 1967, 317 p. Fr. 14.

A sensitive and intelligent reconstruction of the collective fate of a million and a half French prisoners in Germany.

GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN NEUTRALITÄT: VIER JAHRHUNDERTE EIDGENÖSSISCHER AUSSENPOLITIK. BAND III. 1930–1939. By Edgar Bonjour. Basel: Helbing, 1967, 431 p. Swiss Fr. 39.

A leading Swiss historian with special access to the archives of his government offers an authoritative account of Switzerland's efforts to preserve neutrality in a

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Europe increasingly dominated by her Fascist neighbors. Domestic pressures, such as antagonism toward foreign refugees, are assessed, and Swiss gestures of accommodation duly noted. An absorbing study that illuminates the temper of that catastrophic decade.

HITLER'S PRE-WAR POLICY AND MILITARY PLANS 1933–1939. By E. M. Robertson. New York: Citadel Press, 1967, 207 p. $5.95.

A closely reasoned study of Hitler's policies, critical of earlier notions that he followed some sort of master plan. "Hitler seldom looked more than one move ahead" is the theme of this important and illuminating book. (First published in London in 1963.)

TSCHECHEN UND DEUTSCHE: 1918–1938. By Johann Wolfgang Brügel. Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1967, 662 p. DM. 65.

An impartial, well-documented study of Czech-German relations within the Czech Republic, from its inception to Munich. Written with verve by a German from Czechoslovakia, now in London, it emphasizes Czech reasonableness and German willingness to live in the new state, until Hitler destroyed the basis of coexistence. An important book that corrects many misapprehensions.

THE MURDERERS AMONG US: THE SIMON WIESENTHAL MEMOIRS. Edited by Joseph Wechsberg. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967, 340 p. $6.95.

The grim story of the Nazi victim who now ferrets out his people's former tormentors, composed, perhaps inevitably but regrettably, as a kind of thriller.

THE GERMAN REVOLUTION OF 1918. By A. J. Ryder. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967, 303 p. $11.50.

Half of this book deals with the familiar course of German socialism before 1918, presumably because it provides the background for the ineffectual revolution. An informative, scholarly, but unoriginal study.

THE RISE OF FASCISM. By F. L. Carsten. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 256 p. $6.50.

A short, responsible survey of how Fascism came to power in Italy and Germany, with some valuable comparative data on Fascist movements in other European countries.

THE BOMBS OF PALOMARES. By Tad Szulc. New York: Viking, 1967, 274 p. $6.50.

A *New York Times* correspondent reconstructs the chilling story of SAC's loss in Spain of two planes and four hydrogen bombs in January 1966. Incredible luck minimized the extent of the disaster; still it took 79 days to find the last bomb.

SPAIN: THE VITAL YEARS. By Luis Bolin. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1967, 396 p. $6.95.

Franco's side of the Civil War ably but not persuasively set forth by an Anglo-Spanish aristocrat who served as Franco's Press Officer from 1936 to 1938. Provides some new facts, drawn from personal experience and fresh documents, but the "anti-red" line goes beyond providing a corrective to prevailing pro-Loyalist views.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

THE IMPACT OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION, 1917–1967. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1967, 357 p. $7.50.

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A collection of essays by Arnold J. Toynbee, Neil McInnes, Hugh Seton-Watson, Peter Wiles and Richard Lowenthal.

THE FATE OF THE REVOLUTION: INTERPRETATIONS OF SOVIET HISTORY. By Walter Laqueur. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 216 p. $5.95.

A somewhat uneven though often stimulating set of reflections on the historiography of the Russian Revolution, Lenin and Stalin.

DEUTSCHE OSTPOLITIK 1918: VON BREST-LITOWSK BIS ZUM ENDE DES ERSTEN WELTKRIEGES. By Winfried Baumgart. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1966, 462 p. DM. 52.

A major contribution to the diplomatic and political history of World War I dealing with German policies in Russia in 1918, by a young German scholar at the University of Saarbrücken. Having had access to hitherto untapped archival materials, the author analyzes with great clarity the many-layered German plans in Russia and shows how the German Foreign Office, in spite of opposition from the Army High Command and certain diplomatic representatives in Russia, gave support to the Bolsheviks in order to keep Russia weak and to prevent the pro-Allied forces from toppling Lenin's régime, the only factor, so it thought, that kept Russia out of the war.

JUGGERNAUT: A HISTORY OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES. By Malcolm Mackintosh. New York: Macmillan, 1967, 320 p. $6.95.

A brief history, from the formation of the Red Army to the present, much of it dealing with campaigns in the Second World War.

TWENTY LETTERS TO A FRIEND. By Svetlana Alliluyeva. New York: Harper and Row, 1967, 246 p. $5.95.

Although Stalin's daughter provides little political insight and her book is scarcely a literary masterpiece, it is, for all its disconcerting qualities, a significant and moving document, simply because of its existence.

STALINE NÉGOCIATEUR: UNE DIPLOMATIE DE GUERRE. By Guy Hentsch. Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière, 1967, 382 p. Swiss Fr. 30.

A monograph on Stalin as a wartime diplomatic negotiator, with particular reference to his performance at the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences.

A GEOGRAPHY OF THE U.S.S.R. By John Cole. Baltimore: Penguin, 1967, 326 p. $1.65 (Paper).

A convenient, concise regional geography, stressing economic features.

JOURNEY INTO THE WHIRLWIND. By Eugenia Semyonovna Ginzburg. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967, 418 p. $6.95.

An account, by a Russian woman, a party member and wife of an official in Kazan, of eighteen years of concentration camp life during and after the Great Purges. While the general setting of such accounts is by now only too familiar, this work is marked by more than usual vividness and perception.

WORKERS' PARADISE LOST: FIFTY YEARS OF SOVIET COMMUNISM: A BALANCE SHEET. By Eugene Lyons. New York: Funk, 1967, 387 p. $6.95.

The title indicates the author's verdict, and he anticipates troubled days ahead.

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SOVIET POLITICAL SCHOOLS. By Ellen Propper Mickiewicz. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 190 p. $6.50.

A study of Soviet schools for the instruction and indoctrination of adults.

LENIN, UNBEKANNTE BRIEFE 1912–1914. Edited by Leonhard Haas. Einsiedeln: Benziger Verlag, 1967, 156 p. Swiss Fr. 18.80.

A scholarly edition, with German translation, of a number of hitherto unpublished letters by Lenin during the critical years 1912–1914. Of considerable importance for the history of the man and his movement.

THE POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST STATES. By Ghiţa Ionescu. New York: Praeger, 1967, 303 p. $6.75.

An analysis of the relation between state and society in the communist states of Eastern Europe, excluding the Soviet Union. The treatment is topical and deals centrally with the question of state power and the checks upon it through dissent or countervailing influences. (French edition, "L'Avenir Politique de l'Europe Orientale," Paris: S.E.D.E.I.S., 1967, 387 p. Fr. 25.70.)

THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Robert F. Byrnes. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall (for the American Assembly, Columbia University), 1967, 176 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

Chapters by a number of specialists, prepared as background papers for a meeting of the American Assembly, dealing with such themes as political change, economic modernization, cultural change and international and intra-bloc relations.

DIE KRISE DES PARLAMENTARISMUS IN OSTMITTELEUROPA ZWISCHEN DEN BEIDEN WELTKRIEGEN. Edited by Hans-Erich Volkmann. Marburg/Lahn: Herder-Institut, 1967, 184 p. DM. 21.90.

A study of the crisis that befell the parliamentary system in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states in the inter-war years.

ASPECTS DES RELATIONS RUSSO-ROUMAINES: RÉTROSPECTIVES ET ORIENTATIONS. By George Cioranesco and others. Paris: Minard, 1967, 276 p. Fr. 38.

Chapters by a number of authors on the history of Russo-Rumanian relations from the first contacts at the time of Peter the Great to the present.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN COMMUNIST RUMANIA. By John Michael Montias. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1967, 327 p. $10.00.

A leading student of the economics of Eastern Europe provides both a wealth of information and a general summing up.

A SHORT HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA: FROM EARLY TIMES TO 1966. Edited by Stephen Clissold. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1966, 279 p. $5.95.

The major part of this useful introductory survey, written by R. W. Seton-Watson, H. C. Darby and R. G. D. Laffan, was originally published in 1944 by the Naval Intelligence Division of the British Admiralty. Stephen Clissold and Phyllis Auty have contributed chapters on Jugoslav history during and after World War II. Excellent maps.

TEN YEARS AFTER. Edited by Tamas Aczel. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967, 253 p. $5.95.

A rather disconnected series of essays by some notable contributors, com-

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memorating the tenth anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. The whole is not equal to the sum of its parts.

The Middle East

NO END OF A LESSON: THE STORY OF SUEZ. By Anthony Nutting. New York: Potter, 1967, 205 p. $5.00.

After a decade's silence, the former Minister of State who resigned at the time of Suez tells his story of what happened within the British Government before and during the crisis. If any question remains about the fact of collusion with France and Israel, this book dispels it with full clarity of detail as to time and place. Mr. Nutting's criticisms of the conduct of Sir Anthony Eden throughout the whole affair are tempered slightly by recognition of the serious state of his health. A useful contribution to history, though the author's judgments on the main characters need not be accepted without question. Should be read in conjunction with the recent study by Hugh Thomas.

SUEZ: TEN YEARS AFTER. Introduced by Peter Calvocoressi, edited by Anthony Moncrieff. New York: Pantheon Books, 1967, 160 p. $3.95.

Analysis and assessment of the 1956 Suez crisis by means of a series of B.B.C. broadcasts, using interviews with such principal figures as Nasser, Ben-Gurion and Pineau (but not Eden), and a review of the evidence by experts. The book admirably complements the recent revelations of Anthony Nutting and Hugh Thomas.

PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. By M. T. Mehdi. New York: New World Press, 1967, 109 p. $3.00 (Paper, $1.50).

A tract by the founder of the Action Committee on American-Arab Relations proposing the return of Arab refugees to their homes in Palestine and the voluntary emigration of Israeli Jews to countries of their origin or of their choice.

THE EVOLUTION OF OIL CONCESSIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA. By Henry Cattan. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications (for the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law), 1967, 173 p. $7.50.

Useful summary by a long-time legal adviser to Aramco and Tapline.

MODERN EGYPT. By Tom Little. New York: Praeger, 1967, 300 p. $7.50.

A rewriting and updating of a competent general survey of modern Egyptian history, politics and foreign relations first published in 1958. Nasser is pictured as a leader who has not wavered from his early hopes for his country and for the larger Arab revolution, but his failures are a large part of the story.

THE SIX DAY WAR. By Randolph S. Churchill and Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton, 1967, 250 p. $3.95.

Bearing many signs of the rush to publication and of doubtful value as political commentary, this book nevertheless contains a good preliminary account of the war itself, apparently by the younger of this son-and-grandson team.

ISRAEL ET LES ARABES: LE 3e COMBAT. By Eric Rouleau, Jean-Francis Held, Jean and Simonne Lacouture. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1967, 187 p. Fr. 15.

"Instant history" in the form of a dialogue between two well-informed French journalists, probing into the recent crisis both from the Egyptian and the Israeli side. Well worth reading.

THE ARYANIZATION OF THE JEWISH STATE. By Michael Selzer. New York: Black Star, 1967, 126 p. $5.00.

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Despite the title and shrill tone of his self-termed polemic, the author offers much food for thought, especially on the place of the Oriental Jews in Israel and in the Arab-Jewish relationship.

PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN. By George B. Baldwin. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, 212 p. $6.95.

The author, who participated in the formulation of Iran's 1962–67 Development Plan, describes the difficulties of carrying out comprehensive planning amid "the unhappy condition of Iranian politics and administration." Shades of W. Morgan Shuster and Arthur Millspaugh. But the bounty of oil makes up for a good many deficiencies.

South and Southeast Asia

THE NEW FACE OF BUDDHA: BUDDHISM AND POLITICAL POWER IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Jerrold Schecter. New York: Coward-McCann, 1967, 300 p. $6.95.

The *Time-Life* Tokyo Bureau Chief identifies Buddhism as the ultimate source of Asian values, not only in religion and philosophy but also in nationalism and ideology. Here he concentrates on Buddha's importance in the social and political aspects of current world affairs.

CHALLENGES IN INDIA. By Taya Zinkin. New York: Walker, 1967, 248 p. $6.50.

The author treats nine subjects, including India's leaders, youth's unrest, the status of women, corruption, the 50 million Muslims, and government and private enterprise, which pose problems to the India of today.

SECURITY IN THE MISSILE AGE. By J. K. Ray. Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1967, 156 p. Rs. 10.

The author, now with the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, in this volume discusses the impact of nuclear weapons on modern warfare, criticizes Indian defense policies and argues that India should not rely on foreign assistance in order to repel or deter aggression.

A LAMP FOR INDIA: THE STORY OF MADAME PANDIT. By Robert Hardy Andrews. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, 406 p. $7.95.

Mr. Andrews, a journalist and for many years a family friend of his subject, writes a sympathetic biography of the woman who has been so influential in leading India to independence and sovereignty.

KASHMIR: A STUDY IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS. By Sisir Gupta. New York: Asia Publishing House (for the Indian Council of World Affairs), 1967, 511 p. (New York: Taplinger, distributor, $12.50).

A detailed tracing of the highly intricate, still unresolved Kashmir dispute by the Research Secretary of the Indian Council of World Affairs. Of the 1965 foray by the Pakistanis (made overconfident, he believes, by large arms shipments from the U.S.) he says, "If anything, Pakistan has only succeeded in demonstrating that the status quo in Kashmir does not depend for its continuance on her peaceful intentions or postures."

THE KASHMIR PROBLEM. By Alastair Lamb. New York: Praeger, 1967, 163 p. $5.00.

An historian's view, compactly presented, of the quarrel between the two successors to British rule in the Indian subcontinent, providing essential information on the geography, economy, language and racial makeup of its population.

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BHUTAN: A PHYSICAL AND CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY. By Pradyumna P. Karan. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1967, 103 p. $17.50.

The author, in this well-formulated and excellently illustrated economic and political geography, shows how outside influences are increasingly changing Bhutan's centuries-old personality and individuality.

CENTRAL ASIA: A CENTURY OF RUSSIAN RULE. Edited by Edward Allworth. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 552 p. $12.95.

A solid work on the land and peoples of Central Asia, especially the effects of Russian influence on its social, political, economic, religious and literary development since the fall of Tashkent in 1865.

VIETNAM. By Mary McCarthy. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967, 106 p. $1.95 (Paper).

Miss McCarthy's four articles printed in *The New York Review of Books,* which sent her to Viet Nam in February 1967 for firsthand observation. A forceful work adding to criticism of American policy and of American actions and attitudes at home as well as on the scene. She negates nearly all solutions proposed so far, except through the United Nations, which she does not discuss.

VIETNAM: THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT. By Chester A. Bain. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1967, 184 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

An evaluation of the Viet Nam conflict within the context of problems of liberation wars and of universal communist tactics as well as that of Viet Nam's historical development. Mr. Bain, of U.S.I.A., includes translated Viet Cong documents and communist propaganda materials among his sources.

THAILAND: THE WAR THAT IS, THE WAR THAT WILL BE. By Louis E. Lomax. New York: Random House, 1967, 175 p. $4.95.

The author, who states his stand against U.S. Southeast Asian policy and his disbelief in what his government has told him of the situation there, writes of American military and political involvement in Thailand, viewing it as a likely sequel to the Viet Nam battlefield.

THE ORIGINS OF MALAY NATIONALISM. By William R. Roff. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967, 297 p. $8.50.

The effects of British colonial protectorate control and the consequent social, political and economic change on the indigenous Malays, with emphasis on the 1900–1941 period. Sources include unpublished official records and private papers.

INDONESIAN UPHEAVAL. By John Hughes. New York: McKay, 1967, 304 p. $5.95.

Pulitzer Prize-winning articles, expanded and reworked since their original dispatch to *The Christian Science Monitor,* covering the period from three days after the September 30/October 1, 1965 coup to the fall of Sukarno in March 1967.

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA. By A. Doak Barnett. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967, 563 p. $12.00.

A foremost China scholar at Columbia University, with twenty years of analytical observation behind him, bases this study of the organization and operation of the political system of Communist China mainly on interviews with ex-cadres active within the Communist Party and of government bureaucracy.

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MAO TSE-TUNG. By Stuart Schram. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967, 351 p. $7.95.

A leading expert on Mao and Maoism uses, as far as possible, contemporary Chinese texts (later ones were rewritten for various expediencies) for this biography, which extends into the 1967 cultural revolution. He concludes that the Mao cult in its present form will probably not long survive Mao.

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE ARMY. By John Gittings. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1967, 331 p. $8.50.

The changing character of the People's Liberation Army since 1949, the fluctuating position which it occupies in the scale of national priorities, its relationship with the Communist Party and its economic and social roles. Mr. Gittings, long a China scholar, is now with the University of Chile in Santiago.

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY. Edited by Theodore H. E. Chen. New York: Praeger, 1967, 344 p. $8.50.

Texts of laws and directives, with a few official policy statements, selected to show government and party organization and how they exercise control, together with the general direction of economic and social change in Communist China.

JAPAN'S DECISIVE CENTURY: 1867–1967. By Shigeru Yoshida. New York: Praeger, 1967, 110 p. $4.95.

A succinct review of Japan's history since the Meiji Restoration, with emphasis on events following the Manchuria Incident. The late Dr. Yoshida was Foreign Minister in the Surrender Cabinet and Prime Minister through 1954. Slightly revised from an article in the 1967 "Britannica Book of the Year."

THE FALL OF JAPAN. By William Craig. New York: Dial Press, 1967, 368 p. $6.50.

An eminently successful popularization of the history of events in Tokyo and in Washington signaling the end of the war in the Pacific. Mr. Craig's many sources include interviews with Japanese and Americans, official documents and diaries.

THE KOREAN MINORITY IN JAPAN. By Richard H. Mitchell. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 186 p. $5.75.

The author makes extensive use of Japanese government records, especially those of the Home Ministry, to analyze Korean-Japanese controversies which have hindered settlement of basic disputes and restoration of normal diplomatic relations.

KOREA IN WORLD POLITICS, 1940–1950: AN EVALUATION OF AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY. By Soon Sung Cho. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, 338 p. $7.00.

Primarily American policy toward Korea from the 1943 Cairo Conference to the end of the Korean War: how and why policy decisions were made and the reasons for their failure.

THE QUEST FOR SECURITY IN NEW ZEALAND, 1840 TO 1966. By W. B. Sutch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 512 p. $10.40.

Mr. Sutch, active since the thirties in successive New Zealand governments, tells of the struggle to legislate for, and to implement, laws for personal, economic and social security from the time that New Zealand was recognized as a separate member of the British Empire. An enlarged revision of the 1942 edition.

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Africa

NONALIGNMENT. Edited by J. W. Burton. New York: James H. Heineman, 1967, 142 p. $4.50.

This volume contains eight short essays considering the political and economic aspects of nonalignment in Africa and Asia.

AFRICA IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY. By K. A. Busia. New York: Praeger, 1967, 189 p. $4.25.

The former leader of the parliamentary opposition and one of Ghana's most prominent intellectuals analyzes the barriers to the development of democratic forms of government in Africa. He is particularly critical of attempts to combine one-party rule with democracy and of the "Communist prescription for democracy."

THE DRAGON'S EMBRACE: THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND AFRICA. By Emmanuel John Hevi. New York: Praeger, 1967, 152 p. $5.95.

A Ghanaian who spent eighteen months as a student in China tries to make his fellow Africans aware of the menace Chinese diplomacy poses to independent Africa. Examining critically the record of Chinese activities in Asia as well as in Africa, Hevi seeks to expose what he sees as a sinister, deceptive attempt to exploit African weaknesses to expand the area of Chinese domination.

AFRICA AND THE COMMON MARKET. By P. N. C. Okigbo. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967, 183 p. $5.50.

The distinguished Nigerian economist and negotiator of the E.E.C.-Nigerian agreement of July 1966 gives a detailed analysis of the opportunities and problems of various forms of economic relationships between African economies and the Common Market. His main emphasis is on the formerly British territories and their options.

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN AFRICA: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT. By Reginald Herbold Green and K. G. V. Krishna. New York: Oxford University Press (for University College, Nairobi), 1967, 160 p. $2.50 (Paper).

Two University of East Africa economists have written a short discussion of the problems of past attempts at African economic integration and an analysis of future prospects.

THE NEW AFRICANS. Edited by Sidney Taylor. New York: Putnam, 1967, 504 p. $7.50.

A handbook of biographical essays on independent black Africa's political leaders compiled by Reuters' fifty correspondents working in that continent. Attractively illustrated, this volume will be of great use as a reference work, though it will require constant updating.

THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS? A CHALLENGE ON DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN AFRICA. By Guy Hunter. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1967, 132 p. $2.60 (Paper).

A highly readable, concise treatment of the basic problems of modernization in Africa. Among the author's recommendations is a call for a restructuring of African educational systems away from conventional secondary school and university curricula and toward more vocational and technical training oriented to the task of rural economic development.

THE ANGLO-AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH: POLITICAL FRICTION AND CULTURAL FUSION. By Ali A. Mazrui. New York: Pergamon Press, 1967, 163 p. $4.95 (Paper, $3.50).

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Essays on topics of politics, history and culture in English-speaking tropical Africa by the head of the political science department at Makerere University College.

TOWARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION. By Frantz Fanon. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967, 197 p. $6.50.

A collection of essays written between 1952 and 1961, the year of Fanon's death, on such topics as racism, colonialism, the Algerian struggle for independence, and the struggle of all Africans for liberation from post-colonial as well as pre-colonial élites. Fanon's writings have become a source of intellectual and moral inspiration to the "new left" as well as to a generation of African nationalists. (First published in France in 1964.)

BLACK REVOLUTIONARY: GEORGE PADMORE'S PATH FROM COMMUNISM TO PAN-AFRICANISM. By James R. Hooker. New York: Praeger, 1967, 168 p. $5.50.

Basing his account on unpublished letters, interviews, newspaper articles and a variety of secondary sources, a Michigan State University historian follows Padmore's wanderings from Trinidad to the United States to Moscow, London and finally Ghana. This itinerary reflects the development of Padmore's thinking, the central concern of this study.

DU PROTECTORAT À L'INDÉPENDANCE: MAROC 1912–1955. By Georges Spillmann. Paris: Plon, 1967, 245 p. Fr. 18.

Memoirs of a French official directly involved in Moroccan affairs from the time of Lyautey to the end of the French protectorate. He is not hesitant to speak his mind on individuals and policies; incidentally, he places a heavy load of blame on the United States for making impossible a dialogue between France and Morocco and an orderly transfer from protectorate to independence.

MAURITANIA. By Alfred G. Gerteiny. New York: Praeger, 1967, 243 p. $6.00.

A general introduction to the history, geography and social development of one of Africa's least-known countries, which has a population of under a million and a huge land area, most of it desert.

AFRICA IN SOCIAL CHANGE. By P. C. Lloyd. Baltimore: Penguin, 1967, 362 p. $1.65 (Paper).

A competent analysis of the major aspects of social change, modernization and class differentiation in the new states of West Africa, by a prominent British social anthropologist of the University of Sussex.

PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: WITH ILLUSTRATIONS FROM KENYA. By Jacob Oser. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967, 242 p. $7.50.

Professor Oser combines an interesting discussion of the theoretical issues of economic growth with a critical account of development policies in Kenya.

FREEDOM AND UNITY. UHURU NA UMOJA. By Julius K. Nyerere. New York: Oxford University Press, 1967, 366 p. $7.20.

This collection, including selections dating back to as long ago as 1952, reveals the many facets of Tanzania's President—the fighting nationalist, the crusader for racial justice and equality, the complicated intellectual and the gentle democrat. The stimulating introductory essay states Nyerere's social philosophy.

INDUSTRIALISATION AU CONGO: LA TRANSFORMATION DES STRUCTURES ÉCONOMIQUES. By Jean Louis Lacroix. Paris: Mouton, 1967, 358 p. Fr. 42.

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An economist at the Institut de Recherches Économiques et Sociales of the University of Lovanium at Kinshasa attempts to examine Congolese development in the light of contemporary theories of economic growth. The incapacity of the indigenous political structure to make the key decisions in the foreign-dominated economy is seen as a major barrier to rational economic planning.

L'INTERVENTION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO, 1960–1964. By Paul-Henry Gendebien. Paris: Mouton, 1967, 292 p. Fr. 37.

In assessing the work of the United Nations in the Congo this legal scholar and economist at the University of Lovanium concludes that despite its many difficulties, the U.N. intervention did maintain the territorial integrity of the Congo and probably prevented an even more protracted period of violence and chaos.

AFRIKANER AND AFRICAN NATIONALISM: SOUTH AFRICAN PARALLELS AND PARAMETERS. By Edwin S. Munger. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1967, 142 p. $4.00.

A first-rate analysis of competing nationalisms by perhaps the most perceptive student of South African society, now a professor at the California Institute of Technology. He sees Afrikaans nationalism approaching its "maturity," while African nationalism is still largely an élite movement. Despite the proliferation of nationalisms induced by the Bantustan policy, he notes a gradually increasing responsiveness to African demands.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTH AFRICA. By Ralph Horwitz. New York: Praeger, 1967, 522 p. $10.00.

In a detailed, well-documented analysis, a former Lecturer of Business Administration at Cape Town University interprets the economic development of South Africa from the Boer Trek to the present as the product of South African responses to two influences—the forces of international and domestic markets, and the determination of Afrikanerdom to maintain a racially stratified society, whatever the cost.

SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSKEI: THE POLITICS OF DOMESTIC COLONIALISM. By Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas Karis and Newell M. Stultz. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967, 200 p. $6.50.

Three leading academic experts have collaborated on an excellent analysis of South African "domestic colonialism" in the Transkei. While the authors welcome the new opportunities for legitimate African participation in politics, they nevertheless doubt South Africa's often-stated determination to make this first "Bantustan" a viable entity.

HOUSE OF BONDAGE. By Ernest Cole with Thomas Flaherty. New York: Random House, 1967, 187 p. $10.00.

A beautifully executed volume of pictures and text about African life in South Africa. The work of a self-taught African photographer who left South Africa in 1966, this volume communicates more about that country than any other single book. Includes an excellent text written with the assistance of an associate editor of *Life*, Thomas Flaherty, and an introductory essay by Joseph Lelyveld, former *New York Times* correspondent in southern Africa.

THE JAIL DIARY OF ALBIE SACHS. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967, 285 p. $4.95.

Yet another moving account from South Africa of intimidation, imprisonment and brutality. While the identity of the victim always changes—here it is a young lawyer who participated in the Passive Resistance Campaign—the injustices involved are ever the same.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402. *Great Britain:* British Information Services, Sales Section, 845 3rd Ave., New York 10022. *United Nations, International Court of Justice:* United Nations, Sales Section, New York 10017. *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Org., Food and Agric. Org.:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 10027. *Int. Labor Office:* 917 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005 *European Coal and Steel Community, Economic Community, Euratom:* 808 Farragut Bldg., Washington, D.C. 20006. *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development:* 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office, and Congressional documents, unless otherwise noted, are for the 90th Congress, 1st Sess. London imprints are Her Majesty's Stationery Office, and New York imprints are United Nations, unless otherwise noted.

Africa

Experiences with agricultural development in tropical Africa, by J. C. de Wilde and others. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press (for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), 1967. 2 v.

A Nova Africa (Ensaio sociopolítico), by L. F. de Oliveira e Sastro. Lisbon, Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1967. 217 p.

Em Angola (16 de Maio a 2 de Junho de 1967), by J. M. Da Silva Cunha. Lisbon, Agência-Geral do Ultramar, 1967. 39 p.

Malawi: land of promise, by F. E. Read. Blantyre, Malawi Government Information Department, n.d. 124 p.

Agriculture

Agriculture and industrialization. Rome, FAO, 1967. 129 p. (Freedom From Hunger Campaign Basic Studies Series, 17.) $1.50.

Armaments

Arms sales to Near East and South Asian countries. Hearings, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, Mar. 14–Je. 22, 1967. Washington, 1967. 102 p.

Asia and Pacific Ocean

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

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

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

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

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

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